Not Open For Court To Substitute Punishment On Its Own: Jharkhand High Court Upholds Order Directing Reconsideration Of Employee’s Case By Disciplinary Authority
The Jharkhand High Court was considering an appeal under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent directed against the order of the Single Judge setting aside the order of removal from service and remitting the matter for fresh consideration.
While upholding an order remitting a case back to the disciplinary authority for reconsideration, the Jharkhand High Court has reaffirmed that it is not open to the Court to substitute the punishment on its own, and the appropriate course is to remit the matter to the disciplinary authority for reconsideration, so as to maintain a proper balance between the gravity of the charge and the punishment imposed.
The High Court was considering an appeal under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent directed against the order of the Single Judge whereby the order of removal from service was quashed and set aside, with a direction to the concerned disciplinary authority to pass a fresh order by taking into consideration the issue of the quantum of punishment.
Referring to various judgments of the Apex Court dealing with cases of disciplinary enquiries and punishments, the Division Bench of Justice Sujit Narayan Prasad and Justice Arun Kumar Rai held, “ However, it has also been held that, while doing so, the Court must assign reasons explaining what led it to conclude that the punishment shocks its conscience. Moreover, it is not open to the Court to substitute the punishment on its own rather, the appropriate course would be to remit the matter to the disciplinary authority for reconsideration, so as to maintain a proper balance between the gravity of the charge and the punishment imposed, and to ensure that the punishment is not disproportionate.”
A.A.G.-III Ashutosh Anand represented the Appellant, while Advocate Rahul Kumar represented the Respondent.
Factual Background
The petitioner was appointed through the 33rd Combined Competitive Examination conducted by the Bihar Public Service Commission (BPSC) and joined the Bihar Education Service Class II cadre with effect from December 8, 1988. Upon the reorganisation of the State of Bihar, the petitioner was allotted the cadre of the State of Jharkhand. She was posted as Principal of a Government School and was transferred to the post of District Education Officer (DEO), Palamau. However, within a short period of less than eight months, the petitioner was transferred from the post of DEO, Palamau and was directed to report at the Headquarter. It was the petitioner’s case that she was unfairly targeted to allow the Regional Deputy Director to take over the powers and responsibilities of DEO, Palamau, on an in-charge basis. Thus, the Writ Petition came to be filed.
The respondent–writ petitioner, while working as District Education Officer at Palamau, was proceeded departmentally. Allegations of financial irregularities, lack of interest in departmental responsibilities, withholding the salary of subordinates and subjecting them to harassment were made. The delinquent employee respondent, denied all the allegations. However, the charge was found to be proved and the disciplinary authority passed the order of punishment for removal from service. The same was challenged by filing the writ petition which was subsequently amended. During the pendency of the writ petition, the order of punishment of removal from service was passed by the disciplinary authority. The Single Bench set aside the order of punishment and remitted the matter back. The same was under challenge in the present appeal.
Reasoning
Referring to the judgments of the Apex Court, the Bench reiterated that an order of punishment imposed by a disciplinary authority can be interfered with by the High Court in the exercise of its powers of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. “Such interference is permissible even on the ground that the punishment shocks the conscience of the Court, particularly on the issue of proportionality meaning thereby, if the punishment imposed is disproportionate to the gravity of the charge. This can be a valid ground for the High Court to interfere with the order of punishment while exercising its power of judicial review”, it stated.
Considering the fact that the petitioner had confined her prayer only to the issue of the quantum of punishment, the Bench held that the same suggested and clarified that the nature of the allegations was admitted by the respondent-writ petitioner.
The Bench noted that the respondent-writ petitioner has already put in 31 years of unblemished service, and if the order of removal from service was allowed to prevail, then the entire service period of 31 years would not be considered even for pension or any post-retirement benefits. “Therefore, the consideration is to be made by going through the nature of the charge as alleged in the memorandum of charge, and if the nature of the charge is serious, then irrespective of the period of service rendered by the employee, the consequences are to be faced. However, we have not found the nature of the allegation to be of such extent as to warrant the respondent-writ petitioner facing the consequence of denial of retiral or pensionary benefits. Furthermore, there is no allegation of any embezzlement of public money”, it held.
Holding that the impugned order passed by the Single Judge required no interference, the Bench dismissed the appeal.
Cause Title: The State of Jharkhand v. Meena Kumari Rai (Neutral Citation: 2025:JHHC:31835-DB)