No Exceptions Attracted: Allahabad High Court Upholds Murder Conviction Of Man For Burning Pregnant Wife Alive
However, noting that “in jail, nights are darker and days are longer”, the Bench reduced the sentence from life imprisonment to 20 years, given the age and his reformed behaviour as per jail authorities.
The Allahabad High Court, Lucknow Bench, has held that the act of pouring kerosene on an eight-months pregnant wife and setting her ablaze cannot be brought within the exceptions to murder under Section 300 of the Indian Penal Code. Rejecting the appellant’s plea that the incident occurred during a quarrel and warranted conviction for a lesser offence, the Court upheld his conviction for murder under Section 302 IPC, relying principally on a dying declaration found to be voluntary, authentic and trustworthy.
While maintaining the conviction, the Court showed leniency on the question of sentence. Observing that prolonged incarceration carries its own hardships and that “in jail, nights are darker and days are longer”, the Bench reduced the appellant’s sentence from imprisonment for life to 20 years’ rigorous imprisonment.
The Court, however, declined to interfere with the finding of guilt, holding that the dying declaration carried significant evidentiary value, noting that it was supported by a medical fitness certificate duly proved by the attending physician and was recorded by a competent Executive Magistrate who had no reason to falsely implicate the appellant. The Court observed that these factors fortified the authenticity of the declaration and rendered it worthy of reliance.
A Division Bench of Justice Rajesh Singh Chauhan and Justice Indrajeet Shukla observed, “…the bodily injuries inflicted upon the deceased were clearly intentional, as kerosene oil was poured and match stick was lit putting the victim to ablaze, thus, the injury was aimed/intended and caused which resulted into death and in order to doubly sure the death of victim the door was bolted outside of the house, thus, the only intention could be gathered is causing death and as such, the act of appellant herein is covered by first limb of Section 300 IPC and none of the exceptions attached to Section 300 IPC are attracted. The death in the instant case was postponed for 23 days because of treatment in the district hospital as such the primary cause which is directly associated with the death of the victim is extensive burn injuries ranging from first to third degree. In view of elaborated discussions herein-above, we are left with no doubt that the offence in question would be covered by first, second and fourth limb of Section 300 IPC”.
“The presence of medical certification upon dying declaration and having it formally been proved by PW-6 fortifies the authenticity of dying declaration. It is worthy to mention that the dying declaration in question has been recorded by a competent Executive Magistrate, who has no reason to depose against appellant”, further noted.
Advocate Punit Kumar Shukla appeared for the appellant and Bipul Kumar Singh, State Law Officer appeared for the respondent.
According to the prosecution, the deceased, was subjected to persistent harassment and demands for ₹50,000 as additional dowry. On November 28, 2010, while staying at a house allotted to her mother under the Kashi Ram Urban Housing Scheme, she suffered severe burn injuries and was admitted to the District Hospital, Sitapur. She later succumbed to the injuries on December 21, 2010.
The prosecution case primarily rested on her dying declaration recorded by a Naib Tehsildar on November 30, 2010.
In the statement, she alleged that her husband assaulted her, poured kerosene oil on her, set her ablaze, and locked the room from outside before fleeing. The declaration was recorded after a doctor certified that she was conscious and fit to make the statement.
The appellant argued that the dying declaration was unreliable, was not recorded in a question-answer format, lacked independent corroboration, and that the FIR was lodged with considerable delay. He also sought conversion of the conviction from murder to culpable homicide not amounting to murder by invoking the exceptions to Section 300 IPC.
The Court noted that the act of pouring kerosene on the deceased, who was carrying an advanced pregnancy, and setting her ablaze was a deliberate and intentional act, thereby ruling out the applicability of Exceptions 1 and 4 to Section 300 IPC.
“The argument of death due to septicemia having been developed over the period of time suggesting that burn injuries may be remote cause is tested on the touchstone of the ratio of judgement rendered in Sushila Devi (supra) but the said dictum as relied by appellant is not attracted in factual backdrop of this case though in both the cases the death occurred due to septicemia but in the case in hand the appellant is imputed to have taken the deceased to another room after initial altercation and poured kerosene oil from the head by putting her to ablaze and thereafter, bolted the house from outside, so the helpless victim may not save herself. Such conduct as described in the dying declaration is not only cruel but appellant had taken undue advantage of situation where deceased was carrying eight months pregnancy…”, the Bench noted.
“Thus, as a sequel of above, an irresistible conclusion, which, this Court reaches is, the intended burn injuries proved to be fatal. The bolting of the door from outside after putting the deceased to ablaze, though the death occurred after several days of septicemia, yet it is undoubtedly a murder punishable under Section 302 I.P.C”, the Bench said further.
Examining the plea for the benefit of exceptions to murder, the Court noted that the ingredients of grave and sudden provocation were wholly absent and proceeded to analyse whether any statutory exception under Section 300 IPC could apply to the appellant’s conduct.
“Considering the totality of circumstances, namely: (i) the young age of the convict at the time of commission of the offence; (ii) the substantial period of incarceration already undergone; (iii) the positive conduct exhibited in prison; (iv) the probability of reformation, rehabilitation; and reintegration to Society (v) the reduced likelihood of reoffending; and (vi) the socio-economic background of the accused, this Court is of the considered view that the ends of justice would be adequately met by commuting the sentence of imprisonment for life to a fixed term sentence of twenty years without remission”, the Bench, thus, concluded.
Cause Title: Manish v. State of U.P. (Neutral Citation: 2026:AHC-LKO:40009-DB)
Appearances:
Appellant: Pankaj Kumar Tripathi, Abdul Rafey Siddiqui, Ajeet Kumar Singh, Pradeep Kumar Tripathi, Punit Kumar Shukla, Rehan Ahmad Siddiqui, Advocates.
Respondent: Bipul Kumar Singh, State Law Officer.