Mere Criticism Of Government Not A Crime: Andhra Pradesh High Court Quashes Criminal Case Over Social Media Post Against Ex-MLA's Son

The Court partly allowed a criminal petition and quashed proceedings under Section 153 IPC against two accused persons in a case relating to the circulation of a social media post alleging that the son of a former MLA had been arrested for transporting 60 kilograms of ganja and questioned by police.

The Court was hearing a petition under Section 482 CrPC seeking quashing of FIR No.354 of 2021 registered at Jaggaiahpet Police Station for offences under Sections 153, 120B and 505(2) IPC along with Section 66 of the Information Technology Act, 2000.

The prosecution alleged that the petitioners and other accused persons conspired to circulate false propaganda on social media with the caption that the son of a political leader had been arrested in a drugs case while transporting ganja.

A Bench of Justice K. Sreenivasa Reddy observed: “Time and again, this Court and the Hon’ble Apex Court consistently hold that an offence under Section 153/153A IPC requires proving mens rea (guilty intention) to provoke violence or create public disorder.”

The Bench further observed: “It mandates that speech must be evaluated for promoting enmity or hatred, emphasising that mere criticism of the government is not a crime.”

The Court additionally held: “The accused, who has not done anything directly against a specific community, or was not part of a group/rally raising such animosity, they cannot be held guilty merely by association or on suspicion under Section 153A of IPC, …Prima facie in the absence of any such words that has been promoted, this Court without there being any hesitation comes to a conclusion that an offence under Section 153 of IPC would not attract as against the petitioners/A1 and A2.”

Advocate Ginjupalli Subba Rao represented the petitioner, while Public Prosecutor appeared for the State of Andhra Pradesh.

Background

According to the complaint, the de facto complainant alleged that certain persons bearing a grudge against his family circulated a social media post stating that he had been arrested in a drugs case while transporting 60 kilograms of ganja and had been grilled by police during an inquiry.

The complaint further alleged that the post was circulated widely on social media platforms and had damaged the reputation and honour of the complainant and his father, who had served as a Member of Legislative Assembly and Government Whip.

It was alleged that upon inquiry, the complainant came to know that the petitioners, along with other accused persons, were involved in the circulation of the alleged false news. Based on the complaint, Crime No.354 of 2021 came to be registered for offences under Sections 153, 120B, and 505(2) IPC along with Section 66 of the Information Technology Act, 2000.

Before the High Court, the petitioners contended that the ingredients of Section 153 IPC were not made out since there was no allegation that the alleged circulation of social media posts resulted in rioting or provoked any unlawful assembly or public disorder. The petitioners further argued that Section 505(2) IPC was also inapplicable as the allegations did not disclose promotion of enmity or hatred between religious, racial, linguistic or communal groups.

The State, while conceding that Section 153 IPC may not be attracted, opposed quashing of proceedings under Section 505(2) IPC and contended that the allegations disclosed circulation of false propaganda intended to promote enmity between different groups.

Court’s Observation

The High Court examined the scope and ingredients of Section 153 IPC dealing with wanton provocation with intent to cause riot. Referring to the statutory provision, the Court observed that the offence requires an illegal act done maliciously or wantonly with the intention or knowledge that such provocation would lead to rioting.

The Court observed: “The essential ingredients of an offence punishable under Section 153 of IPC are, there must be an illegal act done maliciously or wantonly, providing provocation to any person, and with the intent or knowledge that such provocation will cause the offence of rioting.”

Referring to Bilal Ahmed Kaloo v. State of Andhra Pradesh (1997), the Court discussed the distinction between Sections 153A and 505(2) IPC and observed that both provisions share the common ingredient of promoting feelings of enmity, hatred or ill-will between communities or groups.

The Bench observed: “The common ingredient in both the offences is promoting feeling of enmity, hatred or ill-will between different religious or racial or linguistic or regional groups or castes or communities.”

The High Court further reiterated that prosecution under Sections 153 and 153A IPC requires proof of guilty intention to incite violence or public disorder and that speech must be examined in the context of promoting communal hatred rather than mere criticism or allegations.

The Court observed: “It mandates that speech must be evaluated for promoting enmity or hatred, emphasising that mere criticism of the government is not a crime.”

The Court also clarified that criminal liability under Section 153A IPC cannot arise merely based on association or suspicion in the absence of any direct act targeting a specific community or participation in activities promoting communal animosity.

Examining the allegations in the FIR, the Bench noted that there was no specific accusation that the circulation of the alleged false propaganda had resulted in rioting or public disorder. The Court found the absence of any material showing that the petitioners promoted communal hatred or incited violence.

In this regard, the Court observed: “A perusal of the contents of the report goes to show that there is no specific accusation as against the petitioners/A1 and A2 that because of the circulation of false propaganda, there occurred rioting.”

Accordingly, the Court held that the ingredients necessary to attract Section 153 IPC were not prima facie established against the petitioners.

The High Court however, declined to interfere with proceedings under Section 505(2) IPC at the threshold stage. The Court observed that the allegations in the FIR disclosed circulation of statements allegedly intended to promote enmity between groups and that whether the petitioners were actually involved in the circulation constituted a disputed question of fact requiring investigation.

The Court further observed that an FIR is not substantive evidence and merely forms the foundation for investigation. The Bench reiterated that a detailed evaluation of factual allegations cannot ordinarily be undertaken at the stage of exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC.

The Court observed: “It is a settled law that merely the FIR is foundation of investigation, it cannot be replaced by formal evidence in the Court.”

Conclusion

The Andhra Pradesh High Court partly allowed the criminal petition and quashed proceedings against the petitioners for the offence punishable under Section 153 IPC in Crime No.354 of 2021 of Jaggaiahpet Police Station.

However, the Court refused to quash proceedings under Sections 120B and 505(2) IPC along with Section 66 of the Information Technology Act, 2000, holding that investigation into the allegations under those provisions could not be interdicted at the present stage.

Cause Title: Lagadapati Praveen Kumar v. State of Andhra Pradesh & Anr.

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