Can’t Sanction Marriage-Like Union Barred By Law: Allahabad High Court Refuses Protection To Live-In Relationship Involving Male Partner Aged Below 21

The Court was hearing a writ petition filed by a 20-year-old woman and a 19-year-old man seeking protection of their life and liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution on the ground that they were residing together in a live-in relationship and apprehended interference from family members.

A Bench of Justice Garima Prashad observed: “… where a male is below twenty-one years of age and is treated as a ‘child’ for the purposes of marriage under the statutory framework, the concept of ‘consent’ cannot be used to bypass the legal restriction. A relationship cannot be permitted merely because it is described as consensual, when the law itself treats one of the parties as lacking the capacity to enter into such a union.”

The Court further observed: “If a court cannot permit the parties to marry because the law withholds that permission until the male completes twenty-one years, the court cannot achieve substantially the same result by treating the functional equivalent of that marriage as entitled to judicial support simply because it is described as a live-in relationship.”

Advocate Mahipal Singh appeared for the petitioners, while Ashwani Kumar Tripathi, Additional Chief Standing Counsel, appeared for the respondents.

Background

According to the petition, petitioner no.1 was a 20-year-old woman belonging to the Muslim community, while petitioner no.2 was a 19-year-old male belonging to a Scheduled Caste Hindu family. The petitioners stated that they were residing together in a live-in relationship.

The petitioners alleged that the father of petitioner no.1 was threatening them and pressuring them to sever the relationship, though the parents of petitioner no.2 allegedly had no objection to the arrangement.

Before the High Court, the petitioners contended that they could not presently solemnise marriage under the Special Marriage Act, 1954, since petitioner no.2 had not completed twenty-one years of age. It was argued that being majors, they nevertheless possessed the right to reside together in a live-in relationship.

The State opposed the petition relying upon the provisions of the Special Marriage Act, 1954, the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 and the Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006. It was argued that the statutory framework treated a male below twenty-one years as lacking legal capacity to enter into marriage and that courts ought not indirectly permit a marriage-like arrangement under the guise of a live-in relationship.

Court’s Observation

The High Court first examined the legislative scheme governing marriage under the Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006, the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 and the Special Marriage Act, 1954.

Referring to Section 2(a) of the Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006, the Court observed that a male who has not completed twenty-one years of age is statutorily treated as a “child” for purposes of marriage.

The Court noted that the 2006 Act establishes a comprehensive preventive and enforcement framework, including penal consequences under Section 11 and preventive injunction powers under Section 13. The Bench observed: “The statute is, in substance, a complete code for prevention and intervention in this field.”

The Court further observed that Parliament consciously imposed a higher age threshold for marriage than for attainment of majority, reflecting legislative judgment that marriage requires a greater degree of maturity and readiness.

Examining Section 4 of the Special Marriage Act, 1954 and Section 5 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, the Court observed that both enactments uniformly prescribe twenty-one years as the minimum age for a male to lawfully marry.

The Bench further observed that the petitioners themselves admitted that they had adopted a live-in relationship precisely because the law presently prevented them from entering into a valid marriage.

The Court held: “If such a relationship is consciously adopted because the law withholds the right to marry until a later age, then a court order protecting its continuance does not remain a bare protection order. It begins to operate as an indirect sanction for a presently impermissible marriage-like arrangement.”

Applying the doctrine that what cannot be done directly cannot be permitted indirectly, the Court held that writ jurisdiction cannot be used to circumvent the statutory restrictions governing marital capacity.

The Court further observed: “A relationship cannot be permitted merely because it is described as consensual, when the law itself treats one of the parties as lacking the capacity to enter into such a union.”

The Bench also examined the implications of Section 3 of the Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006, noting that the statute preserves to the child party the option to later repudiate the marriage. The Court observed that recognising such relationships could expose the adult female partner to “serious legal and social insecurity.”

On the issue of parental intervention, the Court clarified that while parents and guardians cannot resort to threats, violence, coercion or illegal confinement, they equally cannot be restrained from taking lawful steps under the statutory framework.

The Court observed: “Where the statute itself places responsibility upon parents and guardians to prevent child marriage, the Court cannot pass an order which, in effect, restrains them from taking lawful steps in discharge of that duty.”

The High Court then examined the precedents relied upon by the petitioners, including Nandakumar v. State of Kerala (2018), Lata Singh v. State of U.P. (2006), Shafin Jahan v. Asokan K.M. (2018), Indra Sarma v. V.K.V. Sarma (2013) and S. Khushboo v. Kanniammal (2010).

Distinguishing those decisions, the Court held that none of them dealt with a situation where one party was statutorily treated as a child for purposes of marriage. The Bench observed that Article 21 autonomy cannot be extended “into a power to bypass legislative age thresholds.”

The Court instead relied upon Independent Thought v. Union of India (2017), observing that child-protective statutes must be interpreted in a manner advancing their object and reinforcing statutory safeguards.

Conclusion

The Allahabad High Court held that writ jurisdiction cannot be exercised to grant protection to a live-in relationship in a manner that legitimises or facilitates a marriage-like arrangement presently impermissible under the statutory framework governing capacity to marry.

At the same time, the Court clarified that individuals remain entitled to protection against unlawful acts such as violence, coercion, illegal detention or abduction and may approach police authorities with specific complaints in that regard.

Holding that the allegations in the writ petition were vague and unsupported by particulars and that no case for issuance of general protective directions was made out, the Court dismissed the writ petition.

Cause Title: SP & Anr. v. State of U.P. & Ors. (Neutral Citation: 2025:AHC:100410)

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