Courts Have No Discretion To Impose Lesser Sentence Once Accused Found Guilty U/S 376(2) IPC Deserving Life Imprisonment: Bombay High Court
The High Court held that once a court finds an accused guilty under Section 376(2) of the Indian Penal Code and determines that the circumstances warrant life imprisonment, the statute leaves no discretion with the court but to impose imprisonment for the remainder of the convict’s natural life.
Justice Manish Pitale, Justice Shreeram V. Shirsat, Bombay High Court
The Bombay High Court observed that once an accused is found guilty under Section 376(2) of the Indian Penal Code and the court concludes that the offence deserves the punishment of life imprisonment, the statutory framework leaves no discretion in the Court but to sentence the appellant for imprisonment for the remainder of his life.
The High Court emphasised that after the 2013 substitution of Section 376 IPC, the law leaves no discretion with the court in such circumstances to impose a lesser form of life sentence.
The Court was hearing a criminal appeal challenging the judgment of the Special Court under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, which had convicted the appellant for offences under Section 376(2)(f) of the Indian Penal Code and provisions of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act and sentenced him to rigorous imprisonment for life, meaning imprisonment for the remainder of his natural life.
A Division Bench of Justice Manish Pitale and Justice Shreeram V. Shirsat, while upholding the conviction and sentence, observed: “It is to be noted that section 376 was substituted in the year 2013, and as it now exists in its present form, …once the Court finds that the accused is proved to be guilty of an offence under section 376(2) and its various clauses, as also the fact that the Court reaches a conclusion about the accused deserving sentence of imprisonment for life, there is no discretion left in the Court, but to sentence the appellant for imprisonment for the remainder of his life”.
Background
The prosecution case arose from a statement given by the victim to the police, which resulted in the registration of the FIR and initiation of the investigation. During the investigation, statements of several witnesses were recorded, and the victim was medically examined. Eventually, a charge sheet was filed, and the accused was charged under Section 376(2)(f) IPC along with relevant provisions of the POCSO Act.
During the trial, the prosecution examined multiple witnesses, including the victim, the medical officer, school authorities, a counsellor, a social worker and investigating officers. Documentary evidence, such as school records and medical reports were also produced to support the prosecution's case. The defence examined witnesses, including close family members, to assert that the accused had been falsely implicated.
After evaluating the oral and documentary evidence, the trial court found that the prosecution had proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt and convicted the accused, sentencing him to rigorous imprisonment for life for the remainder of his natural life along with a fine.
Aggrieved by the conviction and sentence, the accused approached the High Court in appeal, contending that the prosecution had failed to prove essential elements of the case and that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the conviction.
Court’s Observations
The High Court undertook a detailed analysis of the evidence and the legal principles governing the issues raised in the appeal. One of the principal questions raised by the appellant related to the determination of the victim’s age. The Court examined the statutory framework under the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act and the settled principles laid down by the Supreme Court regarding the determination of age in such cases.
The Bench noted that the law consistently accords primacy to documentary evidence, such as school records, while determining the age of a victim. Referring to precedents of the Supreme Court, the Court observed that entries in school admission registers prepared based on information provided by parents constitute credible public documents under Section 35 of the Evidence Act and carry greater evidentiary value than medical opinion.
In the present case, the Court found that the prosecution had produced the original school admission register and related documents which recorded the victim’s date of birth. These entries had been made at the time of admission based on information provided by the father himself. The Court also noted that the accused had admitted the victim’s date of birth during his examination under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
In light of this material, the Court rejected the contention that the victim’s age was not proved. It held that once reliable documentary evidence was available, there was no necessity to rely on ossification or medical tests, which are only guiding factors in the absence of documentary material.
The Court then examined the evidence of the victim. Reiterating the settled legal principle that the testimony of a prosecutrix can by itself form the basis of a conviction if it inspires confidence, the Bench found the victim’s evidence to be consistent and reliable. The Court observed that the victim had clearly described the incidents and her testimony remained unshaken during cross-examination.
The Bench further noted that the evidence of other witnesses, including school authorities, counsellors and social workers, corroborated the circumstances in which the victim eventually approached authorities and reported the offence. The Court found nothing unnatural in the sequence of events that led to the lodging of the complaint.
The defence argument that the case was fabricated due to personal grievances was also rejected. The Court held that such a theory was highly improbable and could not reasonably explain the making of serious allegations of this nature.
As regards medical evidence, the Court observed that the medical examination report supported the version of the victim and that the absence of fresh injuries did not discredit the prosecution's case, particularly when the timing of the alleged incidents explained the medical findings.
The Court then addressed the statutory framework governing punishment under Section 376(2) IPC. The Bench noted that the provision had been substituted in 2013 and now expressly provides that when life imprisonment is imposed for offences under Section 376(2), such imprisonment shall mean imprisonment for the remainder of the convict’s natural life.
The Court, while relying on its previous ruling in Jagannath Pandurang Waghare vs. State of Maharashtra, held that once it concludes that life imprisonment is warranted in such cases, it has no discretion to impose a lesser form of life sentence.
Conclusion
In view of the evidence and the statutory framework, the High Court found no error in the findings of the trial court. It held that the prosecution had successfully established the guilt of the accused and that the sentence imposed was consistent with the statutory mandate under Section 376(2) IPC.
The Court therefore dismissed the appeal and affirmed the conviction and sentence imposed by the trial court.
Cause Title: Mohammad Shahjad Amir Hasan Shaikh v. The State of Maharashtra & Anr. (Neutral Citation: 2026:BHC-AS:11490-DB)
Appearances
Appellant: Advocates Fauzan Shaikh, Mohd. Munerul Shaikh, Shashank Shubham and M. B. Shaikh
Respondents: Sangita E. Phad, APP; Advocates Abhijit P. Kulkarni, Abhishek Roy, Sweta Shah, Shreyas Zarkar and Gourav Shahane