Even Storage Of Child Pornographic Content Can Attract Offence U/S 15 POCSO Act: Karnataka High Court

The Court was hearing a petition seeking the quashing of criminal proceedings initiated for offences under Section 67B of the Information Technology Act and Section 15 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act.

A Single Judge Bench of Justice M. Nagaprasanna, while relying on the Supreme Court’s ruling in Just Rights For Children Alliance v. S Harish (2024), observed: “The Apex Court in the aforesaid judgment in unambiguous terms holds that possession or storage of pornographic material involving a child would attract the rigours of Section 67B of the IT Act and Section 15 of the POCSO Act. The Apex Court further holds that Section 15 of the POCSO Act is in the nature and form of an inchoate offence, which also penalizes the mere storage or possession of child pornographic material when done with the specific intent to share or transmit, without requiring any actual transmission or dissemination, since the intention must be determined from the manner in which such material is stored or possessed and the circumstances in which the same was not deleted, destroyed or reported”.

Background

The case arose from criminal proceedings registered following the seizure of an electronic device during the course of an investigation in a separate matter. The device was subsequently subjected to forensic examination by the investigating authorities.

During the forensic examination, investigators allegedly discovered several digital images and videos depicting sexually explicit material involving children. Based on the recovery of this material, a separate case was registered invoking provisions of the Information Technology Act and the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act.

The petitioner approached the High Court seeking the quashing of the proceedings. It was contended that the material in question had merely been stored on the device and had not been transmitted, circulated, or shared with any other person.

According to the petitioner, the absence of any allegation of transmission or dissemination meant that the ingredients of the offences alleged under the relevant statutory provisions were not satisfied.

The State opposed the petition and argued that the statutory scheme criminalises not only the dissemination but also the storage or possession of child pornographic material under specified circumstances.

Court’s Observation

The Court examined the scope of Section 15 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act along with Section 67B of the Information Technology Act, referring to the interpretation placed by the Supreme Court on these provisions.

The Court noted that the Supreme Court had clarified that Section 15 of the POCSO Act operates as an offence addressing the storage or possession of child pornographic material when accompanied by the requisite intent. The provision was described as an inchoate offence aimed at addressing preparatory conduct associated with offences involving child exploitation.

The Court observed that the legislative framework, particularly after amendments to the provision, recognises different forms of liability depending upon the intention behind storing or possessing such material.

It was further noted that the statutory scheme does not require proof of actual transmission or dissemination of the material. The Court emphasised that the offence may be attracted even where the material is merely stored in a device capable of transmission, provided the circumstances disclose the requisite intent contemplated under the provision.

Referring to the interpretation rendered by the Supreme Court, the Court held that storage of child pornographic material with the capacity of being transmitted falls within the scope of Section 15 of the POCSO Act. The Court also noted that Section 67B of the Information Technology Act criminalises various forms of conduct involving electronic child pornography, including the creation, browsing, collection, and dissemination of such material.

In light of the material placed on record, the Court held that the allegations disclosed the necessary ingredients of the offences alleged, and therefore the proceedings could not be interfered with at the stage of quashing.

Conclusion

The High Court declined to quash the criminal proceedings and held that there was no ground to interfere with the case at the stage when charges had already been framed, and the matter had progressed to the stage of evidence. The Court observed that the petitioner would have the opportunity to establish his defence during the course of the trial.

Cause Title: Binoj P.J. v. State of Karnataka Commercial Street Police Station (Neutral Citation: 2026:KHC:1635)

Appearances

Petitioner: Deenabandhu Rai N., Advocate

Respondents: Vinay Mahadevaiah, High Court Government Pleader

Click here to read/download Judgment