Arbitration Act| "Court" in Section 29A is Court as defined in Section 2(1)(e) Even If Arbitral Tribunal Was Appointed By High Court: Supreme Court

The Court further held that Section 42 of the Act, relating to exclusive jurisdiction of the Court where the first application is made, does not apply to applications under Section 11 and therefore cannot be invoked to confer jurisdiction on the High Court for purposes of Section 29A.

The Court was hearing civil appeals arising out of orders of the Bombay High Court, which had held that applications under Section 29A(4) would lie before the High Court where the arbitrator had been appointed by the High Court under Section 11(6).

A Bench of Justice Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha and Justice R. Mahadevan, while allowing the appeals, observed: “The ‘Court’ under Section 29A shall be the Civil Court of ordinary original jurisdiction in a district and includes the High Court in exercise of its original civil jurisdiction under Section 2(1)(e), and shall not be the High Court or the Supreme Court under Section 11(6) of the Act. Equally, Section 42 of the Act relating to jurisdiction for application will not apply to Section 11 of the Act.”

The Bench further held that “the conclusion on the ground that there will be hierarchical difficulties, conflict of power or jurisdictional anomaly if a Civil Court entertains an application under Section 29A for extension of time of an arbitral tribunal if the High Court under Section 11(6) of the Act has appointed the arbitrator(s) is untenable.”

Background

The dispute arose out of a Memorandum of Family Settlement executed between members of the family. Arbitration was invoked in terms of the settlement agreement.

An application under Section 29A for extension of time to make the arbitral award was filed before the Commercial Court. During the pendency of the arbitration, an application under Section 11 was also filed before the High Court for the appointment of an arbitrator due to the resignation of the presiding arbitrator.

The High Court allowed the Section 11 application and appointed an arbitrator. Thereafter, the Commercial Court extended the time for making the arbitral award under Section 29A.

This extension order was challenged before the High Court by way of a writ petition on the ground that, since the arbitrator had been appointed by the High Court under Section 11, only the High Court had jurisdiction to entertain an application under Section 29A.

The Single Judge referred the matter to a Division Bench due to conflicting High Court precedents. The Division Bench held that Section 29A applications would lie before the High Court where the arbitrator had been appointed under Section 11.

Following this, the Single Judge set aside the Commercial Court’s extension order and directed the parties to approach the High Court for extension of time.

Aggrieved, the appellant approached the Supreme Court.

Court’s Observation

The Supreme Court framed the central issue as whether, when an arbitral tribunal does not complete proceedings within the stipulated or extended period, an application under Section 29A must be filed before the High Court or before the Civil Court of original jurisdiction.

The Court analysed the divergent streams of High Court judgments, noting that some courts had held that Section 29A applications lie before the Civil Court as defined in Section 2(1)(e), while others had taken a contextual approach to hold that such applications must lie before the High Court if the arbitrator was appointed under Section 11.

The Court examined the statutory scheme of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, particularly the distinction between the limited jurisdiction exercised by Constitutional Courts under Section 11 and the curial supervision exercised by Courts under Chapters V and VI of the Act.

The Bench held that the power exercised under Section 11 is confined to the appointment of arbitrators and stands exhausted upon such appointment, rendering the appointing Court functus officio for purposes of the conduct of arbitration proceedings.

“There is no residual supervisory or controlling power left with the High Court or the Supreme Court over the arbitral proceedings after appointment is made. To read Section 11 as conferring such enduring control would be to conflate appointment with supervision, a conflation which the Act as well as the precedents on the subject prohibit”, the Bench elaborated.

The Court rejected the premise that appointment by a High Court creates any residual supervisory or controlling jurisdiction over the arbitral proceedings, stating that “interpretation based on a perception of status or hierarchy of Courts is opposed to the fundamental conception of rule of law”.

Relying on Associated Contractors, Nimet Resources, and other precedents, the Court reiterated that where the legislature has exhaustively defined the term ‘Court’, that definition must be applied unless there is express contextual inconsistency, which was absent in Section 29A.

The Bench also rejected the applicability of Section 42 to Section 11 proceedings and held that Section 42 cannot be used to confer jurisdiction on the High Court for Section 29A applications merely because the arbitrator was appointed under Section 11.

The Court held that extension of mandate and substitution under Section 29A are not in the nature of appointment under Section 11 and therefore cannot be brought within the jurisdiction of the High Court exercising Section 11 powers.

The Court held that Section 29A falls under the chapter dealing with conduct of arbitral proceedings and making of awards, and that extension of time and substitution of arbitrators under Section 29A are matters of curial supervision to be exercised by the ‘Court’ as defined in Section 2(1)(e).

“The extension of mandate or substitution of an arbitrator under Section 29A does not partake the character of “appointment” under Section 11, but is a measure designed to ensure the timely conclusion of the arbitration. Absence of any contextual indicia to the contrary, the expression “Court” in Section 29A must, therefore, be accorded the meaning assigned to it under Section 2(1)(e)”, the Court remarked.

The Court concluded that applications under Section 29A(4) and related powers under Section 29A(6) must be exercised only by the Court as defined in Section 2(1)(e).

Conclusion

The Supreme Court allowed the appeals and set aside the judgment of the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court at Goa and the consequential order of the Single Judge.

The Court restored the order of the Commercial Court extending time under Section 29A.

The Court held that the parties are at liberty to move the Commercial Court for further extension under Section 29A(5), and directed that the Commercial Court shall consider such application and pass appropriate orders in accordance with law.

Cause Title: Jagdeep Chowgule v. Sheela Chowgule & Ors. (Neutral Citation: 2026 INSC 92)

Appearances

Appellant: Advocates Abhay Anil Anturkar, Dhruv Tank, Sarthak Mehrotra, Bhagwant Deshpande, Surbhi Kapoor, AOR and Others

Respondents: Advocates Amit Pai, Omkar Jayant Deshpande, AOR, Ashok Paulo Poul, Shaneen Parikh, Sanskriti Sidana, Rahul Mantri, Adv.

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