Shared Autorickshaw Used For Commuting To Office Not "Workplace" Under POSH Act Unless It Is Provided By Employer: Bombay High Court

The Court held that a shared autorickshaw used by employees for commuting to their respective workplaces does not fall within the statutory definition of a workplace.

The Court was hearing a writ petition challenging an order passed by an Internal Committee under the Sexual Harassment Act, holding the petitioner guilty of sexual harassment and recommending action against him under the applicable service rules.

The petitioner contended that the alleged incident had occurred in a shared autorickshaw and not at a workplace as defined under the Act.

A Division Bench of Justice Suman Shyam and Justice Firdosh P. Pooniwalla observed: “It can be seen that Section 2(o)(v) includes within the meaning of ‘workplace’ transportation by the employer for undertaking a journey to any place visited by the employer arising out of or during the course of employment.

Therefore, the Bench added: "...in order to fall within the meaning of ‘workplace’, the transportation has to be provided by the employer. In the present case, the Petitioner and Respondent No.3, alongwith one another passenger, were sharing an autorickshaw from the Kurla Railway Station to BKC at Bandra. Although the Petitioner was going to his office, the said transportation had not been provided either by his employer or the employer of Respondent No.3. In these circumstances, in our view, such transportation would not fall within the definition of a ‘workplace’ as defined by Section 2(o)(v).”

Advocate Anand Pande appeared on behalf of the petitioner. Advocate Abhijit Joshi appeared for the respondents.

Background

The petitioner, an employee of a bank, was travelling from a railway station to his workplace in a shared autorickshaw. Another employee working for a different organisation was also travelling in the same vehicle.

Subsequently, allegations of sexual harassment were made against the petitioner in relation to the incident that allegedly occurred during the journey. A complaint was first made before the complainant's employer and was thereafter referred to the Internal Committee of the petitioner's employer.

Following an enquiry, the Internal Committee found the petitioner guilty of sexual harassment and recommended action under the applicable service rules. The petitioner challenged the order before the High Court, contending that the Internal Committee lacked jurisdiction because the alleged incident had not occurred at a "workplace" within the meaning of the Sexual Harassment Act.

Court's Observations

The Court first considered whether it should entertain the writ petition despite the availability of an appellate remedy. The Bench noted that the challenge raised a pure jurisdictional issue concerning the authority of the Internal Committee to entertain the complaint. The Court observed that where questions of jurisdiction are raised, a writ court may not necessarily relegate a party to an alternative remedy.

The Bench then examined the statutory scheme of the Sexual Harassment Act, particularly Sections 2(a), 2(o), 9 and 11. The Court noted that Section 2(a) defines an "aggrieved woman" in relation to a workplace, while Section 9 permits a complaint of sexual harassment at the workplace to be made before the Internal Committee. Reading these provisions together, the Court held that the jurisdiction of the Internal Committee is predicated upon the alleged act having occurred at a workplace recognised by the statute.

The Court observed: “Therefore, in the light of the aforesaid provisions, the Internal Committee of a Company or an organisation can entertain a complaint of an aggrieved woman of being subjected to sexual harassment only at the ‘workplace’.”

The Bench then turned to Section 2(o)(v), which extends the definition of workplace to include places visited by an employee during the course of employment, including transportation provided by the employer. Examining the language of the provision, the Court found that the legislature had consciously linked transportation to employer-provided transportation and not to every mode of travel undertaken by an employee while commuting.

The Court observed that the Internal Committee had proceeded on the basis that since the alleged incident occurred while the parties were travelling to work, it would automatically fall within the wide ambit of "workplace". The Bench rejected that interpretation and held that the statutory language did not support such an expansive reading.

The Court further held: “Respondent No.2 cannot entertain a complaint of an aggrieved woman being subjected to sexual harassment if the alleged sexual harassment has not taken place at the ‘workplace’. For this reason, in our view, Respondent No.2 had no jurisdiction to entertain the complaint of Respondent No.3 and pass the Order dated 29th August, 2023.”

The Bench also rejected the submission that the Internal Committee could first entertain the complaint and thereafter determine whether the incident occurred at a workplace. According to the Court, the existence of a workplace within the meaning of the Act is itself a jurisdictional fact that must exist before the Internal Committee can proceed further.

The Court observed: “Since, in the present case, as held by us, the alleged sexual harassment has not taken place at a ‘workplace’, Respondent No.2 had no jurisdiction to entertain the complaint of Respondent No.3. In these circumstances, the question, of Respondent No.2 entertaining the complaint and then deciding whether the alleged sexual harassment took place at a ‘workplace’, does not arise at all.”

Emphasising the sequence mandated by law, the Court further held: “In our view, the law would mandate such an Internal Committee to first decide the jurisdictional question whether the alleged sexual harassment has taken place at a ‘workplace’ and only if the answer to that question is in the affirmative, would the Internal Committee have jurisdiction to conduct a further enquiry in the matter.”

Conclusion

The High Court held that a shared autorickshaw used by employees for commuting to work, without being provided by the employer, does not constitute a workplace under Section 2(o)(v) of the Sexual Harassment Act. Consequently, the Internal Committee lacked jurisdiction to entertain the complaint and pass the impugned order.

Accordingly, the Court allowed the writ petition and set aside the order passed by the Internal Committee. The Bench clarified that it had not examined the merits of the allegations and had expressed no opinion on whether any act of sexual harassment had in fact occurred, leaving that issue open to be dealt with in accordance with the law in appropriate proceedings.

Cause Title: Siddhesh Pradeep Satpute v. State Bank of India & Ors. (Neutral Citation: 2026:BHC-OS:13320-DB)

Appearances

Petitioner: Advocate Anand Pande, instructed by Advocate Shobit Shukla

Respondents: Advocates Abhijit Joshi, Varsha Sawant, Varad Sirsikar and Sourav Somani

Click here to read/download Judgment