UAPA Tribunal Not Akin To Civil Court: Delhi High Court Issues Notice In Plea Challenging Ban On PFI
Observing that the UAPA Tribunal’s role is distinct from that of a civil court, the Delhi High Court issued notice in a petition by the Popular Front of India challenging the Central Government’s order banning the organisation.
Chief Justice Devendra Kumar Upadhyaya, Justice Tushar Rao Gedela, Delhi High Court
While issuing notice in a plea filed by the Popular Front of India (PFI) challenging the Central Government’s order declaring the organisation as unlawful under UAPA, the Delhi High Court has held that the functions of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Tribunal constituted under the Act are distinct from those of a civil court.
The Court was hearing a writ petition filed by the Popular Front of India (PFI) under Article 226 of the Constitution, challenging the order of the Tribunal confirming the Union Government’s notification declaring PFI and its affiliates as unlawful associations under Section 3(1) of the Act.
A Bench comprising Chief Justice Devendra Kumar Upadhyaya and Justice Tushar Rao Gedela, while issuing the notice remarked that even though the Tribunal exercises adjudicatory powers, “the function assigned to the Tribunal under Section 4 of the Act cannot be said to the akin to the function which are assigned and discharged by a civil court for the reason that primary role assigned to the Tribunal under the scheme of the Act is to confirm the notification declaring an association to be unlawful association under Section 3(1) of the Act by the Central Government.”
Advocate Satyakam appeared for the petitioner, while S.V. Raju, Additional Solicitor General, appeared on behalf of the respondents.
Background
The Union Ministry of Home Affairs issued a notification under Section 3(1) of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, declaring the petitioner association and its affiliates as “unlawful associations.”
The notification was referred to and thereafter confirmed by the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Tribunal constituted under Section 5 of the Act, upon adjudicating whether sufficient cause existed for the declaration.
Aggrieved by the Tribunal’s confirmation order, the petitioners first approached the Supreme Court under Article 136. The Supreme Court declined to entertain the special leave petition and observed that “the constitutional writ jurisdiction of the High Court ought to be the forum to which the petitioner should have approached first,” granting liberty to move the High Court having jurisdiction.
The petitioners accordingly filed the present writ petition before the Delhi High Court.
In response, the Union of India raised a preliminary objection that the petition was not maintainable on the footing that the Tribunal, presided over by a sitting Judge of the High Court and vested with certain civil court powers, stands on the same footing as a civil court; the petitioners opposed this objection, relying inter alia on a Division Bench judgment of the Delhi High Court.
Court’s Observation
The Delhi High Court examined the statutory framework of the UAPA in depth, referring to Sections 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, and 9 of the Act. The Court noted that a declaration made by the Central Government under Section 3(1) does not take effect until it is confirmed by the Tribunal under Section 4, and the Tribunal’s decision is final under Section 9.
The Court, however, observed that the Tribunal’s function is confined to determining whether there exists “sufficient cause” to declare an association unlawful, and such function cannot be equated to the adjudication of private rights as undertaken by civil courts. The Bench clarified that “the role assigned to the Tribunal is not to decide the lis between the parties in the sense a lis is decided by a civil court; rather, the function of the Tribunal is, in a way, to confirm the declaration made by the Central Government under Section 3(1) of the Act.”
The Court elaborated that while the proceedings before the Tribunal are deemed to be judicial proceedings and the Tribunal is deemed to be a civil court but “such proceedings are judicial proceedings only within the meaning of Section 193 and 228 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and the Tribunal is to be treated as civil court for the purposes of Section 195 and Chapter XXVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, alone.”
Holding that the Tribunal cannot be considered a civil court under ordinary civil law, the Bench highlighted that “though sub-section (6) and (7) of Section 5 of the Act make applicable certain provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, Indian Penal Code, 1860 and Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, to the Tribunal and the proceedings drawn before it, the same would, in our opinion, not be sufficient to term the Tribunal as a civil court, where the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 are applied in totality with full force.”
On the question of maintainability of the petition under Article 226 of the constitution, the Delhi High Court clarified that “if challenge is made to the order of the Tribunal, such challenge would also amount to challenge to the declaration made by the Government of India under Section 3(1) of the Act declaring the association as unlawful association”, while stating that it would be “anomalous to hold that jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India will not be available for issuing a writ of certiorari against the order of the Tribunal, though it will be available against the action of the Central Government taken by declaring an association to be unlawful under Section 3(1) of the Act.”
Furthermore, while referring to the Supreme Court’s direction to the petitioner to approach the High Court, the Bench observed that the Apex Court had specifically held that “the constitutional writ jurisdiction of the High Court ought to be the forum to which the petitioner should have approached first.” This, the Bench said, left no doubt about the maintainability of a writ against the Tribunal’s confirmation order.
However, at the same time, the Court distinguished the scope of Article 226 from Article 227, holding that while writ jurisdiction is available, supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 is not. The Bench reasoned that since the Tribunal is presided over by a sitting High Court Judge, has the power to regulate its own procedure and is empowered to hold sittings outside the territorial limits of the Court, “holding that this Court will have the power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, will be nothing but a fallacy.”
Conclusion
The Delhi High Court, accordingly, concluded that the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Tribunal does not perform functions akin to a civil court and that its orders are subject to judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution. However, the Tribunal is not amenable to the High Court’s supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227.
Consequently, holding the writ petition to be maintainable, the Court issued notice to the Union of India and granted six weeks to file a counter affidavit, with two weeks for rejoinder. The matter has been listed for further hearing on January 20, 2026.
Cause Title: Popular Front of India v. Union of India
Appearances
Petitioner: Advocates Satyakam, Talha Abdul Rahman, Shaikh Saipam, Arif Hussain, A. Nowfal, Sudhanshu Tewari, Sanu Muhammad, Mansoor Ali
Respondent: ASG S.V. Raju, Senior Advocate Sonia Mathur, CGSC Rakesh Kumar, and others