Self Acquired Property Of Hindu Male Devolving After Enactment of Hindu Succession Act Is Held Individually Not As Coparcenary: Kerala High Court
The High Court held that property inherited by a son after the commencement of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, does not automatically become coparcenary property with his children, but remains his separate property unless proved otherwise.
Justice Easwaran S., Kerala High Court
The Kerala High Court has held that the self-acquired property of a Hindu male, devolving upon his son after the commencement of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, is held by the son in his individual capacity and not as coparcenary property along with his children.
The Court was hearing a Regular Second Appeal arising from a partition suit in which additional defendants challenged concurrent findings of the trial court and first appellate court that the suit property was coparcenary property and that the plaintiff was entitled to a share by birth.
A Single Judge Bench of Justice Easwaran S. framed substantial questions of law including whether property devolving on a son after 1956 is held individually or as coparcenary, and observed that “The self-acquired property of a Hindu male upon his death after the commencement of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 coming into the hands of his son as a class I heir is held by him in his individual capacity and not as a coparcenary along with his children.”
Background
The dispute concerned land originally purchased by an ancestor through a registered sale deed in 1925. After his death, his children executed a partition deed under which a portion was allotted to one son, who later received an additional portion through a release deed from his sister, thereby obtaining absolute title over 46 cents.
That son subsequently executed a gift deed transferring the entire property to his wife. After his death, she remained in possession and later executed a Will bequeathing the property to certain heirs. A suit for partition was filed, claiming a birthright share on the ground that the property was coparcenary.
The trial court held that the parties were governed by Mitakshara law and treated the property as coparcenary property between father and son, granting a preliminary decree for partition. The appellate court affirmed this finding, leading to the present second appeal.
Court’s Observation
The High Court began by emphasising that the plaintiff’s claim depended entirely on establishing that the property in the hands of his father was ancestral. It held that the entitlement to claim a right by birth arises only if the property possessed such a character at the relevant stage.
The Court examined classical Mitakshara principles and authoritative commentary, noting that a Hindu governed by Mitakshara law may possess separate or self-acquired property over which no other coparcener acquires any interest by birth and which he may freely dispose of by sale, gift, or will.
Relying on C.N. Arunachala Mudaliar v. Muruganatha Mudaliar, the Court reiterated that a father has absolute power of disposition over his self-acquired property and that property gifted or bequeathed to a son does not automatically assume ancestral character; the nature of the interest depends upon the intention of the donor and the surrounding circumstances.
The Bench then considered Arunachala Gounder v. Ponnusamy, where the Supreme Court held that self-acquired property of a male Hindu dying intestate devolves by inheritance and not survivorship, reinforcing the distinction between ancestral and separate property.
Turning to the factual matrix, the Court found that the original owner had purchased the property through a sale deed, indicating self-acquisition. No evidence was produced to establish that it was ancestral property. Consequently, the Court held that the plaintiff failed to prove the essential foundation of his claim.
The Court clarified that although there may be a presumption of jointness in a Hindu family, no such presumption exists regarding the jointness of property. Therefore, the mere fact that family members lived jointly could not justify treating the property as ancestral.
It further distinguished Arshnoor Singh v. Harpal Kaur, noting that the precedent concerned property admittedly ancestral in origin, whereas in the present case the original acquisition itself was self-acquired, making that ruling inapplicable.
The Court also referred to Angadi Chandranna v. Shankar, observing that even ancestral property, once partitioned, becomes the separate property of the sharer. However, where the original acquisition itself is self-acquired, even the birth of a son does not confer a coparcenary right or restrict the father’s power of disposition.
On conduct, the Court noted that the plaintiff had earlier treated his mother as the absolute owner by obtaining loans on the strength of her title and offering the property as security, without asserting any co-ownership. This conduct attracted the principle of acquiescence and further weakened his claim.
The Court concluded that when the father himself had no birthright interest in the property and acquired title only through a partition deed after 1956, the property must be treated as his self-acquired property. Accordingly, the plaintiff could not claim any birthright over it.
Conclusion
The High Court held that the courts below had erred in treating the property as joint family property and in granting a preliminary decree for partition. It found the judgments unsustainable, allowed the second appeal, set aside the decrees of the courts below, and dismissed the partition suit with costs.
Ending Section
Cause Title: Santha & Ors. v. Raghavendran & Ors. (Neutral Citation: 2026:KER:12551)
Appearances
Appellants: S. Ramesh Babu, Sr. Adv.; N. Krishna Prasad, P. Ravindra Nath, Advocates
Respondents: S. Sreekumar, Sr. Adv.; Advocates P. Martin Jose, P. Prijith; Shri Thomas P. Kuruvilla, Harkish Sreethu V.S., A. Jani, T.T. Harikumar.