Punjab & Haryana High Court Refuses To Quash FIR Against Advocate For Caste-Based Expressions In Public Speech

The Court held that freedom of speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution is not absolute and must be exercised responsibly, particularly by persons of influence such as Advocates, whose words carry greater societal impact.

A Bench of Justice Vinod S. Bhardwaj, while dismissing the petition, observed: “The petitioner, being a trained Advocate, is assumed to be fully aware of the import and societal implications of the expression that he chooses while addressing the public. The persistent and deliberate reference to ‘caste’ and ‘casteist goons’ in the speech cannot, therefore, be brushed aside as inadvertent or incidental. It rather shows that there was a deliberate attempt on the part of the petitioner to use such expression so as to incite people, which had the potential to create a public disorder and pose imminent danger to public tranquillity”.

Background

The petition was filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, seeking the quashing of an FIR registered against the Advocate under various provisions of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, including Sections 196, 352, 353, and 356.

The FIR arose from a complaint alleging that the petitioner, who projected himself as an Advocate, addressed a public gathering in front of the Mini Secretariat, Hisar, in connection with a murder case, during which he made defamatory and inflammatory statements.

It was alleged that the petitioner repeatedly used expressions referring to “caste” and “casteist goons”, levelled allegations of corruption against police officials, portrayed an entire village in a derogatory manner, and sought to mobilise public opinion in favour of the accused persons in a pending criminal case.

Court’s Observation

The High Court examined the statutory scheme of Sections 196, 352 and 353 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, and observed that these provisions are designed to curb conduct which promotes disharmony, hatred or ill-will between groups, or which has the potential to disturb public tranquillity. The Court noted that the legislature has consciously employed expressions such as “attempts to promote”, “likely to disturb public tranquillity” and “likely to incite”, thereby criminalising conduct based on its potential impact rather than requiring proof of actual violence.

The Court emphasised that while freedom of speech is a fundamental right, it is subject to reasonable restrictions under Article 19(2) in the interests of public order, decency, morality and social harmony. The preservation of public tranquillity and social order, the Court observed, constitutes a legitimate ground for State intervention.

The High Court rejected the petitioner’s contention that his speech ought to be examined in isolation, holding that public speeches must be assessed in their context, including the audience addressed, the locality, the prevailing social conditions and the surrounding circumstances. It was observed that words which may appear innocuous in isolation can acquire an entirely different meaning when delivered before a charged public gathering.

The Court took note of the contents of the speech and observed that the petitioner began his address by acknowledging that he would be accused of targeting a specific caste. The Court found that the repeated and deliberate invocation of expressions such as “caste” and “casteist goons” could not be treated as casual or accidental. It held that such reiteration prima facie indicated a conscious attempt to impute criminality and moral depravity to a caste group, with the potential to incite public disorder.

The Court observed that if the petitioner’s intent was merely to highlight alleged injustice against his client, there was no necessity to repeatedly employ caste-laden expressions. Being a trained Advocate, the petitioner was presumed to be fully aware of the import and societal implications of the words he chose while addressing the public.

The High Court further held that the petitioner had travelled beyond the permissible domain of professional advocacy. It observed that an Advocate’s duty is to defend a client in a court of law, and not to organise or address public congregations in a manner that could influence public perception or interfere with the administration of justice. By addressing a public gathering and uploading the content online, the petitioner stepped into the realm of public mobilisation.

The Court relied upon the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in Amish Devgan v. Union of India (2021) to reiterate that persons of influence owe a higher duty of responsibility in the use of language, and that the impact of speech must be assessed having regard to who the speaker is and the likely effect on the audience.

The High Court distinguished the decisions relied upon by the petitioner, including Balwant Singh v. State of Punjab and Imran Pratapgadhi v. State of Gujarat, holding that those cases were decided in materially different factual contexts and did not assist the petitioner at the stage of quashing, particularly when evidence was yet to be tested at trial.

The Court further reiterated that at the stage of quashing, the Court is only required to examine whether the allegations prima facie disclose the commission of an offence. Once the basic ingredients are made out, the motive attributed to the complainant becomes irrelevant.

Conclusion

Holding that the allegations in the FIR, read as a whole, prima facie disclosed offences under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, the Punjab & Haryana High Court found no ground to exercise its inherent powers to quash the proceedings.

Accordingly, the petition seeking quashing of the FIR and all consequential proceedings was dismissed, and all pending applications were disposed of.

Cause Title: Rajat Kalsan v. State of Haryana & Ors. (Neutral Citation: 2025:PHHC:173665)

Appearances

Petitioner: Arjun Sheoran, Advocate; Tejasvi Sheokand, Advocate

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