Give It A Thought As An Officer Of Court: Supreme Court Asks ASG If Union May Rethink Sonam Wangchuk's Detention Order

The Court was hearing the plea of Dr Gitanjali Angmo, challenging the detention of her husband and Ladakh social activist Sonam Wangchuk, who was detained under the National Security Act, 1980, after the recent Ladakh protests turned violent. The Court had issued notice in the matter on October 6, 2025.

The Bench of Justice Aravind Kumar and Justice Prasanna B. Varale asked Additional Solicitor General KM Nataraj, "Apart from submissions, counter submissions, and all law points...as an officer of the Court, give it a thought as the officer of the Court. The detention order was passed on 26.09.2025, nearly five months and concerning more particularly his health and condition of the detenue, which is certainly not very good. Even the report which we saw on the earlier occasion, it shows that his health is not that good, and there are certain, age-related (issues). Is there any possibility for the Government to rethink or even to relook?"

Senior Advocate Kapil Sibal appeared on behalf of the wife of Sonam Wangchuk, while Solicitor General Tushar Mehta and Additional Solicitor General KM Nataraj appeared for the Respondents.

During the hearing today, Nataraj outlined five key headings for the Court's consideration. He first argued that the subsequent orders related to the detention had not been challenged by the petitioner. He explained the statutory timeline of the National Security Act (NSA), noting that an initial detention order passed by an officer remained in force for only 15 days unless approved by the State Government and subsequently by an Advisory Board.

Justice Kumar pointed out that while the detention order was issued on September 26, the State Government's approval followed on October 4, 2025. Nataraj contended that the Wangchuk could not ignore these subsequent statutory orders, specifically the confirmation order, even though the original detention order had been challenged.

ASG Nataraj further argued that the object of the National Security Act was purely preventive rather than penal. He stated that the law was designed to cater to specific needs, such as preventing actions prejudicial to the security of India or the maintenance of public order. He asserted that the Court could not analyze the "sufficiency" of the grounds for detention, as the law granted the concerned authority wide discretion to exercise power based on the "need of the hour." He further relied on Section 5A of the NSA, arguing that even if one ground for detention was found to be invalid, the order could still be sustained on the remaining independent grounds.

He contended that the detenue owed a primary responsibility to the Court rather than the country. He questioned the basis of the petitioner’s claim that the detention order was a "copy-paste" job.

Nataraj argued that each individual action or activity could be classified as an independent ground for detention. He submitted that under Section 5A of the National Security Act, the non-supply of materials related to a specific ground would not vitiate the entire detention order. He maintained that the law only mandated the supply of "relied-upon" documents, not those that were merely "referred to."

Previously, Solicitor General Tushar Mehta concluded his arguments by reading excerpts from Sonam Wangchuk’s speech, where Wangchuk had noted that it was unacceptable for Ladakhis to be unable to choose their own representatives while areas like Tibet and China held autonomous rights. Mehta argued that such comparisons were particularly dangerous, coming from a border region. He utilized a "sandwich" metaphor to describe Wangchuk’s rhetoric, asserting that while the "bread" on both sides consisted of references to Mahatma Gandhi, the actual content in between served to instigate the public in a sensitive area bordering Pakistan and China.

He explained that the detention was a preventive measure designed to stop the repetition of such statements, striking at the very core purpose of the National Security Act (NSA). He emphasized that the speeches demonstrated a threat to the security of India, public order, and the potential disruption of essential supplies, all of which had to be understood within the context of region-specific sensitivities.

Mehta further submitted that the approval order for the detention remained unchallenged. He walked the Court through the various layers of screening required by the legislature, highlighting the inbuilt checks and balances of the NSA. He asserted that these procedural safeguards, particularly those under Section 8, were scrupulously adhered to, ensuring the detainee received fair treatment. While acknowledging the gravity of the power, he argued that the statutory authority was entitled to certain leeway under the scheme of the Act.

Addressing the Bench’s concern that the detention order appeared to be a "cut-copy-paste" of police recommendations, Mehta revisited the "borrowed information" argument. He contended that a detaining authority frequently received information from various sources and was not required to paraphrase every detail. He argued that as long as the authority read the materials and reached a state of independent satisfaction, the order remained legally valid.

On February 2, 2026, Mehta argued that the Court should not act as an appellate body over the subjective satisfaction of the District Magistrate (DM) regarding the necessity of detention. He emphasized that the DM had identified speeches that were likely to result in activities prejudicial to the maintenance of public order.

Mehta stated that the service of the detention order was conducted with meticulous detail over a four-hour period, during which the DIG of Ladakh sat with the detainee and showed him every page, including video clips, while the entire process was videographed. He expressed readiness to produce this video evidence before the Court if required.

Mehta further explained that the grounds for detention must be examined through two lenses: the documents that were specifically referred to and those that were relied upon. He noted that according to Supreme Court precedents, these grounds and materials must be read conjointly. Addressing the scope of judicial review, he contended that the Court’s role was governed by set parameters and should not involve an inquiry into the correctness of the detention itself, but rather a review of the fairness of the procedure. He characterized the detainee's references to Mahatma Gandhi as a "cover" for inflammatory speeches that were intended to affect the public at large.

During an exchange with the Bench, Justice Kumar questioned whether the detaining authority could arrive at satisfaction based on "borrowed" or "forwarded" material. Mehta strongly denied that the materials were borrowed, arguing that while a DM cannot personally witness every incident, they must rely on materials placed before them. He maintained that just because an authority brought the material to the DM did not mean the DM’s satisfaction was not independent. He asserted that the DM had independently examined the holistic impact of the materials, even in a sensitive border region, to determine if the actions taken were necessary.

Finally, the Solicitor General detailed the "inbuilt security mechanism" within the National Security Act (NSA), noting that a DM's order must be confirmed and allows for a detailed representation presided over by a former High Court judge. He pointed out that the petitioner had chosen not to challenge the state government's order or the findings of the Advisory Board. Regarding the allegation that four videos were not supplied to the detainee, Mehta dismissed this as factually incorrect and a mere "afterthought," stating that these materials had already been examined by the Advisory Board.

"It is the District Magistrate who is the judge of the situation because he may be in several situations which we may not be knowing", Mehta submitted.

Solicitor General Mehta submitted that preventive detention was devised to afford protection to society rather than to punish an individual. He argued that the object was not to punish a man for having done something, but to intercept Wangchuk before he acted and to prevent him from doing so. He stated that the justification for such detention was based on suspicion or reasonable probability, and not on a criminal conviction, which would require legal evidence.

Mehta pointed out that there was no challenge to the order passed by the Advisory Board. He contended that the speeches in question strategically combined inflammatory remarks with calls for non-violence and references to Mahatma Gandhi. He urged the Court to examine the speeches carefully, noting that the District Magistrate (DM) was dealing with a border state where the threshold of tolerance might differ.

Solicitor General argued that the references to Gandhi were merely a "facade" to mask instigation against the people. He noted that the speeches made by Wangchuk attempted to create a divide by positioning security forces as "A" and the protesters as "B." He cited the detainee's references to political unrest in neighboring countries as clear instigation, specifically suggesting that Wangchuk hoped to make Nepal an example for "Gen-Z" and "Gen-Alpha." Mehta concluded that what Mahatma Gandhi did was against imperialism and not against his own people, contrasting it with Wangchuk's alleged actions.

Previously, Senior Advocate Kapil Sibal argued that the video of the speech on September 24, which openly appealed for peace, was not placed before the detaining authority. He contended that this omission prevented the authority from applying its mind to the full context of the events. He noted that despite the video’s availability, it remained unconsidered. Sibal cited Supreme Court precedents which held that the non-consideration of vital materials vitiates the satisfaction of the detaining authority and renders a detention order illegal. He further relied on a case regarding the construction of Article 22(5), asserting that the service of a detention order was only complete when all supporting materials were submitted to the detainee.

Sibal submitted that the deliberate non-placement of vital material vitiated the entire decision-making process. He pointed out that the detaining authority mechanically reproduced the recommendation made by the Senior Superintendent of Police (SSP), noting that the first page was verbatim. Sibal stated that the detainee, who was not well-versed in the law, did not initially realize the extent of this reproduction. He informed the Court that he showed the first page to demonstrate it was identical and confirmed that the subsequent pages were also copy-pasted.

When Justice Kumar asked if these documents could be produced, Sibal explained that the authorities did not allow them to take any documents from custody. He argued that such "borrowed satisfaction" demonstrated a complete non-application of the mind.

Regarding the non-supply of grounds, Sibal highlighted that four specific videos were not supplied to the detainee. He emphasized that one of the most important videos was missing, despite these materials being the primary evidence relied upon by the detaining authority to conclude that a chain of events justified detention. He stressed that the video covering the period when the detainee was on a hunger strike was the most appropriate material for his defence. Sibal argued that this failure effectively curtailed the detainee's right to make an effective representation.

Sibal contended that the detention order was based on "stale" FIRs that lacked any approximate relation to the current grounds. He noted that out of five FIRs, three dated back to March 2024, whereas the detention order was issued in September 2025. He pointed out that these FIRs neither named the detainee nor contained specific allegations against him, but were directed at third persons. He concluded that the authorities relied on selective video evidence to mislead the detaining authority and arrive at a biased satisfaction.

Senior Advocate Sibal contended that the allegations concerning the detainee’s failure to assist the army arose from a language barrier or an intentional distortion of facts. He argued that since the facts were not clearly presented, the detaining authority merely engaged in a "copy-paste" exercise and mechanically signed the order. Regarding the alleged statements against a Hindu Goddess, Sibal clarified that the unedited version of the speech provided a complete picture. He explained that the statement was a political allegory meant to highlight that after the central government "liberated" Ladakh from Kashmir's administration, it failed to fulfill its promise of constitutional safeguards under the Sixth Schedule. He noted that the detainee had compared the government's actions to Lord Rama rescuing Sita from Ravana only to leave her in a vulnerable position.

When the Court questioned if there was a complete denial of making statements against Hindu deities, Sibal maintained that the remark was purely allegorical and focused on the political situation in Ladakh. He remarked that if such metaphorical statements became grounds for detention, free speech would effectively cease to exist. He further pointed out that the detainee’s wife was a practicing Hindu, suggesting there was no intent to offend the religion.

Sibal then drew a parallel between the march from Ladakh to Delhi and the peaceful protests held by Punjab farmers, asserting that the movement caused no disruption. He highlighted the contradiction in the state’s logic, noting that the detainee followed a Gandhian path and broke his hunger strike on September 24 specifically to oppose violence. He questioned how a man committed to non-violence on September 24 could suddenly be declared a threat to national security by September 26. Sibal concluded that the detainee neither participated in nor instigated violence, and argued that the authorities decided to detain him first and then manufactured the grounds for detention later.

Sibal submitted, "Ladakh is a pristine place where nature has to be preserved. A lot of investments of different kinds are coming in now. The same thing happened in Uttarakhand. We also have an Aravalli matter now. We must protest. There’s nothing wrong with that. If Ladakh is to remain pristine, we don’t want any kind of activity that destroys the environment."

Sibal then referred to a video of June 8, 2025.

Sibal said, "He says (Sonam) if the government does not have affection for its citizens, then such a government is an obstacle for the nation. There’s nothing more to it. There’s a question of law that has to be placed. Section 8A of the NSA. If each of the grounds is a separate ground of detention, then the detention order will still be held even if the other grounds are not relevant. Here we are dealing not with separate acts. Here we are dealing with consistent conduct."

Background

On the previous hearing, Sibal submitted that Wangchuk was never provided the complete grounds of detention, and he was never afforded a real, effective opportunity at the earliest to make his representation to the appropriate Government under the Act. He further submitted that it is a clear violation of Section 8 of the Act and Article 22 (5) of the Constitution.

He said the approximate causes that led to the detention order, which is on September 26, 2025, were four videos relied upon by the detaining authorities.

Sibal referred to the petition and the reply filed by the Union Government to the petition.

Sibal argued that although the authorities provided the grounds for detention and links to the relevant videos, the process was flawed. He noted that while a laptop was provided on October 5th, the flash drive delivered on the 29th was missing four of the critical videos.

Sibal submitted, "If the documents, as per the proposition of law, relied upon the grounds of detention are not supplied, the order is vitiated, which is upheld by this court in several judgments."

Sibal then dealt with another propositions i.e. the recommendations for detention were not given to Wangchuk.

Sibal argued that the detention of Wangchuk was based on a fundamental misinterpretation of his conduct and intent. Sibal highlighted that while the detention order aims to prevent prejudicial activities and maintain public order, Wangchuk's actual actions were aimed at achieving the exact opposite.

He pointed out that on the 15th day of his hunger strike, Wangchuk was deeply disturbed by erupting violence and delivered a speech specifically to call off his fast and appeal for peace.

Sibal drew a historical parallel to Mahatma Gandhi’s decision to halt the Non-Cooperation Movement after the Chauri Chaura incident, suggesting that Wangchuk’s leadership was a stabilizing force rather than a threat.

Sibal further contended that the authorities possessed video evidence of this peaceful appeal but chose to ignore it, as it directly contradicts the claim that Wangchuk’s liberty would lead to further unrest.

By including this footage in the petition, Sibal requested the court to view the evidence showing Wangchuk on the dais actively trying to stop the violence.

The Bench subsequently watched the video in court to assess whether the grounds for detention accurately reflected the activist's role in the events of September 2025.

"The tenor of the speech in any way is not threatening the security of the State. The tenor of this speech is not with the intent that he will continue such activities. The tenor of the speech is not to propagate violence but to quell it," Sibal submitted after the video was played in the Courtroom.

Sibal argued that this case involved a deliberate suppression of truth. He pointed out that a wave of state actions—including CBI investigations, Income Tax notices, and the cancellation of land leases for Wangchuk’s institutions—only surfaced in August and September 2025, coinciding with his hunger strike for the democratic rights of Ladakh.

Sibal explained that the core of the protest was a demand for a constitutional council for Ladakh, similar to those in North-Eastern states under the Sixth Schedule.

Sibal's argument focused on the events of September 24th. He asserted that although violence occurred that day, it was also the day Wangchuk publicly renounced his hunger strike to condemn the unrest. Sibal accused the officials of intentionally withholding the video of this peace appeal from the detaining authority.

By keeping the decision-maker "oblivious" to Wangchuk's anti-violence stance, Sibal argued that the authorities ensured the detention order was passed on a one-sided and misleading set of facts, thereby rendering the legal process fraudulent.

Wangchuk was detained under the stringent National Security Act (NSA) on September 26, two days after violent protests demanding statehood and Sixth Schedule status for Ladakh left four people dead and 90 injured in the Union territory. The government had accused him of inciting the violence.

He was detained two days after protests demanding Statehood and Sixth Schedule status for Ladakh, which left four people dead and 90 injured in the Union Territory (UT) of Ladakh. He is currently lodged in the Jodhpur Jail, Rajasthan. His wife, in her plea filed through Advocate Sarvam Ritam Khare, has challenged Wangchuk's detention, besides seeking his immediate release. The plea also questions the decision to invoke the NSA against Wangchuk. Angmo alleged that she had yet to get a copy of the detention order, which is in violation of the Rules.

The Centre had opposed the request made by climate activist Sonam Wangchuk to appear through video conferencing from Jodhpur jail in the case. The activist wanted to be connected via video from jail and sought permission from the bench.

The Supreme Court also took on record the amended plea. On October 15, the Apex Court deferred the hearing on the plea of Angmo after she sought to file an amended petition with additional grounds for challenging the detention of Wangchuk, currently lodged in Central jail at Jodhpur, Rajasthan.

Cause Title: Gitanjali J. Angmo vs Union of India [W.P.(Crl.) No. 399/2025]