Life Imprisonment Must Be Understood As Remainder Of Natural Life In Absence Of Specific Restriction; Remission Is Domain Of Government: Karnataka High Court

The Court was hearing a petition seeking a direction for release from prison on the ground that the petitioner had completed more than twenty years of actual imprisonment and was therefore entitled to be released.

A Single Judge Bench of Justice Suraj Govindaraj, while answering the issue, held that “in the absence of a specific judicial direction restricting the duration of the sentence, the sentence of life imprisonment imposed on the petitioner must be understood as imprisonment for the remainder of his natural life, subject to commutation or remission in accordance with law.”

“The question of remission or premature release lies within the exclusive domain of the appropriate Government under the applicable statutory provisions and policy”, the Bench added.

Advocate Pradeep Patil appeared for the petitioner, while Pradeep C.S., Additional Advocate General, appeared for the respondents.

Background

The petitioner had been convicted of offences under the Indian Penal Code and was initially sentenced to death, which was subsequently modified to life imprisonment by the appellate court.

After undergoing more than twenty years of actual imprisonment and maintaining satisfactory conduct, the petitioner sought release, relying on the premise that life imprisonment should be treated as equivalent to twenty years under Section 57 of the IPC.

The petitioner placed reliance on the Supreme Court decision in Sukhdev Yadav @ Pehalwan v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2025), contending that where life imprisonment is interpreted as a fixed term of actual imprisonment without remission, the convict becomes entitled to release upon completion of that period.

The State opposed the plea, contending that life imprisonment ordinarily means imprisonment for the remainder of the convict’s natural life unless expressly restricted, and that Section 57 IPC does not determine the duration of life imprisonment.

Court’s Observation

The Court first framed the controversy as turning on whether the earlier judgment in Criminal Appeal No.1197/2008, while commuting the death sentence to life imprisonment and directing that the accused should remain in jail “in terms of Section 57 of IPC”, could be read as restricting the sentence to a fixed term of twenty years.

The Court noted that the earlier Bench had only barred routine commutation after fourteen years and required the petitioner to undergo a substantial period of actual incarceration. On that basis, it held that “the judgment passed by this Court in Criminal Appeal No.1197/2008, while commuting the death sentence to life imprisonment and directing that the accused shall serve the sentence 'in terms of Section 57 of the IPC', cannot be construed as restricting the sentence of life imprisonment to a fixed term of twenty years of imprisonment.”

The Court then addressed the petitioner’s reliance on Section 57 IPC and held that the provision does not define the actual duration of a life sentence. Referring to Gopal Vinayak Godse v. State of Maharashtra (1961), Mohinder Singh v. State of Punjab (2013), and Life Convict Bangal @ Khoka @ Prasanta Sen v. B.K. Srivastava (2013), the Court reiterated that life imprisonment ordinarily means imprisonment for the remainder of the convict’s natural life unless commuted or remitted in accordance with law.

It rejected the argument that Section 57 itself entitled the petitioner to release after twenty years and observed that the Supreme Court has consistently held that the reference to twenty years in Section 57 is only for the limited purpose of calculating fractions of punishment. In that context, the Court observed that the language and the scope of Section 57 apply to “calculating the fractions of terms of punishment”, and that it does not say that “life imprisonment shall be deemed to be twenty years for all purposes, or that a convict sentenced to life imprisonment shall be released after twenty years”.

The Court next distinguished the decision in Sukhdev Yadav @ Pehalwan v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2025), on which the petitioner had strongly relied. It noted that in Sukhdev Yadav, the Supreme Court was dealing with a sentence that had been judicially fixed as twenty years of actual imprisonment without remission, and it was in that specific context that release was directed upon completion of that period.

The Karnataka High Court held that the present case stood on a different footing because no such express judicial fixation of sentence was made here. According to the Court, the earlier appellate judgment in the petitioner’s case did not specify that life imprisonment would come to an end after twenty years; it only prevented routine commutation and required actual incarceration.

Having rejected the claim to automatic release, the Court turned to the nature of remission and premature release and held that the matter lies entirely within the executive sphere. Relying again on Gopal Vinayak Godse (1961) and Mohinder Singh (2013), it held that remission is neither automatic nor judicially enforceable as of right, and that the Court cannot substitute its own decision for that of the Government in matters entrusted by statute to the executive.

It also noted that a writ of mandamus can issue only where a legal right and a corresponding public duty are clearly established. Since no right to automatic release had accrued to the petitioner, no mandamus could be issued directing his immediate release from prison.

At the same time, the Court recognised that the petitioner, having crossed the minimum threshold of twenty years of actual imprisonment, "is now eligible to apply for premature release/remission to the appropriate Government, which shall consider such application on its merits in accordance with applicable law and policy."

Conclusion

The Court held that the petitioner was not entitled to automatic release upon completion of twenty years of imprisonment, in the absence of a specific judicial direction restricting the sentence.

However, noting that the petitioner had completed the threshold period, the Court held that he was eligible to apply for remission or premature release, which must be considered by the appropriate Government in accordance with law and applicable policy.

The writ petition was accordingly dismissed.

Cause Title: Sri Kishan v. State of Karnataka & Ors. (Neutral Citation: 2026:KHC:15413)

Appearances

Petitioner: Pradeep Patil, Advocate for Prathap S.S., Advocate

Respondents: Pradeep C.S., AAG with K.P. Yashodha, AGA

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