An Order Does Not Become Non-Speaking Merely Because It Does Not Reproduce Every Contention Verbatim: Allahabad High Court
The authority must apply its mind to the material issues and reach its conclusion on relevant considerations. Rejection of a party’s objections does not, by itself, establish denial of hearing or non-consideration.
The Allahabad High Court has held that an order does not become non-speaking merely because it does not reproduce every contention raised by a party verbatim, provided the authority applies its mind to the material issues and reaches its conclusion on relevant considerations.
The Court was hearing a writ petition challenging a March 2017 order of the District Registrar/Additional District Magistrate (Finance and Revenue), Faizabad, which allowed an appeal against the Sub-Registrar’s refusal to register an agreement to sell and directed its registration in accordance with law.
A Bench of Justice Irshad Ali observed: “The submission that the appellate authority failed to consider the objections raised by the petitioners also cannot be accepted merely on the basis of the fact that the objections were rejected. An order is not rendered non-speaking merely because every contention raised by a party is not reproduced verbatim. What is required is that the authority should apply its mind to the material issues arising for determination and arrive at a conclusion on the basis of relevant considerations.”
Advocate Mohd. Mansoor appeared for the petitioners. Additional Chief Standing Counsel Shiv Ganesh Singh appeared for the State authorities, while Advocate M.E. Khan appeared for the respondents and Advocate Amit Prasad Srivastava represented the intervenor.
Background
The dispute concerned an agreement to sell dated April 30, 1989, allegedly executed by the petitioners’ father in favour of a charitable trust. The petitioners alleged that the document had been fabricated by misusing signatures obtained on stamp papers when their father took a temporary loan.
The Sub-Registrar refused registration in January 1990. The trust challenged that refusal before the statutory appellate authority. During the prolonged proceedings, the petitioners’ father died and his legal heirs were substituted.
In March 2017, the appellate authority held that execution of the agreement had been established and directed its registration. The petitioners challenged that order, contending that their objections concerning fraud, denial of execution, absence of consideration and the witnesses’ credibility had not been properly considered.
The petitioners also argued that the proceedings were incorrectly pursued under Section 72 of the Registration Act, 1908, although a case involving denial of execution had to follow Section 73. They alleged a denial of natural justice and contended that the authority had issued a non-speaking order.
The private respondents relied upon the testimony of the marginal witnesses, a handwriting expert’s opinion and other circumstances concerning the transaction. They submitted that registration did not determine title or grant specific performance, which remained questions for the competent civil court.
Court’s Observations
Rejection Of Objections Did Not Establish Denial Of Hearing
The Court observed that the parties had participated in the statutory proceedings for a prolonged period, filed objections and placed evidence on record. The petitioners had not specifically identified any material evidence that was illegally excluded or any opportunity essential for deciding the appeal that was denied to them.
The Court held: “It is settled that principles of natural justice are intended to secure a fair opportunity and not to create an endless procedural process. The right of hearing does not include a right to insist that the authority must accept the version of the party heard. In the present case, the petitioners were admittedly aware of the proceedings and had filed objections, including their detailed objections dated 17.01.2017. The mere fact that the authority ultimately did not accept those objections cannot, by itself, amount to denial of hearing.”
The Court further found no fundamental non-application of mind in the appellate order when it was examined against the material referred to by the parties.
Writ Court Cannot Re-Weigh Evidence
The Court noted that the appellate authority had not relied solely upon the disputed agreement. Its finding concerning execution was also based on the testimony of marginal witnesses, the handwriting expert’s opinion and other circumstances relied upon by the private respondents.
The Bench stated: “This Court, while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, is not ordinarily required to undertake a fresh appreciation or re-weighing of evidence as if sitting in appeal over every factual conclusion recorded by a statutory authority. Where a finding is founded upon some relevant material and the conclusion cannot be characterised as one which no reasonable authority could have reached, interference merely because another view may also be possible is not warranted.”
The Court observed that the petitioners had not demonstrated that the expert opinion or the marginal witnesses’ evidence was irrelevant or legally inadmissible. Their disagreement with the interpretation or probative value of that evidence did not, by itself, establish perversity or patent illegality.
Incorrect Reference To Statutory Provision Not By Itself Fatal
The Court rejected the contention that the proceedings were necessarily void because of the reference to Section 72 rather than Section 73 of the Registration Act.
The Court observed that Sections 71 to 75 had to be examined together with the substance of the proceedings, the Sub-Registrar’s refusal order and the jurisdiction exercised by the appellate authority.
The Bench held that even if there were some defect in describing or referring to the provision under which the proceedings were instituted, the ultimate order would not become void unless the petitioners established that the authority lacked substantive jurisdiction or that the procedural error caused substantial prejudice. Neither circumstance had been demonstrated.
The Court clarified that registration proceedings could not become a plenary adjudication of title, ownership or the agreement’s ultimate enforceability. However, the authority was required to examine evidence concerning execution because it was directly relevant to deciding whether the document should be registered.
Registration Did Not Determine Title Or Enforceability
The Court accepted the private respondents’ submission that registration of the agreement did not amount to adjudication of title or a decree for specific performance.
The Bench stated: “The impugned order is confined to the statutory consequence arising from the registration proceedings. It does not operate as a decree declaring title in favour of respondent No.4, nor does it by itself compel execution of a sale deed or conclusively determine the parties’ substantive proprietary rights.”
The Court observed that the allegations of fraud, fabrication, non-payment of consideration and misuse of signatures involved disputed factual questions requiring oral and documentary evidence. Those questions, along with the agreement’s validity, enforceability and specific performance, remained open before the civil court.
The Court also declined to reopen the 1998 substitution order indirectly after the petitioners had participated in the subsequent proceedings. It separately protected the intervenor’s claimed independent rights over a portion of the disputed land.
Conclusion
The High Court dismissed the writ petition and affirmed the March 30, 2017 order of the District Registrar/Additional District Magistrate directing registration of the agreement to sell.
The Court clarified that its decision did not finally determine the agreement’s validity, enforceability or specific performance, or the parties’ title and proprietary rights. Those questions were left for independent determination by the competent civil court.
The Court expected the pending specific-performance suit to be concluded expeditiously, preferably within eight months from the parties’ appearance and submission of a certified copy of the judgment, subject to their cooperation and applicable procedure.
The intervenor’s independent claim was left open for adjudication before the competent forum. The 2017 status quo order was vacated without affecting any subsequent interim or final order passed by a competent civil court or other forum. There was no order as to costs.
Cause Title: Rajendra Kumar and Another v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others (Neutral Citation: 2026:AHC-LKO:75352)
Appearances
Petitioners: Advocate Mohd. Mansoor
Respondents: Additional Chief Standing Counsel Shiv Ganesh Singh; Advocate M.E. Khan; Advocate Amit Prasad Srivastava