Statutory Presumption U/S 29 POCSO Act Cannot Be Invoked Routinely: Delhi High Court Acquits Accused In Rape Case
The High Court held that the statutory presumption under Section 29 of the POCSO Act cannot be invoked as a matter of routine, stating that such presumptions arise only after the prosecution first establishes foundational facts through cogent evidence.
Justice Amit Mahajan, Delhi High Court
The Delhi High Court has set aside the conviction of an accused under the POCSO Act, holding that the Trial Court erred in mechanically invoking statutory presumptions without first ensuring that the foundational facts were proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
The Court was hearing a criminal appeal challenging the conviction and sentence imposed by the Trial Court in a case arising out of an FIR alleging the commission of sexual offences against a minor.
A Bench of Justice Amit Mahajan, while setting aside the conviction, held: “Sections 29 and 30 of the POCSO Act, in unequivocal terms, provide for a statutory presumption as to the commission of certain offences and presumption as to the culpable mental state of the accused. Considering the rigours with which the said provisions operate, their invocation ought not to be a matter of routine”.
Advocate Siddharth Yadav appeared for the appellant, while Sunil Kumar Gautam, APP, represented the respondents.
Background
The appellant was convicted by the Trial Court for offences under Sections 342 and 376 IPC and Section 4 of the POCSO Act. The conviction was based primarily on scientific evidence, despite the victim and her family members having turned hostile during the trial.
The Trial Court relied upon statutory presumptions under Sections 29 and 30 of the POCSO Act to hold the appellant guilty, notwithstanding contradictions in witness testimonies, lack of direct identification of the accused, and inconsistencies regarding the place and manner of occurrence.
Aggrieved by the conviction and sentence, the appellant preferred the present appeal before the High Court.
Court’s Observation
The Delhi High Court reiterated that while Sections 29 and 30 of the POCSO Act provide for statutory presumptions regarding commission of offences and culpable mental state, such provisions operate with significant rigour and therefore cannot be invoked mechanically.
The Court observed that “considering the rigours with which the said provisions operate, their invocation ought not to be a matter of routine.” It held that before shifting the burden onto the accused, the prosecution must first establish the foundational facts through reliable evidence.
The Court found that in the present case, “undue weightage was given by the learned Trial Court to the presumptions under Sections 29 and 30 of the POCSO Act without first ascertaining whether the foundational facts stood established by the prosecution”.
The Bench noted serious evidentiary gaps, including contradictions in the versions of the victim, her brother, and her mother, failure to identify the accused, uncertainty regarding the place of occurrence, and unexplained delay in lodging the FIR.
On the issue of the determination of the age of the victim, the Court held that the prosecution failed to establish that the victim was below 18 years at the relevant time. It noted that school records relied upon by the prosecution were based solely on an affidavit of the victim’s mother, without any contemporaneous documentary proof such as a birth certificate or medical age determination.
The Court further held that reliance on DNA evidence alone was insufficient to sustain a conviction, particularly when the prosecution failed to establish minority of the victim and the surrounding circumstances cast serious doubt on the prosecution’s version. The Court observed that the mere presence of DNA could at best indicate physical relations, but could not by itself establish non-consensual sexual assault.
Conclusion
Holding that the prosecution failed to establish the foundational facts necessary to trigger statutory presumptions under the POCSO Act, and that the evidence on record did not meet the standard of proof required in a criminal trial, the Delhi High Court extended the benefit of doubt to the appellant.
Accordingly, the conviction and sentence imposed by the Trial Court were set aside, and the appellant was acquitted of all charges. The Court directed that the appellant be released forthwith, if not required in any other case. The appeal and pending applications were disposed of in these terms.
Cause Title: Mohd. Faisal v. State Government of NCT of Delhi (Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:11816)
Appearances
Appellant: Siddharth Yadav, Advocate; Anmol Kumar Pandey, Advocate
Respondent: Sunil Kumar Gautam, APP; Senior Advocate Asheesh Jain (Amicus Curiae)