Service Of Dismissal Order At Residence Doesn’t Give Rise To Territorial Cause Of Action: Jammu &Kashmir And Ladakh High Court

It was held that territorial jurisdiction is a matter of law rooted in the essential facts of a dispute rather than a "mobile privilege" dependent on a petitioner's residence, noting that allowing such cases would encourage "forum shopping" and undermine the orderly administration of justice.

​The Bench of Justice Wasim Sadiq Nargal observed, “From the stand point of the Disciplinary Authority there was no alternative but to communicate the said order at the native place of the petitioner in Jammu and Kashmir. However, the mere service of an order at a particular location does not by itself give rise to a territorial cause of action at that site. To hold otherwise would allow the petitioner to unilaterally dictate jurisdiction simply by relocating to a forum of their choice. Such a result would contradict legislative intent and invite ‘forum shopping’. Territorial jurisdiction is a matter of law rooted in the essential facts of the dispute, it is not a mobile privilege dependent upon the convenience or residence of the petitioner.”

Senior Advocate Surinder Kour appeared for the Petitioner, while DSGI Vishal Sharma appeared for the Respondents.

Factual Background

The petitioner, a former Constable in the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF), filed a writ petition to contest his removal from service. He sought to cancel the original punishment order and the subsequent decisions made by higher authorities that upheld his dismissal. He requested the court to direct the department to reinstate him with full back pay and benefits, treating his time away as continuous service.

Authorities leveled serious allegations against him regarding an incident involving a physical altercation. The department accused him and another constable of misconduct and disobedience, claiming they fought with a superior officer who sustained injuries during the encounter.

A departmental inquiry followed, which eventually led to his removal from service. Seeking a remedy, the petitioner filed a statutory appeal against the dismissal. The higher authorities reviewed the case but rejected the appeal, finding no merit in his claims. He then submitted a revision petition to a senior official, but this was also dismissed. Left with no other internal options, the petitioner turned to the court to challenge the validity of the charges and the fairness of the entire disciplinary proceeding.

Contention of the Parties

The petitioner argued that the disciplinary proceedings were fundamentally flawed and violated Rule 27 of the CRPF Rules. It was contended that the enquiry was conducted ex-parte without providing the petitioner a copy of the proceedings or an opportunity to cross-examine witnesses. The defence highlighted that the statements were recorded in the petitioner’s absence and that the mandatory procedure for imposing major penalties under the CCS Rules was ignored. Furthermore, the Petitioner claimed the joint enquiry was legally invalid because the order for it was issued by a Commandant instead of the Inspector General as required by law. The petitioner also sought to invalidate the findings on the grounds that the medical officer was never examined and the relevant medical report was withheld from him.

In response, the authorities challenged the court's jurisdiction, asserting that since the alleged misconduct and subsequent legal orders occurred in Delhi, Jalandhar, and Chandigarh, the petition was not maintainable in the current forum. The Respondents produced records suggesting the petitioner was offered a chance to represent against the enquiry report but declined in writing, stating he would accept any decision. They further justified the dismissal by citing the petitioner’s history of multiple prior punishments and argued that the joint enquiry was a discretionary procedural choice that did not prejudice the case.

Observations of the Court

The court focused its analysis on whether it possessed the territorial jurisdiction to hear the case, given that the underlying events occurred outside its geographic limits. It was noted as an undisputed fact that the alleged misconduct took place in New Delhi, the dismissal order was issued there, and the subsequent appeal and revision were rejected by authorities in Jalandhar and Chandigarh. The court observed that since the disciplinary, appellate, and revisional authorities were all situated outside its jurisdiction, no substantial part of the "cause of action" occurred within its boundaries.

The Court said. “Since, the disciplinary authority, the appellate authority and the revisional authority are all situated outside the territorial limits of this court, no substantial part of cause of action can be said to have accrued within the jurisdiction of this Court. The mere fact that the petitioner is a resident of District Poonch or the order of dismissal and order of rejection of appeal and revision was served to him at his residential address, does not entitle the petitioner to file his writ petition before this High Court.”

The Court said that the principle relevant for determination in the present matter is that the cause of action, whether in whole or in part, or even a fraction thereof, must constitute a material, integral or essential component of the lis.

“Any cause of action, or part thereof, must therefore be directly connected with the aforesaid events. The mere supply or service of the copies of documents at the residential of the petitioner does not give rise to any cause of action, nor even a fraction thereof, so as to vest this court with the jurisdiction to entertain the petition. It is well established that both expression cause of action denotes every fact which the petitioner would be required to establish, if controverted, in order to substantiate his entitlement to relief from the court. It must include some act done by the respondents, since in the absence of such an act no cause of action would possibly accrue or would arise”, the Court held.

The court clarified that the mere service of a dismissal notice at a petitioner's residence does not create a legal right to sue in that specific location. The court emphasized that a "cause of action" consists of the material facts and acts done by the respondents—such as the inquiry and the termination itself—rather than the incidental receipt of mail.

Consequently, the court found that since no integral part of the disciplinary process took place in Jammu and Kashmir, it lacked the authority to adjudicate the matter.

The court concluded that it lacked the necessary territorial jurisdiction to hear the petition, noting that such a defect is a fundamental flaw that cannot be corrected. Since the entire disciplinary process—from the initial charge sheet to the final dismissal—took place outside the court's geographic limits, it determined that no valid cause of action arose within its authority. Consequently, the court declined to rule on the actual merits of the petitioner's claims regarding his removal from service.

Accordingly, the writ petition was dismissed solely on the grounds of jurisdiction.

Cause Title: Noshad Ahmed v. Union of India and Ors. [SWP No. 1245/2007]

Appearances:

Petitioner: Senior Advocate Surinder Kour and Advocate Michael Singh Dogra

Respondents: DSGI Vishal Sharma and Advocate Sumant Sudan

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