Suppression Of First Dying Declaration Contradicting Later Statements Fatal: Andhra Pradesh High Court Acquits Man Accused Of Setting Wife On Fire
The Court held that suppression of the earliest dying declaration recorded by the doctor, which attributed the burn injuries to an accidental fire while the deceased was sleeping, rendered subsequent inconsistent dying declarations unreliable.
The Andhra Pradesh High Court has acquitted a man accused of killing his wife after holding that the prosecution suppressed the earliest dying declaration made by the deceased to the duty doctor, which was inconsistent with subsequent dying declarations implicating the accused.
The Court observed that the first statement made by the deceased at the time of admission in the hospital stated that she suffered burn injuries in a fire accident while sleeping in the hut, whereas later dying declarations alleged that the accused lit a matchstick after the deceased poured kerosene on herself.
A Bench of Justice B.V.L.N. Chakravarthi observed: “As rightly argued by the learned counsel for the appellant, Ex.P-13 was suppressed from the Court below by the prosecution. Ex.P-13 has not seen the light of the day, until cross-examination of P.W-12 for the first time. The reasons for not placing Ex.P-13 before the Court below are very clear. If Ex.P-13 is placed before the Court below, it will show that there are multiple dying declarations in the case. One recorded by the doctor, another recorded by the Police Officer and another by a Judicial Magistrate. The first ding declaration recorded in the case would be Ex.P-13 i.e., by the doctor at the time of admission of patient in the hospital. The evidence of P.W-12 as well as P.W-13 both doctors would show that patient was conscious, coherent and in fit statement of mind to make a statement all throughout. Therefore, if Ex.P-13 is taken into consideration as first statement made by the victim/deceased, it is inconsistent with her later dying declaration recorded under Ex.P-12 and Ex.P-15 respectively. In fact, it is diagonally opposite to the statement made later. Probably to avoid the inconsistency, P.W-15 for the reasons best known to him suppressed Ex.P-13 statement recorded by P.W-12 at the time of admission.”
Advocate D. Purnachandra Reddy appeared for the appellant-accused, while Additional Public Prosecutor C.P. Somayaji appeared for the State.
Background
According to the prosecution, the deceased was married to the accused for about ten years, and the couple resided in B. Kodur village in Kurnool District. The prosecution alleged that the accused, who was addicted to alcohol, used to suspect the fidelity of the deceased and harass her.
It was alleged that on 12.01.2007, the accused came home in an intoxicated condition, abused and beat the deceased, and instigated her to commit suicide. The prosecution's case was that the deceased poured kerosene on herself, and while she was searching for a matchbox, the accused lit a matchstick and threw it on her, causing burn injuries.
The deceased later succumbed to septicemia resulting from burn injuries. The Sessions Court acquitted the accused under Sections 498-A and 302 IPC but convicted him under Section 304 Part II IPC and sentenced him to ten years’ rigorous imprisonment.
The accused challenged the conviction before the High Court.
Court’s Observation
The High Court noted that the prosecution's case substantially rested on two dying declarations — one allegedly recorded by a Judicial Magistrate (Ex.P12) and another recorded by the Sub-Inspector of Police (Ex.P15).
However, during the cross-examination of PW-12, the duty doctor at Government Hospital, Nandyal, it emerged that an earlier statement of the deceased had already been recorded in the hospital accident register at the time of admission.
The Court noted that PW-12 categorically admitted that the entry in Ex.P13 was recorded in his handwriting based on the statement made by the deceased herself. According to that statement, the deceased stated that she suffered burn injuries when a fire accident occurred while she was sleeping in the hut at about 8:00 PM.
The Bench observed that both PW-12 and PW-13 doctors had deposed that the deceased remained conscious, coherent and in a fit state of mind to make a statement throughout.
The Court therefore held that Ex.P13 constituted the earliest dying declaration in the case.
The Bench observed: “The first dying declaration recorded in the case would be Ex.P-13, i.e., by the doctor at the time of admission of the patient in the hospital.”
The High Court found that the prosecution deliberately withheld Ex.P13 from the trial court because it contradicted the subsequent dying declarations relied upon by the prosecution.
The Court observed: “Probably to avoid the inconsistency, P.W-15 for the reasons best known to him suppressed Ex.P-13 statement recorded by P.W-12 at the time of admission.”
The Bench referred to Rajaram v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2023) and Jagbir Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2019), dealing with multiple inconsistent dying declarations.
Quoting the principle laid down in Jagbir Singh (2019), the Court reiterated: “The duty of the Court is to examine the rest of the materials in the form of evidence placed before the court and still conclude that the incriminatory dying declaration is capable of being relied upon.”
The High Court noted that the Judicial Magistrate who allegedly recorded Ex.P12 was never examined before the trial court to prove the dying declaration or rule out tutoring and prompting.
The Court also observed that the accused was not present in the hospital when any of the dying declarations were recorded, whereas the parents of the deceased were present at the time of recording statements by the police officer.
The Bench found that the trial court failed to discharge its duty of examining surrounding evidence in light of the inconsistencies between the dying declarations.
The High Court then examined the testimony of PW-2, the child witness and son of the accused and deceased, who was residing in the same house at the time of the incident.
PW-2 deposed that the thatched house accidentally caught fire during the night and that the deceased threw him and his sister out of the house to save them before she accidentally caught fire herself.
The Court noted that the prosecution neither declared PW-2 hostile nor confronted him with any previous inconsistent statement.
The Bench observed: “The testimony of P.W-2 corroborates the statement of the victim recorded under Ex.P-13 by the doctor.”
The Court further noted the absence of evidence regarding the smell of kerosene from the body of the deceased. PW-11, who conducted the postmortem examination, admitted that she did not notice any odour of kerosene. The other doctors also did not depose regarding the presence of kerosene smell.
The High Court additionally found fault with the trial court for failing to consider Ex.P13 and the testimony of PW-12 altogether while basing the conviction solely on Ex.P12 and Ex.P15.
The Bench observed: “The trial Court ignored the material evidence. Simply based its decision on Ex.P-12 and Ex.P-15, though they are diagonally opposite to the statement under Ex.P-13.”
Conclusion
The Andhra Pradesh High Court held that the prosecution failed to establish the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt in view of the suppression of the earliest dying declaration, inconsistencies among multiple dying declarations, and supporting evidence indicating accidental fire.
The Court held that the trial court’s findings were unsustainable as they ignored material evidence, including Ex.P13 and the testimony of PW-2.
Accordingly, the High Court allowed the criminal appeal, set aside the conviction and sentence under Section 304 Part II IPC, acquitted the accused, and directed a refund of the fine amount.
Cause Title: Dudekula Somaiah v. State of Andhra Pradesh (Neutral Citation: APHC010632442009)