The Allahabad High Court has held that dissatisfaction with the outcome or manner of an investigation does not by itself constitute wilful neglect of duty by a public servant under Section 4 of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989.

Holding that the provision requires wilful neglect of a specific duty imposed by the SC/ST Act or the Rules, the High Court dismissed an appeal seeking criminal proceedings against seven public servants over allegations concerning the registration and investigation of a criminal case and their subsequent handling of complaints and representations.

The Court was hearing an appeal under Section 14-A(1) of the SC/ST Act challenging a Special Court order rejecting an application seeking cognizance and criminal proceedings against the public servants for alleged wilful neglect of duty.

A Bench of Justice Santosh Rai observed: “The essential ingredient is ‘wilful neglect of a duty specifically cast by the Act or the Rules’. Dissatisfaction with the outcome of an investigation, a difference of view on how it should have been conducted, or an administrative lapse in responding to representations does not by itself attract Section 4.”

Referring to the appellant’s principal grievance, the Court added: “The appellant's real complaint is that the investigation was one-sided, that persons she names as the actual culprits were not arrested or charge-sheeted, and that provisions of the Act were not added. These grievances relate to the quality and direction of the investigation. Such grievances are not remediable by a prosecution under Section 4.”

Advocate Ganesh Kumar appeared for the appellant. Additional Government Advocate Purushottam Maurya appeared for the State.

Background

The appellant, an illiterate widow belonging to a Scheduled Caste, alleged that the police failed to act on her complaint concerning the disappearance of her minor daughter. After the daughter was recovered, allegations of sexual assault and pregnancy emerged.

The appellant alleged that the police failed to register a case on her complaint, did not invoke the SC/ST Act, conducted a one-sided investigation and attempted to protect the persons she considered responsible. She further alleged that the officers dealing with her subsequent representations, complaints and information requests had wilfully neglected their duties.

The public servants opposed the application and produced the FIR and other records. They contended that an FIR had been registered on the appellant’s own written report, the matter had been investigated and a charge sheet had been filed.

The Special Court rejected the application after finding that the FIR had been registered, witness statements were taken, the place of occurrence was inspected and a charge sheet was submitted. The appellant challenged that decision before the High Court.

Court’s Observations

Section 4 Requires Wilful Neglect Of A Specific Duty

The Court stated that Section 4 applies to a public servant who is not a member of a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe and who wilfully neglects a duty imposed by the Act or the Rules.

The Bench clarified that although the duties enumerated in Section 4(2) are illustrative rather than exhaustive, the prosecution must still identify a statutory or regulatory duty, the public servant responsible for performing it and a deliberate omission attributable to conscious disregard.

The Court explained: “For the purposes of Section 4, the prosecution must, at the threshold, disclose: (i) the existence of a specific statutory or regulatory duty cast upon the public servant; (ii) the public servant’s knowledge of, and responsibility for, performing that duty; (iii) a specific omission or failure to perform it; (iv) that the omission was wilful, deliberate, or attributable to conscious disregard of the duty, rather than to a bona fide error, lack of jurisdiction, inadvertence, or a disputed exercise of official judgment; and (v) where required by the proviso to Section 4(2), the requisite recommendation for an administrative enquiry. The FIR and charge-sheet must therefore be examined against these statutory requirements, and not treated as substitutes for proof of them.”

Registration Of FIR Discharged The Primary Duty

The Court found that the appellant’s assertion that no FIR had been registered was contradicted by the certified record. It noted that an FIR had been registered on her own written report within about two days of her daughter’s disappearance.

The Court further found that the subsequent application on which the appellant sought another FIR concerned the same incident and was filed more than five weeks after the first FIR.

The Court observed: “The application dated 15.03.2020 post-dates the FIR by more than five weeks and concerns the same incident. Where an FIR has been registered on a cognizable offence, no second FIR can be registered on the same incident; further information is to be dealt with in the course of the same investigation. The duty to register an FIR on information disclosing a cognizable offence, had thus already been discharged. The non-registration of a separate FIR on the later application cannot be treated as wilful neglect.”

The Court clarified that the dispute concerning the daughter’s age was for the trial court to determine on evidence and that its judgment should not be treated as expressing an opinion on that question.

Disputed Investigative Choices Do Not Constitute Wilful Neglect

The Court noted that the investigation included statements of the informant, the victim and other witnesses, inspection of the place of occurrence and submission of a charge sheet. It found no material showing that the charge sheet was filed beyond the statutory period without reasons or that any specific duty was deliberately neglected.

The Bench held that complaints concerning the persons arrested or charge-sheeted, the direction of the investigation and the alleged failure to invoke particular penal provisions related to investigative judgment. Such complaints did not, without more, establish an offence under Section 4.

The Court stated: “Whether the provisions of the Act were attracted against the persons the appellant names depends on whether the offences were committed on the ground that the victim belongs to a Scheduled Caste, which is a matter of evidence. A failure to apply particular sections after an FIR has been registered and investigated is, at most, a matter of investigation and trial. It is not wilful neglect of a duty specified in Section 4(2).”

The Court added that an informant dissatisfied with an investigation could approach the competent court for appropriate further steps. It also stated that the trial court could summon additional persons if the evidence produced during trial disclosed their involvement.

Administrative Complaints Did Not Establish An Offence

The Court held that complaints concerning subsequent departmental inquiries, disposal of representations, responses to the National Commission for Scheduled Castes and replies to information requests were, at their highest, allegations of administrative inaction or dissatisfaction with the reasons supplied.

The Bench stated that Section 4 is a penal provision and must be strictly construed. General allegations of casteist bias, collusion or abuse of power, unsupported by specific facts or material, could not establish wilful neglect of a statutory duty.

The Court further held that forwarding a charge sheet which the appellant considered defective did not constitute wilful neglect, particularly when the charge sheet had been accepted and the trial was underway. Alleged breaches of departmental instructions or the Police Act were matters for the departmental or administrative authorities.

Administrative Inquiry And Recommendation Are Mandatory

The Court noted that the proviso to Section 4(2) requires a recommendation based on an administrative inquiry before penal proceedings may be initiated against a public servant. It held that this was not a mere formality but a safeguard against converting every allegation of official inaction into criminal prosecution.

The Court relied on State of GNCT of Delhi v. Praveen Kumar alias Prashant (2024), in which the Supreme Court held: “Interpreting the proviso to sub-section (2) of section 4, on the principles noted above, we notice that the proviso has an important role to play and in the scheme of proceedings under section 4 of the Act of 1989, acts as a condition precedent. Therefore, the commission or omission of any of the duties by the public servant becomes a cognizable offence against the public servant only on the recommendation of the administrative enquiry, for in law, an offence means any act or omission made punishable by any law for the time being in force. A combined reading of sub-sections (1), (2) and (3) of section 4, would demonstrate that the commission or omission by a public servant has penal consequences and the willful neglect is recommended by an administrative enquiry and the cognizance can be taken thereafter.”

The Court held that the inquiry must determine whether the alleged act or omission amounted to wilful neglect rather than a bona fide act, error of judgment or procedural lapse. It added that the Special Court’s power under Section 4(3) incorporates the safeguard contained in the proviso to Section 4(2).

Application Disclosed No Prima Facie Case

The Court found that the appellant had not identified the specific statutory duty allegedly neglected by each public servant. The material also did not establish that a particular duty was entrusted to the concerned official, that a definite omission occurred or that any lapse was deliberate.

The Court concluded: “The application before the Special Court, therefore fails to disclose a prima facie case under Section 4 of the Act. It does not identify the duty allegedly neglected, establish that the duty was entrusted to the public servant concerned, specify the act or omission constituting the breach, or furnish material from which wilfulness can reasonably be inferred. Nor does it demonstrate compliance with the statutory requirement of an administrative recommendation. The provision cannot be invoked merely because the complainant is dissatisfied with official action or because an FIR and charge-sheet exist in a related criminal case. Where the essential statutory ingredients are absent, continuation of the proceedings would expose the public servant to criminal process without the factual foundation required by law and would amount to an abuse of the process of the Court. The application was, therefore, rightly rejected by the learned Special Judge, SC/ST Act, Ghaziabad.”

Conclusion

The Court found no illegality, perversity or jurisdictional error in the Special Court’s rejection of the application under Section 4 of the SC/ST Act. It dismissed the appeal and affirmed the impugned order.

The Court also directed the Registrar (Compliance) to serve a copy of its order on the concerned court through the District and Sessions Judge within 48 hours by fax or email.

Cause Title: G v. State of U.P. and 7 Others (Neutral Citation: 2026:AHC:214606)

Click here to read/download Judgment