If Attachment Orders Can Be Sent Through E-mail, Why Not Assessment Orders? Rajasthan High Court Asks GST Department
The petitioner had filed the petition before the Rajasthan High Court challenging the order of the Appellate Authority, State Tax, Bikaner.
Justice Sangeeta Sharma, Justice Dinesh Mehta, Rajasthan High Court (Jodhpur Bench)
While restoring an appeal to the docket of the Appellate Authority where the assessee was not held to have committed any delay, the Rajasthan High Court has asked the GST department as to why assessment orders cannot be sent through email when the Departement sends attachment orders through the same mode.
The petitioner had filed the petition challenging the order of the Appellate Authority, State Tax, Bikaner whereby the appeal preferred by the assessee-petitioner under section 107(1) of the Rajasthan Goods and Service Tax Act, 2017 was rejected on the ground of limitation.
The Division Bench of Justice Sangeeta Sharma and Justice Dinesh Mehta asked, “As a parting remark this Court would like to record its concern that if the respondent-department can send attachment order through e-mail, why should it not send the assessment orders through the email so as to ward off any sort of communication gap or confusion about the date of communication?”
Advocates Akshay Sharma and Dheeraj Palia represented the Petitioner while AAG Mahaveer Bishnoi represented the Respondent.
Factual Background
The petitioner applied for registration through her tax consultant who gave his own email-ID and mobile number at the time of submitting petitioner’s application for registration under the provisions of the Act of 2017. A dispute arose between the petitioner and her consultant due to his irregularity in filing GST return. According to the petitioner, when she requested her consultant to provide login ID and Password for filing GST returns etc., he refused to provide the same. The petitioner requested the Commercial Taxes Officer, Circle-Churu to change login credentials and requested to change the same with different mobile number and email-ID. Such request came to be accepted by the Assessing Officer.
Before such acceptance of the Petitioner’s request, the Assessing Officer issued an order and attached the bank account of the petitioner.The case set up by the assessee-petitioner was that when she received the order of attachment of bank account issued by the Assessing Authority, she came to realise/know that an assessment order had been passed and was uploaded on the common portal of the department. The petitioner downloaded the same and preferred an appeal.The Appellate Authority however rejected the said appeal on the ground of limitation.
Reasoning
On a perusal of the facts of the case, the Bench noted that the assessee petitioner was unable to access the common portal in the wake of the dispute with the tax consultant as at that time she had requested the Assessing Officer to update her mobile number and e-mail ID qua her firm. After the petitioner came to receive the attachment order dated March 5, 2025, she had preferred the appeal on March 25,2025.
The Bench was of the view that until the petitioner’s mobile number and e-mail ID were changed, she could not have had access to the common portal. “Since such request of the assessee came to be accepted by the department as late as on 17.03.2025, she cannot be accused of the delay”, it held.
It was further noted that the period of limitation could not be reckoned from any date prior to March 17, 2025, when her request for change of mobile number and e-mail ID was accepted and she was able to access the common portal from March 5, 2025, when she received intimation of attachment of her bank account. “The petitioner has immediately preferred the appeal on 25.03.2025 and, therefore, it cannot be said that she was lax or had committed any delay, much less inordinate delay”, it added.
“The expression “communication to such person” used under section 107(1) of the Act of 2017 has its own significance. Passing of the order and uploading the same on the common portal, in the extant case cannot be read literally. A purposive interpretation needs to be given to a provision, when it relates to valuable statutory right of an assessee, more particularly, when upper cap of only 30 days for condonation of delay has been provided under sub-section (4) of section 107 of the Act of 2017”, it stated.
Allowing the writ petition, the Bench quashed the impugned order. The Bench directed the appeal to be restored to the docket of the Appellate Authority.
Cause Title: M/s Sahil Steels v. State Of Rajasthan (Neutral Citation: 2025:RJ-JD:38423-DB)
Appearance
Petitioner: Advocates Akshay Sharma, Dheeraj Palia
Respondent: AAG Mahaveer Bishnoi, Advocate Rishabh Dadhich