No Particular Form Of Medical Certificate Required To Treat Dying Declaration As Valid If It Is Truthful & Voluntary: Allahabad High Court

The Court was hearing a criminal appeal challenging the conviction of the appellant under Section 302 IPC for setting the deceased ablaze. The conviction was primarily based on the deceased’s dying declaration recorded by a Magistrate while she was undergoing treatment for burn injuries.

A Bench of Justice J.J. Munir and Justice Vinai Kumar Dwivedi observed: “The holding of the Constitution Bench would show that it is broadly to be gathered by the Magistrate on the questions put to the injured that he/ she is in a fit state of mind, whereafter the Magistrate could record the dying declaration. If he had medical opinion about the victim's state of mind and he testified to it that would be enough. There is no particular form of the medical certificate to be insisted upon in order to regard a dying declaration valid. All that is to be seen, therefore, is whether the dying declaration can be held to be one that is truthful and voluntary. Of course, the Magistrate or the Officer, recording the dying declaration, must find that the declarant was in a fit condition to make a statement.”

Advocate Mohammad Haadi Zaidi appeared for the appellant, while Government Advocate appeared for the State.

Background

The prosecution's case was that the appellant had borrowed money from the deceased and, when she demanded its return, he doused her with oil and set her on fire. She sustained extensive burn injuries and was taken to the hospital, where her dying declaration was recorded by a Magistrate. The case, initially registered for attempt to murder and criminal intimidation, was later converted into one under Section 302 IPC after she died during treatment.

The Trial Court convicted the appellant under Section 302 IPC and sentenced him to rigorous imprisonment for life along with a fine. Before the High Court, the appellant argued that there was a delay in lodging the FIR, that the prosecution witnesses were not eyewitnesses, that the dying declaration contained a discrepancy regarding the kind of oil used, and that the Trial Court ignored material circumstances, including the appellant’s alleged role in taking the deceased to the hospital.

The State opposed the appeal, submitting that the Trial Court had rightly relied on the dying declaration, which named the appellant and was corroborated by the surrounding evidence. The State argued that the prosecution witnesses supported the material circumstances and that no illegality or perversity was committed by the Trial Court in convicting the appellant.

Court’s Observations

The High Court first considered the argument regarding the delay in lodging the FIR and held that, in the totality of circumstances, the delay was well explained. The Court noted that the victim’s dying declaration was recorded on the very day of the occurrence and carried the substance of the allegation. It was observed that the police and authorities were already aware of the occurrence, as the Magistrate had reached the hospital to record the dying declaration pursuant to official communication.

The Court held that the informant was not an eyewitness, but found that this did not affect the prosecution case. It noted that the first information in substance had already emerged through the victim’s medical condition and the prompt recording of her dying declaration. The Court also accepted the explanation that the informant had panicked due to the condition of the deceased and had faced reluctance in the registration of the report.

The Bench then examined the testimony of two prosecution witnesses who had reached the scene soon after the occurrence. It found that though they were not eyewitnesses to the actual act of setting the deceased on fire, they had seen her in flames soon after the assault and heard her identify the appellant as the assailant. The Court treated them as witnesses of res gestae and held their testimony to be valuable and weighty.

The Court also dealt with the defence's attempt to discredit one such witness by referring to an alleged omission in his statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C. Referring to Section 162 Cr.P.C., Section 145 of the Evidence Act and Section 155 of the Evidence Act, the Court held that a witness must be contradicted with his prior statement in the manner known to law. It relied on Tahsildar Singh v. State of U.P. and Vinod Kumar v. State (NCT of Delhi), and held that a casual confrontation with the police statement, without properly marking and proving the omission through the Investigating Officer, could not be used to discredit the witness.

The Court observed that the testimony of the witnesses who reached the scene immediately after the incident was admissible and reliable. It held that the deceased was in flames, was crying, and was conveying the identity of her assailant soon after the occurrence.

Turning to the dying declaration, the Court noted that it was recorded by the Magistrate in question-answer form. The deceased stated that she was cooking when the appellant poured oil on her and set her on fire. The declaration also recorded that she had no quarrel with anyone, including her husband.

The Court noticed that the doctor had endorsed that the patient was conscious and able to give her dying declaration. Though the certificate did not mention the doctor’s name, date or time in full detail, the Court held that the omission was of little consequence. It found that the Magistrate had recorded the statement in his own handwriting, read it over to the deceased, and took her thumb impression.

The Bench referred to the Constitution Bench judgment in Laxman v. State of Maharashtra, which had resolved the conflict between Paparambaka Rosamma v. State of A.P. and Koli Chunilal Savji v. State of Gujarat. It noted that the Supreme Court had disapproved a hypertechnical view that a dying declaration must be rejected merely because the doctor certified only consciousness and not fitness of mind in a particular form.

The Court held that the law does not insist upon any rigid form of medical certification. What is required is that the officer recording the statement must be satisfied that the declarant was fit to make it, and the declaration must appear truthful and voluntary.

The Bench observed: “From the testimony of PW-7 and a reading of the dying declaration, there is not a shadow of doubt in our mind that the dying declaration was made by Satyavati in a fit state of mind and she did so voluntarily. It was not also influenced by any extraneous factor. It is entitled to all the weight that attaches to a dying declaration that passes the threshold. It is, therefore, entitled to great weight.”

The Court also relied on the testimony of the doctor who had attended the deceased soon after she was brought to the hospital. The doctor stated that the deceased was fully conscious at the time of examination and had sustained extensive burn injuries. The Court held that the doctor’s testimony, the medical endorsement on the dying declaration, and the Magistrate’s evidence together placed the matter beyond doubt that the deceased was conscious and capable of making the statement.

On the discrepancy regarding whether vegetable oil or kerosene was used, the Court held that the worth of the dying declaration could not be discounted on that basis. It was observed that a person who had suffered burn injuries of such magnitude could mistake the kind of oil used in the assault.

The Bench held: “The testimony of PW-9, who was the doctor who attended on the victim Satyavati, soon after she was admitted on 02.07.2015, has clearly stated that she was fully conscious, a stand which he has maintained in his cross-examination. PW-9, who is a doctor and attended on Satyavati, is the best person who speak about her position regarding being conscious or not. The testimony of this witness, together with the doctor's certificate endorsed on the dying declaration, which we do not know if it was by Dr. Gupta, and the testimony of PW-7, the Additional City Magistrate, who found Satyavati conscious and capable of making a statement, place the matter beyond all cavil of doubt that the dying declaration given by Satyavati was in possession of her full senses and while she was conscious and capable of making it. She has clearly attributed the assault to Tilluka. The discrepancy about the kind of of oil, that was poured on her, is logical. She has said in her dying declaration that it was vegetable oil, whereas elsewhere it has been reported as kerosene, a fact which the doctor, who examined her, also suggests. Any person in the victim's position, who has suffered an assault by fire, sustaining 80% burn injuries, could mistake the kind of oil, that was employed in the assault. On this score, the worth of the dying declaration cannot be discounted.”

The High Court then referred to Panneerselvam v. State of T.N., where the Supreme Court summarised the principles governing dying declarations. It reiterated that there is neither a rule of law nor a rule of prudence that a dying declaration cannot be acted upon without corroboration. If the Court is satisfied that it is true and voluntary, a conviction can be based on it without further corroboration.

Applying these principles, the Court held that the dying declaration inspired confidence and was free from tutoring, prompting or imagination. It noted that the Magistrate had denied that the deceased’s family members were present at the time of recording, thereby excluding any inference of outside influence.

The Bench observed: “The law being what it is, we have already held that the dying declaration in this case is one that inspires confidence with us and is free from the blemish of vitiating factors, like tutoring, prompting or imagination. PW-7, the Magistrate who recorded the dying declaration, has clearly said in his cross-examination that it is incorrect to say that at the time of recording it, the deceased's family, to wit, her husband or brothers-in-law, were present. There was, thus, reason to infer any kind of prompting or influence that could have made the deceased speak falsehood. Her statement is very clear and in the question and answer form. She has clearly said that she was cooking vegetables, when her devar (brother-in-law), Tilluka, poured vegetable oil on her and set her afire. She has also said that she did not have any quarrel or dispute with any one, not even her husband. This kind of a dying declaration made by a person in a fit state of mind, to which there is ample testimony, both medical and non-medical, is hard to ignore. It is also supported by the evidence of res gestage offered by PW-2 and PW-3, who reached the scene of occurrence, shortly after the assault and while the deceased was suffering the flames. She was shouting that she had been set afire by Tilluka.”

The Court finally rejected the appellant’s argument that his alleged role in helping take the deceased to the hospital belied the prosecution's case. It held that even if such conduct was accepted, it could not prevail against the clear and cogent dying declaration made before the Magistrate.

Conclusion

The Allahabad High Court held that the dying declaration was valid, voluntary, truthful and entitled to great weight. It further held that the delay in lodging the FIR was explained and that the prosecution evidence, including the res gestae witnesses and medical evidence, supported the conviction.

The Court dismissed the criminal appeal and affirmed the conviction and sentence imposed by the Trial Court under Section 302 IPC.

The Court directed that the order be communicated to the appellant in jail and that the Trial Court record be transmitted back to the Court concerned.

Cause Title: Tilluka @ Manoj v. State of U.P. (Neutral Citation: 2026:AHC:130820-DB)

Appearances

Appellant: Advocates Mohammad Haadi Zaidi, Phoolbadan Yadav, Swati Agrawal Srivastava, Varsha Srivas and Zia Naz Zaidi.

Respondent: G.A.

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