Appeal U/S 21 NIA Act Not Maintainable Against An Order Framing Charge: Delhi High Court
The High Court held that an order framing a charge is an interlocutory order and does not fall within the scope of appeal under Section 21 of the National Investigation Agency Act, 2008, as the appellate provision is confined to final orders.
The Delhi High Court has clarified that an order framing charge does not finally determine the proceedings and, therefore, cannot be treated as an appealable order under Section 21 of the National Investigation Agency Act.
The Court was hearing a batch of criminal appeals filed under Section 21 of the NIA Act, challenging orders passed by Special Courts by which charges were framed against the appellants in cases investigated by the National Investigation Agency.
A Division Bench of Justice Vivek Chaudhary and Justice Manoj Jain, while stating that “an Order framing Charge, as against final order is an interlocutory order, as it does not decide any proceeding finally and the term ‘intermediate order’ is a concept of revisional jurisdiction, which cannot be applied while interpreting the term ‘appeal’ both on facts and law”, clarified that under the scheme of the NIA Act, “an appeal is provided only from any judgment, sentence or order, not being an interlocutory order, of a Special Court to the High Court both on facts and on law”
Senior Advocate Nitya Ramakrishnan appeared for the appellants, while Senior Advocate Sidharth Luthra represented the respondents.
Background
The appeals arose from orders passed by Special Courts constituted under the NIA Act, whereby charges were framed against the appellants in matters involving scheduled offences. Invoking Section 21 of the Act, the appellants contended that an appeal would lie against any order of a Special Court other than an interlocutory order.
It was argued that an order framing a charge cannot be treated as an interlocutory order and instead falls within the category of an “intermediate order”, relying on Supreme Court decisions that interpret the expression “interlocutory order” in the context of revisional jurisdiction under the Code of Criminal Procedure.
The NIA raised a preliminary objection on maintainability, contending that Section 21 contemplates appeals only against final orders and judgments, and that permitting appeals against orders framing charge would be contrary to the object of the Act, which envisages expeditious trial of scheduled offences.
Court’s Observation
The Delhi High Court examined the scheme of Section 21 of the NIA Act and noted that while sub-section (1) permits an appeal against any “judgment, sentence or order, not being an interlocutory order”, sub-section (3) expressly bars any appeal or revision except as provided under the Act. The only exception carved out by the legislature, the Court noted, is under sub-section (4), which permits an appeal against an order granting or refusing bail.
Placing reliance on the Constitution Bench judgment in V.C. Shukla v. State, the Court reiterated that “in the context of Criminal Procedure Code, an Order framing Charge is more than an interlocutory order, but also does not fall within the category of a final order, it falls somewhere in between and is termed as ‘matters of moment’ or intermediate order.”
The Court further held that the expression “order” in Section 21(1) “is preceded by words ‘judgment’ and ‘sentence’ and followed by ‘not being an interlocutory order”, stating that thus, “the order has to be a final order, like a judgment or sentence which can be challenged both on facts and law and conclude proceeding finally”.
The Court further stated that, unlike Amar Nath v. State of Haryana and Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra, where the Court was interpreting the term ‘interlocutory order’ in a revision, hereunder the NIA Act, “this Court is interpreting the term ‘order’ with reference to an appeal on facts and law”, while clarifying that “there, anything more than an interlocutory order was found not hit by restriction of interlocutory order of Section 397(2) Cr.P.C., but, here it has to be an order from which appeal, on facts and law, may be made available”, the Court remarked.
The Bench explained that "at the stage of framing of Charge, as settled by a catena of judgments, the Court is to summarily look into the evidence collected by the prosecution and to find if a Charge is made out. It is also obliged to see that there is no abuse of the process of law or jurisdictional defects in the proceedings. However, the evidence is yet to be led by the parties before the Court and thus, at this stage, the Special Court is not expected to give any definite finding on facts and law; consequently, an appeal on facts and law cannot be envisaged".
Furthermore, emphasising the object and purpose of the NIA Act, the Bench observed that permitting appeals against orders framing charges would frustrate the legislative intent of ensuring the speedy trial of offences affecting national security.
Summing up, the Bench held that “a conjoint reading of Section 21, other sections and purpose of the NIA Act shows that the term ‘order’ in Section 21(1) refers to a final order and not an interlocutory or intermediate order.”
The Court, however, highlighted that the absence of an appellate remedy does not render an accused remediless, “as the NIA Act does not bar application of Section 482 Cr.P.C./528 BNSS” and that “any person aggrieved can challenge the same under the inherent powers of the High Court”.
Conclusion
Holding that an appeal under Section 21 of the NIA Act is not maintainable against an order framing charge, the Delhi High Court dismissed the appeals on the ground of maintainability. All pending applications were also disposed of.
Cause Title: Shahid Yousuf v. National Investigation Agency & Connected Matters (Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:11786-DB)
Appearances
Appellants: Senior Advocates Nitya Ramakrishnan, Tanveer Ahmed Mir, with other Advocates
Respondent: Senior Advocate Sidharth Luthra, with Special Public Prosecutors for NIA