Places of Worship Act Does Not Curtail State's Power To Acquire Religious Places For Public Purpose: Allahabad High Court

The Court observed that the Act is intended to preserve the religious character of places of worship and cannot be construed as restricting the State's power of eminent domain.

The Court was dealing with a writ petition filed by tenants and shopkeepers seeking protection against a road widening project and also seeking directions restraining the proposed acquisition of certain mosques, contending that such acquisition was prohibited under the Places of Worship Act, 1991.

A Division Bench of Justice J.J. Munir and Justice Arun Kumar observed: "When Section 4(1) of the Act of 1991 is read together with Section 3, it is evident that there is a prohibition imposed by Section 3 upon any person converting any place of worship of any religious denomination or a sect thereof into a place of worship of a different sect of the same denomination or to that of a different religious denomination. Sections 3 and 4 of the Act of 1991, when harmoniously construed, prevent the religious character of a place of worship belonging to a religious denomination from being changed into a place of worship of another religious denomination, from whatever it was on the 15th day of August, 1947. In short, a temple on 15th August, 1947 cannot be converted to a church or a mosque, and likewise, a mosque or a church to a temple. The purport of the Act of 1991 is not to place beyond the pale of authority of the State’s right as the owner paramount of all lands in the territory of India and to acquire and use it for any public purpose, subject, of course, to the owner's right to receive just and fair compensation. That is what the doctrine of eminent domain, after all, means. The Act of 1991 is not meant to derogate from that right of the State."

Senior Advocate Quazi Mohammad Akaram appeared for the petitioners. Additional Advocate General Mahesh Chandra Chaturvedi appeared for the respondents.

Background

The petitioners, who were tenants and shopkeepers, challenged the proposed road widening project, alleging that they were being threatened with dispossession without following due process. Besides seeking protection of their tenancy rights, they also sought directions against the proposed acquisition of six mosques, contending that these were places of worship that had existed before August 15, 1947, and whose acquisition would violate the Places of Worship (Special Provisions) Act, 1991.

The State opposed the petition, submitting that acquisition proceedings were being undertaken in accordance with the Land Acquisition Act of 2013 and that neither the Places of Worship Act, 1991, nor the Waqf Act prohibited acquisition of religious property for a public purpose. It was argued that the 1991 Act was enacted only to prohibit conversion of places of worship and preserve their religious character as it existed on August 15, 1947.

Court's Observations

The Court first held that the petitioners' rights as tenants were limited to their tenancy and did not confer proprietary rights over the premises. It observed that acquisition challenges ordinarily lie at the instance of the owner and that the petitioners had also mixed an altogether different cause of action relating to protection of the mosques, whose primary custodians were the concerned Mutawallis and the Waqf Board. Nevertheless, since elaborate arguments had been addressed on the interpretation of the Places of Worship Act, the Court proceeded to examine that issue.

Examining Sections 3 and 4 of the Places of Worship Act, the Bench held that they must be read harmoniously and not in isolation. Rejecting the contention that Section 4 rendered the religious character of a place of worship absolutely immutable for every purpose, the Court observed:

“… the Act of 1991 prohibits the conversion of place of worship of one religious denomination into another. It does not derogate from the State's authority to acquire any place of religious worship for a secular and public purpose, like development of a road or augmentation of infrastructure or any similar activity”.

The Court clarified that the legislative object of the 1991 Act was confined to prohibiting the conversion of places of worship and preserving communal harmony. It observed:

"The object of the Act of 1991 also shows that it was enacted to prohibit conversion of any place of worship, and when read with Section 3, the scope of the Act is limited to conversion of a place of worship of one religious denomination into another, or from one sect of the same denomination into another. The Act of 1991 does not, at all, go beyond the said prohibition."

Turning to the Waqf Act, the Bench held that Section 51 itself recognises acquisition of waqf properties for a public purpose, subject to consultation with the Waqf Board and compliance with the statutory safeguards. Having already interpreted the Places of Worship Act as prohibiting only religious conversion, the Court held that there was no inconsistency between the two enactments.

The Court relied upon the Constitution Bench decision in Dr M. Ismail Faruqui v. Union of India (1994), wherein the Supreme Court held that places of worship, including mosques, are immovable properties liable to acquisition like other properties, subject to constitutional protections. Reproducing the Constitution Bench's observations, the High Court noted:

"Every immovable property is liable to be acquired. Viewed in the proper perspective, a mosque does not enjoy any additional protection which is not available to religious places of worship of other religions."

The Bench also referred to Yusuf Ajij Shaikh v. Special Land Acquisition Officer No. 2, Pune (1995), where the Bombay High Court had held that the Places of Worship Act neither expressly nor impliedly prohibits acquisition of religious property under the land acquisition law. Endorsing that reasoning, the Court extracted the following passage:

"No provision of the Places of Worship Act bans such acquisition expressly or impliedly. The provisions of the Land Acquisition Act are not abrogated. It is very clear that this Act has been enacted for the limited purpose to prohibit and punish one section or community who illegally takes over the land of religious worship of another community or section and changes its character... This cannot cover in its sweep the acquisition of land under the Land Acquisition Act."

Agreeing with the above authorities, the Bench held that the Places of Worship Act preserves the religious character of places of worship but does not extinguish the sovereign power of the State to acquire land for legitimate public purposes. Acquisition for infrastructure development, subject to statutory safeguards and payment of compensation, cannot be equated with the conversion of the religious character of a place of worship.

Conclusion

Holding that the petitioners had no enforceable right either to challenge the proposed acquisition on behalf of the concerned religious institutions or to seek the other reliefs claimed, the High Court dismissed the writ petition. The Court clarified that its observations would not prejudice the rights of the State, the Waqf Board or the concerned Mutawallis in any appropriate proceedings that may arise in future.

Cause Title: Syed Rashid Ali & Ors. v. State of U.P. & Ors. (Neutral Citation: 2026:AHC:130818-DB)

Appearances

Petitioners: Quazi Mohammad Akaram, Senior Advocate.

Respondents: Mahesh Chandra Chaturvedi, Additional Advocate General, assisted by Suresh Singh, Additional Chief Standing Counsel for the State; Advocates Vineet Sankalp & Ravi Prakash Pandey

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