Supreme Court: Employees Acquiring Disabilities During Service Must Not Be Abandoned Or Prematurely Retired Even In Absence Of Contractual Rights

The Supreme Court has reaffirmed that even in the absence of contractual rights, employees who acquire disabilities during service must not be abandoned or prematurely retired without being afforded a fair and reasonable opportunity for reassignment.

A Civil Appeal was preferred against the Judgment of the Telangana High Court, which allowed the Writ Appeal of the Telangana State Road Transport Corporation (TSRTC).

The two-Judge Bench of Justice J.K. Maheshwari and Justice Aravind Kumar observed, “Thus, even though in the present case the Appellant had an enforceable right under a statutory industrial settlement—placing his claim on firmer footing—we find it necessary to reaffirm that even in the absence of such contractual rights, employees who acquire disabilities during service must not be abandoned or prematurely retired without being afforded a fair and reasonable opportunity for reassignment. The obligation to reasonably accommodate such employees is not just a matter of administrative grace, but a constitutional and statutory imperative, rooted in the principles of non-discrimination, dignity, and equal treatment.”

The Bench added that beneficial and remedial legislation must not be diluted by narrow interpretation, and the protections offered therein must be extended purposively to protect the livelihood, dignity and service continuity of employees who acquire disabilities during employment.

Senior Advocate C. Mohan Rao appeared for the Appellant while Senior Advocate Satyam Reddy Sarasani appeared for the Respondents.

Factual Background

The Appellant was selected and appointed as a ‘driver’ in the Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation (APSRTC) i.e., the predecessor-in-title of the Respondent Corporation in 2014, after fulfilling the eligibility criteria fixed for the post. On a periodical medical examination conducted by the medical officer of the dispensary belonging to the Respondent, it was found that the Appellant was ‘colour blind’ and was declared unfit to hold the post of driver. The Appellant filed an Appeal, challenging the observation regarding his fitness and also sought for alternate employment in the event he was declared medically unfit. The Appellate Authority dismissed his Appeal upon which he made a representation to the Medical Board to consider his case by the hospital belonging to the corporation. The Board reiterated the findings of the medical officer and the Appellate Authority. The Appellant’s representation seeking alternate employment was rejected on the ground that extant rules do not provide for granting alternate employment to colour bind drivers.

Hence, the Respondent retired him and directed him to avail the additional monetary benefits provided under the policy governing the same. The Appellant approached the High Court via Writ Petition contending that his disability falls under the category of disablement under the provisions of the Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995 and that he cannot be discriminated. He also relied on a Memorandum of Settlement (MOS) entered between the Respondent and recognized union which had a provision namely Clause 14 stating that drivers would be provided with an alternate employment. The Single Judge allowed his Petition against which the Respondent filed an Appeal. The Division Bench set aside the Single Judge’s Order and directed the Appellant to make a representation to the Respondent seeking the benefit as prescribed under the regulations and the scheme governing the corporation. Being aggrieved, the Appellant approached the Apex Court.

Reasoning

The Supreme Court in view of the facts and circumstances of the case, said, “Retirement on medical grounds must be a measure of last resort, only after the employer exhausts all reasonable avenues for redeployment. This principle is inherent in the concept of “reasonable accommodation”, which is now recognised as an aspect of substantive equality under Articles 14 and 21. The failure to explore alternate employment before resorting to medical retirement is not merely a procedural lapse—it is a substantive illegality that violates the Appellant’s right to livelihood and equal treatment.”

The Court noted that the burden lies on the Corporation not the employee to establish that no suitable alternate post was available or could reasonably be created and mere invocation of a medical certificate, or the silence of a circular, cannot constitute compliance.

“Inaction is not neutrality; in such cases, it is a form of institutional exclusion. … In the present case, there is no evidence that the Respondents examined even the most basic parameters—availability of vacancies, suitability of tasks, or the Appellant’s qualifications. This total failure undermines the Corporation’s claim of compliance with either the 1979 or 1986 framework, and renders the retirement order void for non-consideration of Appellant’s claim in proper perspective”, it further observed.

The Court remarked that when a disability is acquired in the course of service, the legal framework must respond not with exclusion but with adjustment and the duty of a public employer is not merely to discharge functionaries, but to preserve human potential where it continues to exist.

“The law does not permit the severance of service by the stroke of a medical certificate without first exhausting the possibility of meaningful redeployment. Such obligation is not rooted in compassion, but in constitutional discipline and statutory expectation … In light of this evolving doctrine, the Court in Mohamed Ibrahim clarified that employees with conditions like colour blindness, although not falling within the defined categories of the statute, must still be accommodated wherever their functional capacity permits. To do otherwise would result in a regressive interpretation of the law, undermining the very foundation of equal opportunity in public employment”, it added.

The Court also clarified that it is not only vindicating the Appellant’s rights but also reaffirming its Constitutional commitment to a just and humane employer-employee relationship.

Conclusion

The Court noted that the Appellant was prematurely retired from service on medical grounds without any meaningful effort by the Respondent–Corporation to explore his suitability for alternate employment and this action, taken in disregard of Clause 14 of the binding MOS, and without adherence to principles of fairness or accommodation, cannot be sustained in law.

“The Corporation’s omission to consider redeployment violates both statutory and constitutional obligations. Settled jurisprudence, including Kunal Singh (supra), which mandates that an employee who acquires a disability during service must be protected through reassignment where possible. The duty to reasonably accommodate such employees is now part of our constitutional fabric, rooted in Articles 14 and 21”, it emphasised.

Moreover, the Court said that while judicial restraint guards against overreach, it must not become an excuse for disengagement from injustice and when an employee is removed from service for a condition he did not choose, and where viable alternatives are ignored, the Court is not crossing a line by intervening, it is upholding one drawn by the Constitution itself.

“The employer’s discretion ends where the employee’s dignity begins”, it concluded.

Accordingly, the Apex Court allowed the Appeal, set aside the impugned Judgment, and directed the Respondent to appoint the Appellant to a suitable post, consistent with his condition and on the same pay grade as he held, within 8 weeks, and held that the Appellant shall be entitled to 25% of the arrears of salary, allowances, and benefits from the date of his termination to the date of reinstatement.

Cause Title- Ch. Joseph v. The Telangana State Road Transport Corporation & Others (Neutral Citation: 2025 INSC 920)

Appearance:

Appellant: Senior Advocate C. Mohan Rao, AOR Dharmendra Kumar Sinha, Advocates R. Santhana Krishnan, and Lokesh Kumar Sharma.

Respondents: Senior Advocate Satyam Reddy Sarasani, AOR Shishir Pinaki, and Advocate Sri Ruma Sarasani.

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