No Insulation From Legal Consequences Even If Parties Present Themselves As Family: Delhi High Court Refuses To Quash FIR Under POCSO Act For Child Marriage

The Court was hearing a petition under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, seeking quashing of an FIR and proceedings against the purported husband and in-laws of the victim. 

A Bench Justice Sanjeev Narula, examined the scope of the High Court’s jurisdiction to quash criminal proceedings in cases involving sexual offences against minors, and held: “The present case does not involve only two young persons who chose to live together; the parents of both sides stand arraigned under the Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006 on the allegation that they facilitated or condoned a marriage involving a minor girl. An order quashing the prosecution in such circumstances would almost inevitably be perceived as judicial endorsement of the notion that underage marriages can be insulated from legal consequences, so long as the parties subsequently present themselves as a settled family.”

Advocate Vishal Kumar appeared for the petitioners, while Hemant Mehla, APP, represented the respondents.

Background

The FIR originated from a call received on the women’s helpline alleging domestic violence. During the inquiry, the police found that the petitioner and respondent were cohabiting and claiming to be married with parental consent.

According to the directions of the Child Welfare Committee, the respondent's age was verified and found to be 16 years and 5 months at the relevant time. Her statement under Section 164 of the CrPC disclosed no allegation of sexual assault or coercion, and she stated that she did not wish to pursue any action against her husband or in-laws.

Medical examination revealed that she was pregnant. On this basis, the FIR came to be registered. During the pendency of proceedings, the respondent attained majority and gave birth to a child. The petitioners approached the High Court seeking the quashing of the FIR, relying primarily on the victim’s present stance and the stability of the family unit.

Court’s Observation

The High Court noted that under the POCSO Act, a “child” is defined as any person below 18 years of age, and the statutory scheme criminalises sexual acts with a child per se, without incorporating consent as a constituent element of the offence.

The Court observed that, unlike Section 375 of the IPC, the provisions of the POCSO Act do not employ expressions such as “against her will” or “without consent”. Once it is established that the victim was below 18 years of age and the physical acts alleged fall within the scope of the statute, the offence stands constituted.

The Court emphasised that “the law proceeds on the footing that a child lacks the legal capacity to consent to sexual activity, and that any such activity with a person below 18 is inherently exploitative”, while elaborating that “the apparent willingness of the child, howsoever genuine it may appear on facts, does not carry exculpatory value in determining guilt.”

Referring to Sections 29 and 30 of the POCSO Act, the Court noted that once the foundational facts are established, statutory presumptions arise against the accused, and the victim’s assertion of voluntariness may be relevant at later stages, such as bail or sentencing, but not for quashing proceedings at the threshold.

The Court rejected the argument that subsequent developments, including marriage, cohabitation, birth of a child, and the victim’s present unwillingness to prosecute, could retrospectively legitimise conduct which was criminal at the time of occurrence. It held that carving out a judicial exception for “near-majority consensual relationships” would amount to crossing the line from interpretation into legislation.

The Court further observed that the case also involved allegations against family members under the Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, and quashing the proceedings would risk conveying a message that underage marriages could be sanitised by later cohabitation and acceptance.

“Courts cannot ignore the possibility that what appears, on the surface, as voluntary acquiescence by a 16-year-old may, in fact, be the product of familial pressure or community expectations, especially once pregnancy has occurred”, the Bench remarked.

While acknowledging the hardship faced by the victim and her family, the Court held that the pull of equity could not override the clear command of the statute, particularly in matters involving the protection of children.

“To snuff out the prosecution at the threshold would risk sending a message that child marriages and sexual relationships with minors can be retrospectively sanitised by arranging a ceremony and continuing cohabitation. That would sit squarely at odds with the legislative purpose of both POCSO and the child marriage law, which is to deter early marriage and sexual exploitation of children”, the Court Concluded.

Conclusion

Holding that the FIR disclosed the essential ingredients of offences under the POCSO Act and allied statutes, and that there was no patent abuse of process, the Delhi High Court refused to quash the criminal proceedings.

The petition was dismissed, with the Court clarifying that its observations were confined to the decision on the quashing petition and would not influence the outcome of the trial on the merits.

Cause Title: Prince Kumar Sharma & Ors. v. State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr. (Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:10080)

Appearances

Petitioners: Advocates Vishal Kumar, Pawan Kapoor, Shubhangi Singh

Respondents: Hemant Mehla, APP; Respondent No. 2 (in person)

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