Prohibition Of Child Marriage Act & POCSO Act Apply To All Citizens Irrespective Of Religion: Allahabad High Court
The Bench noted that personal law permitting marriage upon puberty cannot wipe out statutory bans enacted for public health.
The Allahabad High Court has held that the Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006 (PCMA) and the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO Act) apply universally to every citizen of India, irrespective of religion. The Court clarified that no personal law can wipe out the statutory prohibitions against child marriage or insulate individuals from the penal consequences of acts that inherently violate children's rights and public policy.
The Bench noted that under Shariat law, a Muslim girl who has attained puberty is competent to marry, firmly establishing that later, all-encompassing central welfare legislations prevail over exceptions carved out in older statutes. The Court said that since carnal relations are inseparable from the institution of marriage, permitting the marriage of a person below 18 years would amount to an acknowledged violation of the POCSO Act, which categorically criminalizes sexual intercourse with a minor.
The question that the Bench had to adjudicate upon was, whether a minor who is married under the Muslim Law, would be governed by the provisions of the Personal Law or the POCSO Act and the PCMA.
A Division Bench of Justice J.J. Munir and Justice Achal Sachdev observed, “…no personal law can wipe out the prohibition of child marriage brought about by the PCMA, and the effect of the POCSO Act, which renders sexual intercourse with a child, that is a person below 18 years, a crime under that statute. The age of marriage, in our considered opinion, for every citizen of the country, irrespective of religion, is that, that is spelt out by the PCMA…”.
“…Also, it is equally true that if the marriage of a person below 18 years were permitted, carnal relations being inseparable almost form the institution of marriage, it would be an acknowledged violation of the POCSO Act. The PCMA and the POCSO Act are statutes that are based on public health and national policy in this regard. They have a scientific understanding to them, legislatively translated into prohibitory statutes and there can be no escape from it for anyone”.
Advocate Pooja appeared for the petitioners and Ghanshyam Kumar, Additional Government Advocate-I, and Shashi Shekhar Tiwari, Additional Government Advocate appeared for the respondents.
The dispute arose after police and the Child Line Team, Bulandshahr, on February 15, 2026, intervened to prevent the child marriage of a 16-year-old girl in Village Sunpeda Baksuwa. When officials attempted to rescue the minor for production before the Child Welfare Committee, they were allegedly assaulted and obstructed by 19 named persons and around 50 others, who briefly snatched the girl from official custody.
An FIR was thereafter registered at Police Station Kakor under various provisions of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, including offences relating to obstruction of public servants.
Seeking to quash the criminal proceedings, the nineteen accused approached the High Court. The petitioners' counsel argued that under Muslim Personal Law, a girl who has attained the age of 15 is legally competent to marry, and that such personal laws are protected by non-obstante clauses in the Majority Act, 1875, and the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1937.
Conversely, the state's law officers strongly opposed the petition, defending the statutory duty exercised by the rescue teams.
Dismissing the petition, the High Court observed that the statutory age of marriage applies uniformly across communities, noting that the PCMA and POCSO Act are modern, all-encompassing social safety statutes that override any contrary personal law provisions.
“…We have already expressed it and we say it again in tune with the line of authority that has held likewise, and that is that the Shariat Law providing for puberty as the competent age under the law permissible for a girl to marry or be married, runs clearly in the teeth of the PCMA as well as the POCSO Act”, the Bench said.
The Court determined that the allegations prima facie established a case of criminal obstruction and assault on public servants acting bona fide in the discharge of their legal duties. It held that interdicting a thorough investigation at an incipient stage would be improper, as the specific involvement of the accused is a matter to be tested during the trial.
Accordingly, the Court dismissed the writ petition and vacated the interim stay order dated April 6, 2026.
Cause Title: R and others v. State of U.P. and others (Neutral Citation:2026:AHC:130283-DB)
Appearances:
Petitioners: Pooja, Advocate.
Respondents: Ghanshyam Kumar, Additional Government Advocate-I, and Shashi Shekhar Tiwari, Additional Government Advocate.