The Allahabad High Court, Lucknow Bench, has held that an Arbitral Tribunal retains the competence to adjudicate upon the limitation period of an application filed under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The Court noted that the High Court’s jurisdiction at the referral stage is one of ‘minimal interference and maximum delegation’, confined only to the existence of an arbitration clause. Consequently, an order appointing an arbitrator does not act as a final determination on mixed questions of fact and law, such as limitation, which must be "ruled" upon by the Tribunal under Section 16 of the Act.

The Division Bench drew a sharp distinction between judicial ‘examination’ required under Section 11 and the "ruling" mandated under Section 16. While an examination at the referral stage does not imply a contested or laborious inquiry, a ‘ruling’ by a Tribunal involves a formal adjudication of disputes after admitting evidence. The Bench observed that the Tribunal erred in law by assuming it lacked the authority to revisit the issue of limitation simply because the High Court had made the referral, noting that such an abnegation of jurisdiction justifies the rare exercise of writ interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

Justice Shekhar B. Saraf and Justice Abdhesh Kumar Chaudhary observed, “…A ‘ruling’ connotes adjudication of disputes after admitting evidence from the parties. Ergo, it is evident that the referral court is only required to examine the existence of arbitration agreements, whereas the Arbitral Tribunal ought to rule on its jurisdiction, including the issues pertaining to the limitation for appointment of an arbitrator under Section 11 of the Act and the Tribunal has erred in law in declining to adjudicate on the jurisdictional issue of limitation for appointing arbitrator under Section 16 despite having the competence and jurisdiction to rule on the same”.

Advocates Nirmit Srivastava, Tejas Singh appeared for the petitioner and Advocate Ritesh Kumar Srivastava appeared for the respondent.

In the matter, pursuant to a 2013 partnership deed, following a dispute, the respondent invoked arbitration on September 04, 2017 but filed the Section 11 application for the appointment of an arbitrator only on May 31, 2023. The petitioner argued that the Section 11(6) application was barred by the three-year limitation period under Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963.

After the High Court appointed a Sole Arbitrator on August 05, 2025, the petitioner filed a jurisdictional challenge under Section 16. The Arbitral Tribunal rejected the plea on October 9, 2025, holding that it could not adjudicate a limitation issue that it believed was implicitly settled by the High Court during the appointment process.

Now, the Division Bench clarified that the referral court must not get "lost in thickets" of disputed facts. It held that the statutory mandate of Section 16 specifically empowers the Tribunal to rule on its own jurisdiction. By refusing to hear the limitation plea, the Tribunal failed to exercise its jurisdiction, as the High Court’s role is merely to facilitate the start of the process, not to decide preliminary objections that require detailed inquiry.

“…we are of the considered view that the present case is one of the rarest cases warranting interference by writ court in light of the findings given above”, the Bench observed.

“…The power of the High Court being a reference court under Section 11 of the Act is of minimal interference and maximum delegation and the jurisdiction of the High Court in appointing an arbitrator under Section 11 is confined to examination of arbitration clause in the agreement and the Court at this stage should not get lost in thickets and decide disputed and mixed questions of fact such as the limitation for appointing the arbitrator. Moreover, as per P. Ramanatha Aiyar, The Law Lexicon [(2nd Edn., 1997) 666] the expression ‘examination’ does not connote or imply a laborious or contested inquiry. On the other hand, Section 16 provides that the Arbitral Tribunal can ‘rule’ on its jurisdiction, including the existence and validity of an arbitration agreement”, the Bench, thus, noted.

Accordingly, the Court quashed the Tribunal’s order and directed it to adjudicate the limitation issue as a preliminary objection under Section 16 on its merits. It further directed the Tribunal to decide the matter expeditiously after hearing both parties.

Cause Title: Rajendra Prasad Singh v. M/s Arch Construction Thru. Partner Sri Santosh Kumar Singh and 3 Others (Neutral Citation: 2026:AHC-LKO:29790-DB)

Appearances:

Petitioner: Nirmit Srivastava, Tejas Singh, and Aakched Nath, Advocates.

Respondents: Ritesh Kumar Srivastava and Alok Kumar Singh, Advocates.

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