The Allahabad High Court has held that a statement can be treated as a dying declaration only if it is established that the maker was under an expectation of imminent death induced by the grievous nature of the injuries or the severity of the medical condition.

The Court observed that the credibility of a dying declaration must necessarily be assessed in light of the deceased's medical condition, and the prosecution must prove that the declarant had lost all hope of survival when making the statement.

The Court was hearing four connected criminal appeals filed by the husband, mother-in-law, brother-in-law and sisters-in-law of a woman who had been convicted under Section 302/149 IPC and sentenced to life imprisonment for allegedly setting her on fire. The prosecution's case rested almost entirely on the deceased's alleged dying declaration after all the material prosecution witnesses turned hostile.

A Division Bench of Justice Ajay Bhanot and Justice Divesh Chandra Samant observed: "Expectation of imminent death and extinguishment of hopes to survive induced by the grievous nature of injuries or parlous medical condition of the person are the prerequisites of bringing the statement of such person within the fold of a dying declaration. Imaginary fears of death which do not have any medical basis cannot be invoked to qualify a statement as a dying declaration.”

The Bench further added: “Determination of credibility of the dying declaration has to be predicated by an examination of the medical condition of the deceased. More specifically it has to be established whether the deceased was in expectation of imminent death when she gave her statement.”

Senior Counsel and Amicus Curiae I.K. Chaturvedi appeared for the appellants, while AGA Rishi Chaddha appeared for the State.

Background

According to the prosecution, the deceased had been subjected to persistent dowry harassment by her husband and his family over demands for ₹1 lakh and a motorcycle. It was alleged that after the demands remained unmet, the husband, brother-in-law, mother-in-law and sisters-in-law poured kerosene on her and set her ablaze inside her matrimonial home.

The trial court convicted all the accused principally on the strength of the dying declaration even though the deceased's mother, father, brother and other material witnesses had turned hostile during the trial.

Court's Observations

The Court first revisited the jurisprudential basis of dying declarations, observing that such statements derive their evidentiary value from the belief that a person standing at the threshold of death is unlikely to lie. However, this principle is subject to careful judicial scrutiny and cannot be applied mechanically.

Examining the record, the Bench found that the prosecution had failed to produce crucial medical evidence. Neither the bed-head ticket nor the medical case sheet prepared at the district hospital had been brought on record. Likewise, the doctors who actually treated the deceased were not examined, and even the post-mortem report did not specify the percentage of burn injuries sustained. Consequently, the Court held that the actual medical condition of the deceased remained uncertain.

The Court observed: "From the available evidence, no accurate finding can be recorded regarding the medical condition of the victim prior to her death... The conditions precedent for treating statement of the deceased as a dying declaration have not been established by the prosecution."

The Bench also found that the dying declaration itself suffered from several infirmities. It made sweeping allegations against every member of the matrimonial family without assigning any specific role to each accused, thereby affecting its credibility.

The Court remarked: "The failure to provide relevant details and assign particular roles to accused persons dents the credibility of the dying declaration. It appears that the intent of the dying declaration is more to wreak vengeance on the husband and his family than to state the truth."

Another significant factor noticed by the Court was that the deceased claimed she did not know who had taken her to the hospital. This, according to the Bench, was contradicted by the FIR as well as the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, all of whom consistently stated that it was the husband and his family who rushed her to the hospital immediately after the incident. Since the deceased had been found fully conscious while making the statement, the Court considered this discrepancy to be material.

The Court further noted that the prosecution had suppressed a second statement of the deceased recorded by the Investigating Officer shortly before her death. Holding the unexplained suppression of this material evidence against the prosecution, the Bench drew an adverse inference under Section 114(g) of the Evidence Act.

The Court observed: "The prosecution has however chose to suppress the aforesaid dying declaration and has not produced the same as evidence before the trial court... This Court hence draws an adverse inference against the prosecution by holding that in the event such dying declaration would have been adverse to the case of the prosecution."

The Bench also found that all the material prosecution witnesses had contradicted the allegations of dowry harassment and that their testimony, coupled with the surrounding circumstances, did not rule out the possibility of suicide or accidental death. It was further observed that the husband and his family had immediately shifted the deceased to the hospital and informed her parental family, conduct which appeared bona fide.

Holding that the dying declaration could not safely form the sole basis of conviction, the Court concluded that once it was discarded, the prosecution's case collapsed entirely. It also found no evidence to sustain the alternative charges under Sections 304-B and 498-A IPC or Sections 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.

Conclusion

Allowing all four appeals, the High Court set aside the judgment of conviction passed by the trial court, acquitted all the accused of the offences under Sections 302/34 and 304-B IPC, and discharged their bail bonds.

Cause Title: Mahnaz and Another v. State of U.P. and Connected Appeals (Neutral Citation: 2026:AHC:132590-DB)

Appearances

Appellants: Advocates Achchhey Lal Tiwari, Vinay Kumar Tripathi, Chandra Kumar, Devendra Singh, Shri I.K. Chaturvedi, Senior Advocate (Amicus Curiae), Advocate Ali Jamal Khan (Amicus Curiae).

Respondent: G.A., Rishi Chaddha, AGA, Ghan Shyam Yadav.

Click here to read/download Judgment

Tags: