The Allahabad High Court has held that where screening-test marks count towards final merit, reserved-category candidates who score above the unreserved cut-off must be included in the unreserved category at the screening stage.

The Court was hearing a special appeal against a Single Judge’s decision dismissing as premature a writ petition challenging a Uttar Pradesh Public Service Commission policy and an advertisement condition permitting adjustment of reserved-category candidates against unreserved vacancies only at the final-selection stage.

A Division Bench of Justice Rajan Roy and Justice Manjive Shukla observed: “In view of the aforesaid, appellants-petitioners if they secure more marks than the minimum cut-off for the Unreserved category in the screening test will have to be included in the Unreserved category and the recruitment shall be held accordingly in terms of the judgment in Rajat Yadav (supra), and the discussion made hereinabove.”

Advocate Navneet Yadav appeared for the appellants. Senior Advocate Jaideep Narain Mathur, appeared for the Uttar Pradesh Public Service Commission.

Background

The Uttar Pradesh Public Service Commission issued an advertisement for several posts, including Health Education Officer. The recruitment comprised a screening test followed by an interview, with 75% weight assigned to the screening-test marks and 25% to the interview.

One condition provided that reserved-category candidates would be adjusted against the unreserved category only at the final-selection stage and only if they had not received any relaxation in qualifying standards during the screening examination. The condition was based on a general office memorandum issued by the Commission in 2020.

The appellants applied for recruitment but challenged the condition before the screening test was conducted. They contended that reserved-category candidates scoring at or above the unreserved cut-off had to be included in the unreserved category from the stage at which merit was first assessed.

The Single Judge dismissed the petition as premature. The Division Bench had earlier reversed that conclusion, stayed the impugned condition and retained the matter to decide the merits instead of remanding it, after the parties sought adjudication by the appellate court.

The appellants argued that restricting merit-based inclusion to the final stage violated Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution and Section 3(6) of the Uttar Pradesh Public Services (Reservation for Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Other Backward Classes) Act, 1994.

The Commission initially contended that the screening test was merely intended to shortlist candidates and that reserved-category candidates could remain in their respective categories until final selection. It subsequently accepted that screening-test marks would constitute 75% of the final merit.

Court’s Observations

Section 3(6) Is Not Confined To Final Selection

The Court examined Section 3(6) of the Uttar Pradesh Public Services (Reservation for Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Other Backward Classes) Act, 1994. The provision states that a reserved-category candidate selected on merit in open competition with general candidates cannot be adjusted against the vacancies reserved for that category.

The Court held that Section 3(6) does not distinguish between different stages of recruitment or restrict its application to the final select list.

The Court observed: “On a bare reading of the provisions of the Act, 1994, especially Section 3(6), we find that the said provision does not draw any distinction as to its applicability based on the stage of recruitment.”

The Court relied on U.P. Power Corporation Ltd. v. Nitin Kumar (2015), where a Coordinate Bench had held that Section 3(6) also applies during shortlisting. An unreserved post is open to every candidate irrespective of category, and a reserved-category candidate cannot be excluded from an unreserved shortlist despite securing marks above its cut-off.

Screening Test Was A Substantive Part Of Selection

The Court noted that the governing recruitment rules and advertisement required 75% of the screening-test marks and 25% of the interview marks to be combined for preparing the final merit list.

The Court therefore rejected the Commission’s initial contention that the screening examination was merely a shortlisting exercise at which merit was not determined.

The Court observed: “The screening test in the case at hand is not stricto sensu a mere shortlisting exercise instead it has bearing on the final selection, substantially, as, largely (75% marks) the marks in the final selection are based on this very test and interview comprises of only 25% of total marks.”

The Court held that the factual basis offered for retaining reserved candidates within their respective categories at the screening stage was therefore incorrect.

Rajat Yadav Governed Merit-Based Inclusion At Screening Stage

The Court applied Rajasthan High Court v. Rajat Yadav (2025), where the Supreme Court held that an open or unreserved category is available to all candidates and that merit is the only criterion for inclusion in it.

The Court explained that the Supreme Court did not treat inclusion of a meritorious reserved candidate in the open shortlist as “migration.” At that stage, all successful candidates must initially be considered on merit, and those exceeding the open-category cut-off must be placed in that list irrespective of their social category.

The Court noted that Rajat Yadav concerned a similar two-stage process in which marks from the first stage substantially contributed to final merit. It held that the present recruitment was squarely covered by that decision.

The Court stated: “In view of the above, inclusion or adjustment of a reserve category candidate in the list of unreserved category candidates, which the Commission refers as migration is applicable even at the preliminary or screening test stage, especially where the marks obtained in such preliminary/screening tests are added to the marks of the final selection.”

The Court added that the principle applied where the reserved-category candidates had not claimed or received a relaxation or concession in the relevant qualifying standard, as in the present case.

The Court rejected the Commission’s reliance on Chattar Singh v. State of Rajasthan (1997).

The Court noted that under the recruitment scheme considered in Chattar Singh, marks obtained in the preliminary examination did not count towards final merit. It further noted that the validity of the applicable rules was not under challenge in that case.

By contrast, the Court found that the present screening test carried 75% of the final assessment. It therefore held that the screening stage had substantial and determinative value, bringing the recruitment within the principle stated in Rajat Yadav rather than Chattar Singh.

Blanket Restriction In Commission’s Policy Was Unreasonable

The Court found that the Commission’s office memorandum contained an omnibus restriction postponing the inclusion of reserved-category candidates in the unreserved category until final selection, irrespective of the governing recruitment rules or the function performed by the screening test.

The Court held that such a blanket policy ignored situations where screening marks formed part of final merit and could exclude a reserved candidate who had scored higher than candidates included in the unreserved shortlist.

The Court observed: “There is no constitutional or legal basis for such a blanket prescription, that too, by the Commission, especially when Section 3(6) of the Act, 1994 does not put any such restriction.”

The Court further noted that the policy could lead to an anomalous situation where the reserved-category cut-off exceeded the unreserved cut-off. A reserved candidate scoring above the open cut-off could then be excluded from the next stage merely because the candidate had not crossed the higher cut-off within the reserved category.

The Court held that such a result would violate the guarantee of equal opportunity in public employment under Article 16(1).

No Qualifying-Standard Relaxation Was Claimed

The Court separately examined whether the candidates could be denied inclusion in the unreserved category because of a concession or relaxation.

Referring to Jitendra Kumar Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2010), the Court noted that relaxation in age or examination fees under Section 8 of the 1994 Act does not amount to relaxation in the standard prescribed for selection. The Uttar Pradesh Government’s policy permits meritorious reserved candidates to compete against unreserved vacancies despite receiving such concessions.

The Court also considered Niravkumar Dilipbhai Makwana v. Gujarat Public Service Commission (2019), Gaurav Pradhan v. State of Rajasthan (2018), Union of India v. Sajib Roy (2025) and Chaya v. State of Maharashtra (2026). It noted that the permissibility of inclusion after availing a concession depends upon the applicable recruitment rules and State policy.

The Court found that neither the State’s statutory framework nor its policy prohibited merit-based inclusion because of age or fee relaxation. It further found no assertion that the appellants had received any relaxation in the minimum qualifying standard.

The Court consequently held that the relaxation-related limb of the Commission’s policy could not prevent their inclusion in the unreserved category.

Commission Cannot Determine Reservation Policy

The Court held that the reservation policy governing State public services falls within the domain of the State Government under Articles 16 and 309 of the Constitution and the 1994 Act.

The Court explained that the Public Service Commission conducts examinations under Article 320 but is not the employer and cannot determine conditions of service or the State’s reservation policy.

Referring to State of Punjab v. Manjit Singh (2003), the Court held that the Commission may prescribe recruitment procedure subject to applicable statutes, service rules and government orders. It cannot encroach upon the State Government’s power to determine recruitment conditions and reservation policy.

The Court observed: “The Commission is not the employer under Article 320 (1) of the Constitution, it has the duty to conduct examinations for appointments to the services of the ‘State’. It has no authority to decide the conditions of service, including the policy of reservation and its modalities.”

The Court nevertheless refrained from conclusively deciding the Commission’s wider jurisdiction to issue such policies. It directed the Commission to reconsider the office memorandum after examining the constitutional and statutory framework.

Participation Did Not Bar The Challenge

The Court rejected the objection that the appellants could not challenge the advertisement after submitting their applications.

Relying on Dr. (Major) Meeta Sahai v. State of Bihar (2019), the Court held that participation signifies acceptance of the prescribed procedure, not an illegality embedded in that procedure. It also referred to Raj Kumar v. Shakti Raj (1997), which distinguished Madan Lal v. State of Jammu and Kashmir (1995) where recruitment is conducted contrary to governing rules.

The Court noted that the appellants had challenged the condition before the screening test and had raised questions concerning Articles 14 and 16. It therefore held that estoppel, waiver or acquiescence did not bar the petition.

Conclusion

The Allahabad High Court allowed the special appeal and the writ petition. It declared that the Commission’s 2020 office memorandum did not apply to the recruitment of Health Education Officers and set aside the corresponding condition in the advertisement.

The Court directed that if the appellants score above the minimum cut-off for the unreserved category in the screening test, they must be included in the unreserved category and the recruitment must proceed in accordance with Rajat Yadav.

The Commission was directed to examine the application of the impugned condition to other posts covered by the advertisement and take an early decision. It was further directed to revisit its general office memorandum, after examining the constitutional and statutory position, within three months.

The State Government was also directed to consider and clarify its position by framing a specific policy on the issue in accordance with law within three months.

Cause Title: Bhavna Yadav and 6 Others v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others [Neutral Citation: 2026:AHC-LKO:69231-DB]

Appearances

Appellants: Navneet Yadav, Aahuti Agarwal, Abhishek Khare, Chhote Lal Yadav, Jitendra Kumar, Mohd. Yasir and Vijay Nandan Mani Tripathi, Advocates

Respondents: Jaideep Narain Mathur, Senior Advocate; Raj Kumar Upadhyaya, Advocate; Chief Standing Counsel

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