Separate Sentences U/S 25 & 29 NDPS Act Permissible As They Constitute Independent Offences: Supreme Court

The Court was hearing a criminal appeal challenging the judgment of the Himachal Pradesh High Court, wherein the appellant’s conviction under Sections 20(b)(ii)(C), 25 and 29 of the NDPS Act was upheld, with modification of sentence.

A Bench comprising Justice Prashant Kumar Mishra and Justice N.V. Anjaria observed: “When the offence under Section 25 is entirely possible to be committed separately as an independent offence to remain distinct in itself, and when the offences of abetment and criminal conspiracy mentioned in Section 29 are in themselves independent offences, it is entirely logical to deduce and conclude that commission of these offences once established, would attract separate punishment and sentence.”

Advocate Ajay Marwah appeared for the appellant, while Advocate Bimlesh Kumar Singh appeared for the respondent.

Background

The case arose from a prosecution initiated under the NDPS Act following the recovery of 4 kg and 100 grams of charas from a vehicle during a police naka checking operation. The appellant was found seated in the front seat of the vehicle along with the co-accused, who was the registered owner of the car.

Upon search, contraband was recovered from beneath the front seat occupied by the appellant. After following due procedure, both the accused were arrested and charge-sheeted for offences under Sections 20(b)(ii)(C), 25 and 29 of the NDPS Act.

The trial court convicted both accused and imposed separate sentences of 12 years rigorous imprisonment along with a fine for each of the offences under Section 20 and Sections 25 read with Section 29, directing the sentences to run concurrently.

On appeal, the High Court partly allowed the appeal by reducing the sentence to 10 years' rigorous imprisonment, while maintaining separate convictions and fines.

Before the Supreme Court, the appellant confined his challenge primarily to the legality of the imposition of separate sentences and fines under Sections 20, 25 and 29, contending that these offences arose from a single transaction and did not warrant separate punishment.

Court’s Observation

The Apex Court undertook a detailed analysis of the scheme of Chapter IV of the NDPS Act, which deals with offences and penalties. It noted that Sections 15 to 24 prescribe specific punishments for different categories of contraventions, depending upon the nature and quantity of the contraband.

It observed that while Section 20 expressly provides punishment for contravention relating to cannabis, Sections 25 and 29 adopt a different legislative technique by prescribing punishment “for that offence”, thereby referring to the punishment applicable to the principal offence.

Rejecting the contention that Sections 25 and 29 do not contemplate separate punishment, the Court held that both provisions create distinct offences. It was observed that allowing premises or conveyance to be used for the commission of an offence under Section 25 constitutes an independent offence, separate from the principal offence itself.

Similarly, the Court noted that abetment and criminal conspiracy under Section 29 are themselves independent offences, drawing support from settled principles under the IPC that conspiracy is a substantive offence capable of independent punishment.

The Court, therefore, held that “it would not be right to say that when Section 25 and Section 29 mention the punishment… ‘punishment for that offence’, it would mean that the imposition of separate punishment is not contemplated.”

In this context, the Court explained that the phrase “punishment for that offence” is an instance of legislation by reference, whereby the punishment prescribed for the principal offence under Section 20 is incorporated into Sections 25 and 29, stating that “the legislature has referred to the punishment mentioned in the particular section to be referred to and applied for the purpose of punishment and sentence to be imposed under another section.”

The Court elaborated that such legislative drafting ensures that while the offences remain distinct, the punishment structure remains aligned with the gravity of the principal offence.

At the same time, the Court clarified that in many cases, offences under Sections 25 and 29 may arise out of the same transaction and may be interdependent or derivative in nature, explaining that “though separately punishable, the offences under Sections 25 and 29 could be parasitic and derivative.”

In such circumstances, while separate punishment is legally permissible, the Court held that it would be appropriate to direct the sentences to run concurrently to avoid double punishment. It emphasised that the principle of concurrent sentencing serves to prevent double jeopardy when multiple offences arise from the same set of facts.

On the issue of the applicability of Section 25 to the appellant, the Court rejected the argument that he could not be held liable as he was not the owner of the vehicle. It held that the term “occupier” under Section 25 is wide enough to include a person in control or use of the conveyance, and that the appellant, being in occupation of the vehicle, could be held liable.

The Court also addressed the issue of a fine and held that the fine forms part of the sentence under Section 53 IPC. It clarified that although default imprisonment for non-payment of fine is a penalty, the fine itself constitutes punishment.

In this regard, the Court held that where sentences are directed to run concurrently, the fine imposed as part of the sentence cannot be treated cumulatively to require payment of a double fine.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court upheld the imposition of separate sentences under Sections 20, 25 and 29 of the NDPS Act, holding that these provisions create independent offences attracting separate punishment.

However, the Court clarified that in cases arising from the same transaction, sentences ought to run concurrently to avoid double punishment. It further held that the appellant cannot be required to pay double fine where sentences are concurrent.

Taking note of the fact that the appellant had already undergone more than 11 years of imprisonment, including default imprisonment, the Court directed that he be released forthwith, if not required in any other case.

The appeal was disposed of in these terms.

Cause Title: Hem Raj v. State of Himachal Pradesh (Neutral Citation: 2026 INSC 332)

Appearances

Petitioner: Ajay Marwah, AOR; Advocates Swaroop Anand Mishra, Mrigank Bhardwaj, Dhriti Sharma, Rahul Kumar, Ravideep Badyal, Rohan Mazumdar, Sanjay Shukla

Respondent: Advocates D.K. Thakur, Rajeev Kumar Gupta, Tavleen Singh, Vallabhi Shukla, Jogindar Mann, Kiran Verma, Bhagyashree Bhardwaj; AOR Bimlesh Kumar Singh; Advocate Neeraj Agarwal

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