Six Conditions For Granting Mandatory Injunction Under Specific Relief Act: Supreme Court Explains

The Supreme Court was deciding a batch of Civil Appeals filed by the Estate Officer, Haryana Urban Development Authority and others, challenging the Judgment of the Punjab and Haryana High Court.

Update: 2025-07-18 07:45 GMT

Justice J.B. Pardiwala, Justice R. Mahadevan, Supreme Court

The Supreme Court explained certain conditions for granting a mandatory injunction under the Specific Relief Act, 1963 (SRA).

The Court was deciding a batch of Civil Appeals filed by the Estate Officer, Haryana Urban Development Authority and others, challenging the Judgment of the Punjab and Haryana High Court, which affirmed the First Appellate Court’s Judgment.

The two-Judge Bench comprising Justice J.B. Pardiwala and Justice R. Mahadevan summarized the following conditions –

i) Obligation: There must be a clear obligation on the part of the defendant.

ii) Breach: A breach of that obligation must have occurred or be reasonably apprehended.

iii) Necessity: It must be necessary to compel the performance of specific acts to prevent or rectify the breach.

iv) Enforceability: The court must be able to enforce the performance of those acts.

v) Balance of Convenience: The balance of convenience must be in favour of the party seeking the injunction.

vi) Irreparable Injury: The injury or damage caused by the breach must be irreparable or not adequately compensable in monetary terms.

ASG Aishwarya Bhati appeared on behalf of the Appellants while Senior Advocate Surender Singh Hooda, Advocates Rajiv Raheja, and Siddharth Mittal appeared on behalf of the Respondents.

Brief Facts

Suits were instituted with almost stereotyped plaints. The Plaintiffs failed to deposit 10% of the earnest money along with an appropriate application addressed to the authority concerned in accordance with the Policy of 1992. In the absence of any application with deposit of 10% earnest money, the benefits of the 1992 Policy could not have been extended. Such was the stance of the Appellant as Defendants before the Trial Court. On the other hand, the case of the Plaintiffs before the Trial Court was that it was not mandatory to deposit 10% of the earnest money. The suits were instituted almost after a period of 15 years from the date of 1992 Policy.

The High Court took the view that entire controversy could be said to be covered by the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Brij Mohan and Others v. Haryana Urban Development Authority & Anr. (2011) and the Full Bench decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case of Jarnail Singh & Ors. v. State of Punjab (2010). Saying so, the High Court though fit to dismiss all the Second Appeals thereby affirming the original decree passed by the Trial Court in favour of the Plaintiffs (oustees) & some cases the Judgment and Order passed by the First Appellate Court allowing the Appeals filed by the original Plaintiffs. Hence, the Appellants approached the Apex Court.

Court’s Observations

The Supreme Court in view of the above facts, observed, “Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and having gone through the materials on record the only question that falls for our consideration is whether the respondents herein are entitled to claim plots as oustees at the rate prescribed by the 1992 policy or at the rate prescribed by the revised policy of 2016?”

The Court elucidated that mandatory injunction by its nature embodied under Section 39 of the SRA is discretionary and the granting of mandatory injunction is a matter of judicial discretion of the Court which can be granted only in a case which falls strictly within the four corners of the provision - Section 39 of SRA.

“The two elements which govern Section 39 of the Act 1963 for the grant of mandatory injunction are (i) the necessity to prevent breach of an obligation by the intervention of the court and (ii) that such acts should be of that nature capable of enforcement by the court. Yet another ingredient is also available which is crucial in the matter of grant of mandatory injunction that it should be ‘amenable for exercise of judicial discretion’, it further noted.

The Court said that a relief which is not amenable for exercising judicial discretion of the Court cannot be granted by way of a mandatory injunction and it should satisfy not only breach of an obligation and the necessity of its prevention, but also the availability of judicial discretion to be exercised.

“A mere breach of an obligation or necessity to prevent the same alone cannot be brought under the purview of mandatory injunction unless the same is amenable for exercising discretion by the Court”, it also added.

Conclusion

The Court, therefore, concluded the following points along with directions –

(i) The Respondents are not entitled to claim as a matter of legal right relying on the decision of Brij Mohan that they should be allotted plots as oustees only at the price as determined in the 1992 policy.

(ii) The Respondents are entitled at the most to seek the benefit of the 2016 policy for the purpose of allotment of plots as oustees.

(iii) The Court granted four weeks’ time to all the Respondents to prefer an appropriate online application with deposit of the requisite amount in accordance with the policy of 2016.

(iv) It clarified that there shall not be any further extension of time for the purpose of applying online with deposit of the requisite amount.

(v) Some of the Respondents may be very rustic and illiterate and may not be in a position to apply online, in such circumstances, the Court permitted them to apply by preferring an appropriate application or otherwise addressed to the competent authority with deposit of the requisite amount.

(vi) It further clarified that the entire exercise shall be completed within a period of eight weeks from the date of the receipt of the online application that may be filed by the Respondents.

(vii) The State of Haryana as well as HUDA shall ensure that land grabbers or any other miscreants may not form a cartel and try to take undue advantage of the allotment of plots. At the end it should not happen that unscrupulous elements ultimately derive any benefit or advantage from allotment of land to the oustees. In this regard the State and HUDA will have to remain very vigilant.

(viii) Since the allotment of plot is with a laudable object and not for any monetary gain, a condition should be imposed at the time of allotment that the allotee shall not be entitled to transfer the plot to any third party without the permission of the competent authority and in any case not within five years from the date of the allotment.

(ix) This litigation is an eye opener for all States in this country. If land is required for any public purpose law permits the Government or any instrumentality of Government to acquire in accordance with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act or any other State Act enacted for the purpose of acquisition. When land is acquired for any public purpose the person whose land is taken away is entitled to appropriate compensation in accordance with the settled principles of law. It is only in the rarest of the rare case that the Government may consider floating any scheme for rehabilitation of the displaced persons over and above paying them compensation in terms of money. At times the State Government with a view to appease its subjects float unnecessary schemes and ultimately land up in difficulties. It would unnecessarily give rise to number of litigations. The classic example is the one at hand. What we would like to convey is that it is not necessary that in all cases over and above compensation in terms of money, rehabilitation of the property owners is a must. Any beneficial measures taken by the Government should be guided only by humanitarian considerations of fairness and equity towards the landowners.

(x) Ordinarily, rehabilitation should only be meant for those persons who have been rendered destitute because of loss of residence or livelihood as a consequence of land acquisition. In other words, for people whose lives and livelihood are intrinsically connected to the land.

(xi) In cases of land acquisition, the plea of deprivation of right to livelihood under Article 21 of the Constitution is unsustainable.

Accordingly, the Apex Court disposed of the Appeals and directed the Registry to circulate the copy of the Judgment to all the High Courts.

Cause Title- Estate Officer, Haryana Urban Development Authority and Ors. v. Nirmala Devi (Neutral Citation: 2025 INSC 843)

Appearance:

Appellants: ASG Aishwarya Bhati, AAG B.K. Satija, AORs Samar Vijay Singh, Vishwa Pal Singh, Sanjay Kumar Visen, Advocates Poonima Singh, Sabarni Som, Aman Dev Sharma, Fateh Singh, Amit Ojha, and Prashant Sharma.

Respondents: Senior Advocate Surender Singh Hooda, AORs Rajiv Raheja, and Siddharth Mittal.

Click here to read/download the Judgment

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