Judicial Intervention U/S 165 Evidence Act Cannot Supply Missing Ingredients Of Offence: Karnataka High Court Acquits Two In Gang Rape Case
Court found the medical evidence inconclusive, noting the history given to the doctor was "misbehavior by two persons with hands" rather than rape.
The Karnataka High Court while acquitting two persons convicted of Gang Rape, has observed that a trial judge, while empowered to question a witness, cannot use Section 165 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 to suggest answers or provide essential elements of a crime, such as penetration, in a rape trial, if the prosecutrix has not herself deposed to those facts. The Court’s reasoning was that the sole testimony of the prosecutrix, was not of ‘sterling quality’ and did not inspire confidence.
Furthermore, the Court found the medical evidence inconclusive, noting the history given to the doctor was "misbehavior by two persons with hands" rather than rape, and highlighted significant procedural lapses, including an unexplained delay in recording the victim's Section 164 statement. These factors, combined with the trial judge's improper leading questions, created a "substantial and reasonable doubt" regarding the guilt of the appellants.
Justice G. Basavaraja observed, “…although a Judge may legally ask leading questions to a rape victim under Section 165, such power must be exercised only for clarification and to obtain proper proof of relevant facts. The Judge cannot suggest answers, introduce material facts not already spoken to by the witness, or supply essential ingredients of the offence—such as penetration— if the witness herself has not deposed to them. Nor can the Judge neutralize contradictions brought out in cross-examination or repair weaknesses in the prosecution case…”.
“…Any such intervention may give rise to an apprehension of bias and may affect the fairness of the trial, which is an integral component of Article 21 of the Constitution…In the present case the Trial court has put leading question as to the directly commission of alleged offences by the accused persons which has prompted the victim to say affirmatively, however when the same question was putforth the victim has answered that the accused have attempted to commit rape, which is against to the jurisprudence of role of judges during trial of sexual assault cases”, the Bench noted.
Advocate K.A. Chandrashekara appeared for the appellants and B. Lakshman, High Court Government Pleader appeared for the respondent.
As per the facts, an incident occurred on June 16, 2021, where the accused allegedly entered the victim’s home, bolted the doors, and committed gang rape while under the influence of alcohol.
The trial court had initially convicted the appellants under Section 376-D IPC, sentencing them to 25 years of rigorous imprisonment and a fine of ₹1,00,000 each. However, the defense argued on appeal that the conviction was based on the "shaky" testimony of a victim who failed to identify the accused in court and whose medical examination showed no signs of forcible sexual intercourse or external injuries.
Thereafter, the matter reached the High Court as an appeal under Section 374(2) CrPC against the judgment of the III Additional District and Sessions Judge, Ramanagara. The appellants challenged the legality of the conviction, citing material contradictions in the victim's testimony and the trial court's failure to extend the benefit of doubt.
Now, the Court after reassessing the material evidence, testimonies and statements recorded, observed that the victim explicitly stated in her cross-examination that she had not seen the faces of the persons who committed the offence and that the accused present in court were not the persons involved.
“No doubt, it is a settled principle of law that conviction for the offence of rape can be based on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix, provided her evidence inspires confidence and is found to be wholly reliable and trustworthy. It is equally settled that no rule of law requires corroboration in every case. However, this principle applies only when the testimony of the prosecutrix is clear, consistent and free from material contradictions…”, it noted further.
“…Therefore, victim’s evidence cannot be said to be of such sterling quality so as to form the sole basis for conviction without corroboration. A comparison of victim’s statement under Section 164 CrPC, the contents of the FIR and victim’s deposition before the Court reveals substantial variations on material particulars. These contradictions relate to important aspects of the alleged incident and affect the credibility of victim’s version. In such circumstances, it would not be safe to rely solely upon victim’s testimony. As a matter of prudence, independent corroboration on material particulars was necessary before recording a finding of guilt against the appellant”, the Bench noted.
The Court was of the opinion that the judicial intervention prompted the victim to respond affirmatively, even though she later contradicted this by stating the accused had only "attempted" to commit the act. The Bench emphasised that the role of a judge is to facilitate a fair process for all stakeholders without assuming the "mantle of the prosecuting agency," particularly in sensitive matters involving offences against women where the balance between sensitivity and impartiality is paramount.
The Court while setting aside the impugned judgment acquitted both appellants of the charge under Section 376-D IPC. The Registrar (Judicial) was directed to immediately communicate the acquittal to the relevant jail authorities to ensure the appellants' release, provided they are not required in connection with any other legal matter.
Cause Title: Mohan Naik & Anr. v. State of Karnataka & Anr. Crl.A. No.824 of 2023
Appearances:
Appellants: K.A. Chandrashekara, Advocate.
Respondent: B. Lakshman, High Court Government Pleader.