Family Court Cannot Relegate Parties To Fresh Suit While Executing Consent Decree: Gujarat High Court
The High Court held that once a decree is passed based on mutual consent, the Family Court, while executing such decree, cannot direct the parties to institute a separate civil suit for enforcement of terms already agreed upon and incorporated in the decree, as doing so would defeat the very object of the Family Courts Act, 1984 and the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.
The Gujarat High Court has held that a Family Court, while exercising jurisdiction in execution proceedings, cannot refuse to enforce the terms of a consent decree and relegate the decree-holder to initiate a separate suit for the enforcement of obligations already settled between the parties.
The Court observed that such an approach would be contrary to the legislative intent behind family law adjudication, which seeks to reduce multiplicity of proceedings and ensure expeditious resolution of matrimonial disputes
The Court was hearing a First Appeal arising out of an order passed by the Family Court, Ahmedabad, which had declined to direct execution of a relinquishment deed in respect of immovable property, despite such obligation forming part of the consent terms recorded in a decree of divorce by mutual consent under Section 13B of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.
A Division Bench comprising Justice Sangeeta K. Vishen and Justice Nisha M. Thakore, while stating that “the Family Court for executing the decree cannot relegate the party to file a separate suit for the issues already agreed and judgment having passed in terms thereof”, further held that “if such a course is allowed, it would go against the spirit of the Act of 1984 as well as the Act of 1955 as the central theme underlying both the legislations, is to lessen the litigation, providing early resolution to the disputes between the parties”.
Background
The parties had jointly approached the Family Court seeking divorce by mutual consent. As part of the settlement recorded in the petition and reiterated in affidavits, the respondent had expressly agreed to relinquish her rights in a jointly owned immovable property and to execute a release deed in favour of the appellant.
The Family Court granted a decree of divorce strictly “as per the terms and conditions stated in the petition.” Subsequently, disputes arose when the respondent declined to execute the release deed, prompting the appellant to initiate execution proceedings.
The Family Court dismissed the execution petition, holding that since no specific relief for execution of a document had been prayed for or adjudicated, the decree could not be enforced and that the appellant must seek specific performance by filing a separate suit.
Court’s Observation
The High Court examined the statutory scheme governing Family Courts and the execution of decrees.
The Court noted that under Section 7 of the Family Courts Act, 1984, Family Courts are vested with jurisdiction over suits and proceedings relating to property disputes between spouses. Further, Section 18 of the Act mandates that a decree passed by a Family Court shall be executable in the same manner as a decree of a civil court.
The Bench observed that once a consent decree has been passed and has attained finality, the executing court cannot go behind the decree or refuse to enforce an obligation that forms an integral part of the settlement recorded therein.
The Court held that the Family Court erred in treating the obligation to execute the release deed as requiring independent adjudication. It was observed that the consent terms were not collateral or incidental, but constituted the very basis on which the decree of divorce was granted.
The High Court further held that directing the decree-holder to file a fresh suit would amount to reopening settled issues and would be contrary to Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, which requires all questions relating to execution, discharge, or satisfaction of a decree to be decided by the executing court itself.
The Bench emphasised that the Family Courts Act, 1984 and the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, are designed to reduce multiplicity of litigation and ensure expeditious resolution of matrimonial disputes. Permitting parties to re-litigate obligations already agreed and crystallised into a decree would frustrate this legislative intent.
Taking note that the Family Court had passed the order under section 13B of the HMA, 1955, the Court underscored that “when the judgment was passed in terms of the compromise decree, it is deemed that the terms and conditions contained in the compromise decree become a part and parcel of the judgment and decree”.
Further, referring to Order XXI Rule 34 of the Civil Procedure Code, the Court highlighted that “Sub-rule (6) (a) of Rule 34 provides that where the registration of document is required under any law, the Court or such officer of the court as may be authorized, shall cause the document to be registered in accordance with such law”, accordingly concluding that “the provision ought to have been taken recourse of and the Court ought to have directed the execution of the documents”.
Conclusion
The Gujarat High Court set aside the impugned order and held that directing parties to initiate fresh proceedings for the enforcement of agreed terms is impermissible in execution proceedings. The appeal was accordingly allowed
Cause Title: SAB v. MSB (Neutral Citation: 2025:GUJHC:74570-DB)
Appearances
Appellant: Advocate Tanaya Shah for Evolve Legal
Respondent: Advocate M.B. Gohil