Husband Crossing Age Limit Under ART Act Does Not Automatically Extinguish Wife’s Independent Eligibility For IVF: Chhattisgarh High Court

The Court set aside the rejection of a couple’s request and permitted them to proceed with IVF/ART treatment, subject to medical fitness and the remaining statutory safeguards.

The Court was hearing a writ petition challenging the rejection of permission for IVF/ART treatment solely because the husband, aged about 57, had crossed the upper age limit prescribed for men under Section 21(g)(ii) of the ART Act. The wife, aged about 47, remained within the limit prescribed under Section 21(g)(i) and had been found medically suitable for the procedure.

A Bench of Justice Amitendra Kishore Prasad observed: “Thus, merely because petitioner No.2 has crossed the age prescribed for a man under Section 21(g)(ii) of the ART Act, the statutory eligibility of petitioner No.1, who continues to fall within the age prescribed for a woman under Section 21(g)(i) of the ART Act, cannot automatically be treated as extinguished. Such interpretation would amount to reading into the Act a composite age restriction for a couple which is not expressly provided by the legislature.”

The Bench further added: “Where medical fitness, informed consent and the capacity to assume parental responsibilities are established, the mere fact of crossing a prescribed age cannot be viewed in isolation from the constitutional guarantee of dignity and personal liberty.”

Advocate Gagan Tiwari appeared for the petitioners. Panel Lawyer Anmol Sharma appeared for the State.

Background

The petitioners had been married for approximately 22 years and had no surviving child. The wife underwent an unsuccessful intrauterine insemination procedure in 2013. She subsequently conceived in 2015 but suffered a miscarriage at approximately four months of pregnancy.

After conventional medical options proved unsuccessful, the couple approached a registered ART clinic for IVF treatment. Following medical examination and counselling, the clinic found them suitable for the proposed treatment but advised them to obtain permission from the competent authority because the husband had crossed the prescribed age limit.

The couple’s representation was rejected solely because the husband was over the age of 55. The authority proceeded on the basis that his ineligibility rendered the commissioning couple collectively ineligible for ART services.

The petitioners contended that Section 21(g) prescribed separate, gender-specific age limits and did not provide a composite age ceiling for a commissioning couple. They argued that the wife’s eligibility had to be examined independently because she was below 50 and medically suitable for treatment.

They relied upon Neeru Singh v. State of Chhattisgarh and Others (2026), Sanchita Ghosh and Another v. Union of India (2024), X2 v. Chief Medical Officer-cum-Civil Surgeon and the Appropriate Authority (2026), Ankhi Laha v. Union of India (2026), Piu Das Sarkar v. Union of India (2026), Babitha A. Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2026), Chayana Bisui v. State of West Bengal (2026), Shewta Tuteja v. Union of India (2026), Pushpa v. Union of India (2026) and Jayanta Dasgupta v. State of West Bengal (2026).

The State opposed the petition, contending that the ART Act expressly limited services to women between 21 and 50 and men between 21 and 55. It argued that the Court could not relax an express statutory condition or create an exception based upon the couple’s personal circumstances.

Court’s Observations

ART Act Does Not Prescribe A Composite Age Limit

The Court examined Section 21(g), which permits ART services for women above 21 and below 50, and men above 21 and below 55. It held that the provision prescribes age requirements separately for women and men instead of laying down a joint age ceiling for a commissioning couple.

The Court observed: “Conspicuously, the Act does not contain the concept of combined age for commissioning couples analogous to the composite age criteria applicable to prospective adoptive parents. Instead, the Act adopts an individual-centric approach, whereby the age eligibility criteria are separately laid down for women and men rather than collectively for a couple.”

The Court found further support in Section 2(1)(n), which defines “patients” as an individual or a couple approaching a registered clinic for infertility management. It held that the language of the statutory framework indicated that age eligibility had to be examined with reference to the individual seeking the ART service.

The Court noted that the wife independently satisfied the prescribed age condition and had been found medically suitable. The husband had consented to and was willing to participate in the treatment, while the couple expressed willingness to comply with all statutory declarations and safeguards.

The Court held: “The provision, being part of a regulatory framework governing ART services, cannot be extended beyond its express terms so as to create an additional restriction which the legislature has not specifically incorporated.”

Husband’s Ineligibility Could Not Automatically Attach To Wife

The Court found that the husband was not claiming eligibility contrary to the age restriction applicable to him. The couple instead sought treatment through the wife, who remained eligible under Section 21(g)(i), with the husband’s consent and participation.

It held that the statutory definition of a commissioning couple did not make one spouse’s eligibility entirely dependent upon the other spouse’s age. Treating the husband’s age as an absolute bar to treatment for the wife would, therefore, import a cumulative restriction that was absent from the Act.

The Court added that such an interpretation would substantially curtail the wife’s reproductive choice despite her independently satisfying the statutory age criterion.

Reproductive Autonomy Forms Part Of Article 21

The Court relied upon Suchita Srivastava v. Chandigarh Administration (2009), in which the Supreme Court recognised a woman’s reproductive choices as a dimension of personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution.

It also referred to K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017), which recognised decisional autonomy concerning reproduction as part of the constitutional protection of privacy, and X2 v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2023), which explained that reproductive rights include the right to choose whether and when to have children and to access reproductive healthcare.

The Court also considered X4 v. Union of India (2024) and Vijaya Kumari S. v. Union of India (2026) while examining the relationship between statutory regulation, reproductive freedom and the circumstances in which an assisted-reproduction process was pursued.

The Court observed that the ART Act’s requirements had to be followed but interpreted in light of the legislation’s object and the constitutional rights involved.

The Bench stated: “A rigid and mechanical interpretation of an age restriction, particularly where one spouse independently satisfies the prescribed eligibility criteria and the proposed treatment is medically permissible, ought not to result in an unintended and disproportionate denial of the opportunity to pursue parenthood.”

Other High Courts Rejected Composite-Age Interpretation

The Court referred to D and Another v. Union of India and Another (2023), which considered the prospective application of ART age restrictions where treatment had commenced before the statutory limits came into force. That decision had also relied upon Nandini K. v. Union of India (2022), where discontinuing an already initiated ART process was found to unreasonably restrict reproductive choice.

The Court considered Sarbjit Kaur and Another v. State of Punjab and Others (2026), in which the Punjab and Haryana High Court held that restrictions not found in the ART Act could not be used to defeat its regulatory purpose where the couple was medically suitable and willing to undertake the associated risks.

The Court also referred to Shyamoli Saha and Another v. State of West Bengal and Others (2024), where the Calcutta High Court held that an otherwise eligible wife should not be denied ART services because her husband had crossed the age limit.

Reliance was further placed upon Sajitha Abdul Nazar and Others v. Union of India (2025), where the Kerala High Court held that requiring both spouses to satisfy the age criteria would disadvantage married women compared with single women, despite the absence of any express composite-age restriction in the Act.

The Court also considered Shewta Tuteja and Another v. Union of India (2026), which emphasised that the ART Act is a regulatory enactment intended to ensure safe and ethical practices and should not be construed as importing restrictions not expressly contemplated by the legislature.

Medical Fitness And Statutory Safeguards Remained Mandatory

The Court found that the rejection was not based upon any medical contraindication, the wife’s unsuitability or non-compliance with any other statutory safeguard. It was based solely upon the husband’s age.

The Court held that the case warranted intervention because the wife remained within the prescribed age, had undergone medical examination and counselling and had been found suitable for the treatment.

At the same time, the Court accepted that the registered clinic could not be faulted for declining to proceed without permission. It observed that the clinic remained bound by the ART Act and could act only after an appropriate direction from the Court or competent authority.

The Court clarified that permission did not dispense with medical assessment, informed consent, professional advice or any statutory, ethical and regulatory requirement governing IVF/ART treatment.

Crossing Age Of 50 During Ongoing Treatment

The Court directed that if the wife crossed the age of 50 during a treatment cycle commenced pursuant to its order, the intervening attainment of that age would not, by itself, require discontinuation of the ongoing cycle.

It clarified that continuation would remain subject to medical advisability and compliance with every other applicable statutory requirement.

The Court further observed: “Where the body remains capable and the heart remains willing, the desire for parenthood cannot be dismissed merely as a desire whose time has passed.”

Conclusion

The Court allowed the writ petition and set aside the order rejecting permission solely because the husband had crossed the age prescribed under Section 21(g)(ii) of the ART Act.

It directed the authorities and the registered clinic to permit the couple to proceed with IVF/ART treatment, subject to the wife satisfying the applicable medical requirements and both petitioners complying with all statutory, ethical and regulatory safeguards.

The Court held that the husband’s age could not, by itself, bar the eligible wife from undergoing the procedure. It further directed that her crossing the age of 50 during an ongoing treatment cycle would not automatically discontinue or frustrate that cycle.

The Court protected the clinic from penal or adverse action under the ART Act for providing treatment in compliance with its order, provided all other requirements were followed. It also directed the authorities not to create unnecessary administrative impediments.

The Court clarified that the relief was confined to the peculiar facts of the case and did not dispense with any other mandatory requirement under the ART Act or the applicable rules and regulations.

Cause Title: Archana Tiwari and Another v. State of Chhattisgarh and Others (Neutral Citation: 2026:CGHC:43127)

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