The Bombay High Court has held that the right of protected slum dwellers to rehabilitation cannot be equated with ownership or an entitlement to permanent alternate accommodation on the same land or within its vicinity.

The Court declined to interfere with the allotment of Project Affected Persons tenements to eligible slum dwellers at Bhandup instead of granting them in-situ rehabilitation on the developers’ land at Chinchpokli.

The Court was hearing a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution challenging an order passed by the Assistant Commissioner of the Mumbai Municipal Corporation, which had rejected the petitioners’ appeal seeking in-situ rehabilitation. The petitioners also sought enforcement of undertakings allegedly furnished by the developers for accommodating eligible hutment dwellers in the redevelopment scheme.

A Bench of Justice Suman Shyam and Justice Advait M. Sethna observed: “…the Petitioner has lead much emphasis on the right, including fundamental right of the Petitioners to in-situ rehabilitation. In this context, it is apposite to refer to the judgment of a coordinate Bench of this Court in Abdul Majid Vakil Ahmad Patvekari & Ors. vs. Slum Rehabilitation Authority & Ors. In a similar factual complexion, this Court held that the fact of being protected slum dwellers, cannot elevate their protection to such an extent that such slum dwellers have to be rehabilitated either on the same land, if any remaining, after the project work is completed or they may be provided a permanent alternate accommodation, within the vicinity. Mere right of rehabilitation cannot be recognized to be equivalent to a right of ownership. More particularly, when it is not the case that the Petitioners are being denied of the benefit of rehabilitation. In our view, the ratio in the said decision would clearly apply in the given case.”

Advocate Mohit A. Singh appeared for the petitioners. Additional Government Pleader Jyoti Chavan appeared for the respondents.

Background

The petitioners were eligible slum dwellers whose structures were situated wholly or substantially on land belonging to the Mumbai Municipal Corporation. Adjoining land owned by private developers was being redeveloped under Regulation 33(7) of the Development Control and Promotion Regulations for Greater Bombay, 2034.

One developer had undertaken to hand over a setback area to the Corporation, while another undertaking stated that eligible hutment dwellers situated on the developers’ land would be accommodated in the proposed redevelopment scheme.

The petitioners and other slum dwellers previously instituted a civil suit seeking permanent alternate accommodation in that redevelopment scheme. The suit was dismissed for non-prosecution, and subsequent applications seeking its restoration were unsuccessful. Although the High Court later granted liberty to challenge an earlier order refusing restoration, the petitioners did not pursue that remedy.

The Corporation subsequently classified the hutment dwellers according to whether they were to be rehabilitated by it or by the developers. The petitioners were declared eligible for rehabilitation by the Corporation and were allotted permanent alternate accommodation in Project Affected Persons tenements at Bhandup.

After an earlier writ petition, the petitioners were permitted to appeal before the Assistant Commissioner under the bottleneck policy. Their appeal against the allotment and their request to enforce the developers’ undertaking were rejected, leading to the present petition.

The petitioners contended that the undertakings required the developers to provide them in-situ rehabilitation and that denying such accommodation violated Article 21 of the Constitution. The Corporation maintained that the petitioners were being offered completed tenements at Bhandup and could not insist upon accommodation on the developers’ land. The developers argued that the petitioners’ structures were situated wholly or substantially on municipal land and that similar relief had already been pursued through the civil suit.

Court’s Observations

The Court noted that the petitioners had previously approached the Civil Court for substantially similar relief and that the suit remained dismissed for non-prosecution. Despite being granted liberty to pursue their remedy against the order refusing restoration, they had not taken further steps.

The Court observed: “Contextually, we may observe that the issues raised and reliefs claimed in the said Suit, vis-à-vis, the present proceedings are similar/overlapping, indicative of parallel proceedings for similar cause of action. Some of the Petitioners had filed an Appeal from Order before this Court, and as the chronology of events (supra) would clearly indicate, the same was disposed of by an Order dated 8th July 2025. It was left open to the Petitioners to pursue their remedies against the dismissal of the earlier Application of the Petitioners, for restoration of the Suit by the Trial Court. Nothing from the record is pointed out to indicate any further steps initiated/taken by them, pursuant to such Order.”

The Court accepted the developers’ submission that the writ petition amounted to another attempt to secure relief similar to that claimed in the civil proceedings.

The Court noted that the unchallenged Annexure-II prepared by the Corporation identified the petitioners as eligible for rehabilitation by the municipal body. A subsequent municipal communication divided responsibility for the identified hutments between the Corporation and the developers.

The Assistant Commissioner had found that the petitioners’ hutments were situated substantially on municipal land rather than the developers’ property. The Court rejected the contention that the authority had failed to consider the undertakings or had violated natural justice.

It observed: “We find that the same is a speaking Order. There are elaborate factual findings recorded by the Competent Authority after due consideration of the contentions raised by the hutment dwellers and the contesting Respondents. There is a clear finding of fact recorded by such fact finding authority, inter alia to the effect that the hutments of the Petitioners are majorly situated on plot bearing C.S. No.782 of Mazgoan Division, owned by Respondent No. 2 and not by the Developers i.e. Respondent Nos. 4 and 5.”

The Court held that the petitioners’ request for disclosure of complete rehabilitation records, allotment details, plans and undertakings amounted to a roving inquiry that could not be undertaken in the proceedings.

The Court found that determining the petitioners’ entitlement would require an adjudication of contested questions about the location of their structures on municipal and private land. Those issues had already been considered by the Assistant Commissioner and could not appropriately be reopened under Article 226.

The Court remarked: “These are not admitted facts and are seriously disputed/contested by the parties. In such view of the matter, we would refrain from entering into the realm of factual disputes in light of contesting claims and counter-claims raised by the parties. To adjudicate the same in a Writ Petition, would not fall within the ambit of our extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.”

The Court also rejected the petitioners’ parity claim based on another hutment dweller. It noted that the person relied upon had independently approached the High Court for similar relief and had not been granted interim protection. The pendency of those proceedings had not been disclosed in the present petition.

The Court recorded that the Corporation was willing to execute permanent alternate accommodation agreements and rehabilitate the petitioners in completed tenements at Bhandup. The petitioners nevertheless insisted upon accommodation on the developers’ land at Chinchpokli.

Applying Abdul Majid Vakil Ahmad Patvekari v. Slum Rehabilitation Authority (2021), the Court held that protected status did not entitle slum dwellers to insist upon rehabilitation on the same land or within its vicinity when the benefit of rehabilitation itself was not being denied.

The Court held: “As analyzed above, we are not persuaded by the Petitioners in the given facts and circumstances, to interfere in writ jurisdiction, on the ground that the Petitioners have a right as also a fundamental right of in-situ rehabilitation on Developer’s Land, as claimed by them.”

The Court also took note of the Corporation’s submission that the road adjoining and passing through both parcels of land had been taken over for development, which further undermined the claim for in-situ rehabilitation.

Referring to High Court On Its Own Motion v. State of Maharashtra (2026), Moinuddin Pashamiya Shaikh v. Slum Rehabilitation Authority (2023) and Bishop John Rodrigues v. State of Maharashtra (2024), the Court recorded: “This Court made specific observations deprecating the claim of in-situ rehabilitation. This, in the backdrop of the avalanche of disputes governed under the Slum Act, reaching the Courts. Similar findings are echoed in Judgments of the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in Moinuddin Pashamiya Shaikh Vs. Slum Rehabilitation Authority and Bishop John Rodrigues Vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors. This Court has, inter-alia, observed in High Court On Its Own Motion (supra) that such claims of in-situ rehabilitation find no justification within our constitutional scheme and is unconscionable.”

The Court found that the petition contained averments seeking to invoke promissory estoppel and legitimate expectation. However, the petitioners had neither identified a representation or promise supporting promissory estoppel nor established an enforceable right underlying their asserted legitimate expectation.

The Court observed: “However, there is no material and/or submissions advanced before us in this regard. In any event, in the absence of any representation and/or promise pointed to us by the Petitioners, for invoking the doctrine of promissory estoppel in the given facts, as also the endeavour to invoke legitimate expectation, without an enforceable right, would not aid and/or assist the case of the Petitioners, in any manner.”

Conclusion

The Bombay High Court declined to interfere with the Assistant Commissioner’s order and disposed of the writ petition without costs. It granted the petitioners liberty to raise such claims or counterclaims before the appropriate authority or court as permitted by law.

Cause Title: Mangesh Yashwant Parave & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra Through Urban Development Department & Ors. (2026:BHC-OS:19000-DB)

Appearances

Petitioners: Advocate Mohit A. Singh

Respondents: Additional Government Pleader Jyoti Chavan and Assistant Government Pleader Vikrant Parashurami; Advocates Chaitanya Chavan and Anuja Tirmali, instructed by Advocate Komal Punjabi; Advocate Mayur Khandeparkar, with Advocates Aditya Miskita, Sanjeel Kadam and Netra Jagtap, instructed by Kadam & Co.

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