Mere Breach Of Promise To Marry Doesn’t Constitute Rape Sans Material Indicating Initial Deception: Uttarakhand High Court

The High Court was considering an application filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure by the Applicant seeking quashing of the charge-sheet, the cognizance order and the entire proceedings emanating from a case registered under Sections 376, 323, 504 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code.

The Single Bench of Justice Ashish Naithani stated, “The legal position governing such cases is no longer res integra. Consent for sexual relations, when given by an adult woman, does not become vitiated merely because a relationship ultimately culminates in refusal to marry. To attract the offence under Section 376 IPC on the ground of promise of marriage, it must be prima facie shown that the promise was false from the very inception and was made solely as a device to obtain consent. A mere breach of promise, howsoever reprehensible morally, does not ipso facto constitute rape in the absence of material indicating initial deception.”

Advocate Pawan Mishra represented the Petitioner while Brief Holder Vijay Khanduri represented the State.

Factual Background

As per the FIR, the applicant and the complainant (second respondent) were in a relationship and on the assurance of marriage, the applicant developed physical relations with the complainant over a considerable period. It was further alleged that the applicant later refused to marry her. This led the complainant to lodge the FIR, alleging commission of rape and other allied offences.

Reasoning

On a perusal of the facts of the case, the Bench noted that the applicant and the respondent complainant were both majors at the relevant time and were in a relationship spanning a considerable period. The FIR itself acknowledged continued interaction, voluntary companionship, and repeated consensual physical relations between the parties.

The Bench was of the view that in order to attract the offence under Section 376 IPC on the ground of promise of marriage, it must be prima facie shown that the promise was false from the very inception and was made solely as a device to obtain consent.

Coming to the facts of the case, the Bench noted that neither the FIR nor the charge sheet disclosed any specific circumstance, conduct, or contemporaneous material suggesting that the applicant never intended to marry the complainant from the inception of the relationship. The Bench found that there was an admitted long duration of the relationship, repeated interactions, and continued voluntary association, which militated against an inference of initial fraudulent intent. “The allegations, taken at their face value, at best indicate a relationship that subsequently failed, which by itself cannot be criminalised under Section 376 IPC”, it added.

According to the Bench, allowing the prosecution to proceed in the case would result in subjecting the applicant to the rigours of a criminal trial in the absence of foundational facts necessary to sustain the charge. Thus, holding that the case fell within the recognised categories where criminal proceedings deserve to be quashed at the threshold, the Bench allowed the application and quashed the proceedings.

Cause Title: Suraj Bora v. State of Uttarakhand and Another (Neutral Citation: 2026:UHC:800)

Appearance

Petitioner: Advocates Pawan Mishra

Respondent: Brief Holder Vijay Khanduri, Advocates Shubhang Dobhal, Bhupendra Singh Bora

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